01VATICAN3507 2001-07-03 12:12 2010-12-10 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Vatican
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
Tuesday, 03 July 2001, 12:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH
HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO
NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
EO 12958 DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS PREL, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, VT, VTPREL, VTPREL, VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
REF: 00 ROME 0988
¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA JOSEPH MERANTE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
---------------------------
¶2. (U) THIS CABLE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE PLANNED PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH THE POPE. IT UPDATES REFTEL, OUTLINING ASPECTS OF THE USG- HOLY SEE RELATIONSHIP THAT WE BELIEVE WILL REQUIRE U.S. ATTENTION IN THE NEAR AND MIDTERM. THE MIDDLE EAST WILL FEATURE PROMINENTLY. IN ASIA, VATICAN PRIORITIES WILL REMAIN FOCUSED ON CHINA, TAIWAN, VIETNAM AND INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR. THE VATICAN IS INVOLVED IN MEDIATING AFRICA’S GREAT LAKES CONFLICT, WHILE CUBA LOOMS LARGE AMONG VATICAN INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS CABLE IDENTIFIES AREAS IN WHICH THE U.S. AND THE VATICAN SHARE INTERESTS, AND AREAS IN WHICH THERE ARE POLICY DIFFERENCES.
¶3. (U) BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE HOLY SEE IS A SUPRANATIONAL ENTITY THAT HAS ITS CAPITAL AND TERRITORIAL MANIFESTATION IN THE STATE OF VATICAN CITY. THE UNITED STATES BASED ITS 1984 RECOGNITION OF THE HOLY SEE IN PART ON THE FACT THAT THE HOLY SEE EXERCISES SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE 109 ACRES OF THE VATICAN CITY STATE. HOWEER ALL AMBASSADORS TO THE HOLY SEE, INCLUDING THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, ARE ACCREDITED TO THE HOLY SEE AN NOT/NOT TO THE STATE OF VATICAN CITY. THE VATIAN INSISTS ON THIS POINT TO REMIND THAT ITS REAC AND INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY IS GLOBAL. FOR PRPOSES OF THIS CABLE, THE TERMS HOLY SEE AND VATICAN WILL BE USED INTERCHANGEABLY. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z
¶4. (U) BACKGOUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE HOLY SEE ISONE OF THE OLDEST CONTINUALLY EXISTING INTERNATINAL ENTITIES. IT EXERCISED TEMPORAL CONTROL OF TE ITAIAN PENINSULA DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, BUT WAS COMPLETELY BEREFT OF TERRITORY BETWEEN 1870 AND 1929. NEVERTHELESS, EVEN DURING THIS PERIOD, MOST NATIONS CONTINUED TO RECOGNIZE THE IT AS AN INTERNATIONAL ENTITY AND MAINTAINED FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
¶5. (U) BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE VATICAN IS ONE OF VERY FEW SOVEREIGN ENTITIES THAT HAVE PRESENCE AND REACH IN VIRTUALLY EVERY COUNTRY OF THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH ITS SOVEREIGNTY IS OVER LIMITED TERRITORY, VATICAN TEACHING AND POLICIES CAN INFLUENCE THE OVER ONE BILLION ADHERENTS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. END BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION.
DEVELOPING POLICY TOWARD THE HOLY SEE
-------------------------------------
¶6. (C) IN DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS THIS UNIQUE ENTITY, POLICYMAKERS SHOULD THINK OF THE HOLY SEE AS SIMILAR TO A TRADITIONAL NATION-STATE, WITH A VARIETY OF FACTORS INFORMING ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING INCLUDE:
-- RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES/HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS: THE VATICAN STRIVES TO TRANSLATE ITS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ITS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS INTO CONCRETE POLICIES. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES INCLUDE: SUPPORT FOR THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT AND DEBT RELIEF FOR POORER COUNTRIES, OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, OPPOSITION TO ABORTION AND CONTRACEPTION, AND OPPOSITION (ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS) TO EMBARGOES;
-- “NATIONAL” SELF-INTEREST: THE HOLY SEE SEEKS TO PROTECT CATHOLICS AROUND THE WORLD, ITS OWN POSITION OF INFLUENCE, AND ITS VAST WEALTH. THE VATICAN’S SUPPORT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN RESULTS FROM ITS DESIRE TO PROTECT 600,000 IRAQI CATHOLICS FROM ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM; ITS REFUSAL TO PUBLICLY CRITICIZE CROAT NATIONALIST CLERGY IN BOSNIA STEMS IN PART FROM THE CROAT CHURCH’S STAUNCH DEFENSE OF THE FAITH DURING THE COLD WAR;
-- HISTORY/TRADITION: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND OTHER LATIN COUNTRIES GO BACK OVER 500 YEARS. THE VATICAN’S HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THESE COUNTRIES FREQUENTLY DEMANDS AN ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY ROLE;
-- PROSELYTISM: THE VATICAN KNOWS THAT IT MUST
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8384
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /002W ------------------00B3A7 031716Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
CONTINUALLY REFRESH ITS MESSAGE FOR CHANGING TIMES. VATICAN II IN THE 1960S WAS AN EXAMPLE. INTERFAITH AND ECUMENICAL OUTREACH IS AN IMPORTANT FOCUS OF THE CURRENT PAPACY, AND PROSELYTISM/POPULATION GROWTH IN THE THIRD CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z WORLD ACCOUNTS FOR MUCH OF THE GROWTH OF THE CHURCH IN RECENT YEARS.
¶7. (C) PAPAL HEALTH/SUCCESSION AND WHAT IT MIGHT MEAN FOR U.S. POLICY: POPE JOHN PAUL II IS SURELY THE MOST WIDELY RECOGNIZED WORLD LEADER. ALONG WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, HE ENJOYS THE HIGHEST STATURE AND PROFILE AMONG WORLD LEADERS. IN EARLY 2000, PRESS MISREPRESENTATION OF A GERMAN BISHOP’S REMARKS IN THE POPE JOHN PAUL II’S ABILITY TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE, SPARKED A SERIES OF SPECULATIONS AROUND THE WORLD ABOUT SUCCESSION. THE POPE AND THE VATICAN STRONGLY DENIED THAT HIS CONDITION WAS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT ABDICATION. THERE IS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT THE POPE WOULD IN FACT RESIGN EVEN IF HIS HEALTH WERE TO DECLINE PRECIPITOUSLY. THE LIST OF CARDINALS WIDELY PERCEIVED AS POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY AMERICANS, AND ONLY ONE ANGLOPHONE. AN ELECTION OF A EUROPEAN CARDINAL (MOST LIKELY AN ITALIAN) WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN ONLY MINOR CHANGES IN VATICAN POLICY AND ITS CURRENT STANCE ON ISSUES VIS A VIS THE UNITED STATES. IF THE NEXT POPE IS FROM LATIN AMERICA, ASIA, OR AFRICA, WE SHOULD EXPECT THE VATICAN TO TAKE POSITIONS FURTHER TO THE “LEFT OF CURRENT U.S. POSITIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT FURTHER “RIGHT” ON SOCIAL ISSUES.
MIDDLE EAST
-----------
¶8. (C) MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS (MEPP): THE HOLY SEE DENIES WANTING TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z ASPECTS OF THE MEPP, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS KEENLY INTERESTED IN WHAT IT TERMS THE “CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS” ASPECTS OF THE HOLY SITES IN THE REGION (SPECIFICALLY JERUSALEM). THE VATICAN MAINTAINS THAT ITS CONCERNS HAVE BEEN LARGELY IGNORED BY THE USG AND THE ISRAELIS, AND IN 1999 WORKED WITH THE FRENCH AND SEVERAL OTHER EU COUNTRIES IN THE “JERUSALEM WORKING GROUP” (JWG -- SINCE INACTIVE).
¶9. (C) THE VATICAN WAS CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED WHEN THE USG AND GOI DECLINED TO ASSOCIATE WITH THE JWG INITIATIVE. THE GOI’S DECISION TO ALLOW CONSTRUCTION OF THE NAZARETH MOSQUE CREATED ALARM (AND IN SOME CASES, RESENTMENT) AT THE VATICAN. THE GOI FOR ITS PART WAS CONCERNED THAT THE POPE LEFT UNANSWERED BASHIR ASSAD’S ANTI-SEMITIC INVECTIVE DURING THE POPE’S MAY 2001 SYRIA VISIT. WE CAN EXPECT CONTINUED TENSION IN THESE AREAS. THE HOLY SEE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE MEPP, WHILE DENYING THIS INTENTION. EMBASSY VATICAN CONTINUES TO RECOMMEND A HIGH LEVEL VISIT TO ENCOURAGE THE VATICAN TO PLAY A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE, OR AT LEAST LESS UNHELPFUL, ROLE IN THE PROCESS.
ASIA
----
¶10. (C) THE VATICAN AND THE U.S. SHARE INTERESTS IN MANY OF THE SAME COUNTRIES (E.G. INDONESIA, CHINA, TAIWAN, VIETNAM), BUT NOT ALWAYS FOR THE SAME REASONS. IN ADDITION TO THE FORMAL CHURCH NETWORK NUMEROUS, OFTEN SEMI-AUTONOMOUS, CATHOLIC MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z OPERATING THROUGHOUT ASIA HAVE A SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THEIR AREA. CONTACT WITH THESE MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDES UNIQUE INSIGHTS INTO CONDITIONS IN THESE COUNTRIES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH IN ASIA IS AN EXPRESS GOAL OF THE CHURCH. THE VATICAN AND ITS CONSTITUENT EPISCOPATES ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DIALOGUES WITH POLITICALLY POWERFUL MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX FAITHS. THE RESULTS OF THESE DIALOGUES WILL IMPACT PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, STABILITY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.
¶11. (C) CHINA: WITH ITS OWN NETWORK OF CONTACTS AMONG CHINA’S UNDERGROUND AND PATRIOTIC CHURCHES, THE HOLY SEE HAS EXCELLENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING DISSIDENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION. THERE IS A CONSTANT CONTROVERSY AROUND THE EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS ISSUE INVOLVES THE VATICAN’S RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE. BEIJING’S REGULATION AND OFTEN OPPRESSION OF THE CATHOLIC
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8394
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------00B442 031721Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
CHURCH IS PARALLEL TO AND THEREFORE A WINDOW ON PROBLEMS IN CHINA WITH U.S.-BASED PROTESTANT CHURCHES AS WELL AS ISLAM AND BUDDHISM. THE CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH AND THE REPORTING SYSTEM WITH THE NUNCIOS AND CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z BISHOPS, NOT TO MENTION INDEPENDENT MISSIONARY GROUPS, GIVES EMBASSY VATICAN A UNIQUE VIEW OF EVENTS INSIDE CHINA.
¶12. (C) VIETNAM: UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE VATICAN ON ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE GOV’S ATTEMPT TO CONTROL RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IS ONE OF THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCKS FROM A VATICAN PERSPECTIVE. THE VATICAN’S ATTEMPTS TO APPOINT BISHOPS WITH MINIMAL GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE AND THE REPORTING PROVIDED BY ITS NUNCIO ON THESE EFFORTS CAN BE USED AS A GAUGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ISSUES IN VIETNAM.
¶13. (C) INDIA: INDIA HAS SEEN SIGNIFICANT SECTARIAN VIOLENCE OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, AS MUCH AGAINST MUSLIMS AS CHRISTIANS. RESOLUTION OF THIS VIOLENCE IS A KEY TO DEMOCRACY, STABILITY AND THE GUARANTEE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE VATICAN, LOCAL BISHOPS WHO REPORT TO THE VATICAN, AND VARIOUS MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS WILL ALL CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE OBSERVERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND DEVELOPMENTS.
¶14. (C) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR IS POISED TO BECOME THE SECOND CATHOLIC COUNTRY IN ASIA (THE OTHER IS THE PHILIPPINES). THE VATICAN, THROUGH ITS BISHOPS, HAS BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS FOR YEARS. THE VATICAN IS INVOLVED IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN EAST TIMOR. IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA WRACKED BY SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, THE CATHOLIC PRESENCE IS LESS PRONOUNCED, BUT CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION. CATHOLIC PRELATES HAVE ALSO ACTED AS CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z MEDIATORS BETWEEN OTHER CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES AND MUSLIM GROUPS. VISITS OF THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRESIDENT TO THE VATICAN UNDERSCORE THE INFLUENCE THE VATICAN HAS ON A COUNTRY OF SIGNIFICANT POLICY INTEREST TO THE USG.
¶15. (C) NORTH KOREA: VATICAN OFFICIALS, AND CATHOLIC RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS PERIODICALLY VISIT NORTH KOREA. WE LEARN FROM THEIR VISITS AND WE CAN GIVE SUGGESTIONS TO OUR CONTACTS FOR POINTS TO RAISE WITH NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS.
AFRICA
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¶16. (C) GREAT LAKES: VATICAN CONTACTS ADMIT PRIVATELY THAT CHURCH RELATIONS WITH LATE DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT KABILA BEGAN ON THE WRONG FOOT BECAUSE OF KABILA’S MINDSET AND THE CHURCH’S PREVIOUS ASSOCIATION WITH THE MOBUTU REGIME. REAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND RELIGIOUS (EVANGELIZATION) CONSIDERATIONS PUT AFRICA ON THE SCREEN AT THE VATICAN. THE VATICAN AFFILIATED SANT’EGIDIO COMMUNITY PLAYS AN IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO MEDIATE THE CRISIS, KEEPING THE VATICAN INFORMED OF THEIR EFFORTS.
LATIN AMERICA
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¶17. (C) CUBA: THE POPE’S 1998 VISIT TO CUBA HAS NOT BROUGHT THE KIND OF PROGRESS ON CHURCH FREEDOM SOUGHT BY CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z THE POPE. THAT SAID, VATICAN-GOC DIALOGUE HAS CONTINUED WITH FOLLOW-UP VISITS TO CUBA BY SENIOR VATICAN OFFICIALS -- AND TO THE VATICAN BY CUBAN COUNTERPARTS. AMONG THE TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: THE GOC’S TREATMENT OF THE CUBAN CHURCH, THE STATUS OF DISSIDENTS, AND THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. EMBARGO, ABOUT WHICH THE HOLY SEE SHARES CASTRO’S CRITICISM. THE VATICAN IS QUIETLY LOOKING AHEAD TO THE DAY WHEN FIDEL CASTRO DEPARTS THE SCENE. IT IS CONCERNED HOWEVER, THAT HIS REPLACEMENT CAN ACTUALLY BE WORSE.
EUROPE
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¶18. (C) THE VATICAN WOULD LIKE TO SEE A UNIFIED, CHRISTIAN (IE. CATHOLIC) EUROPE. AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY ITS DIALOG WITH THE LEADING PROTESTANT GROUPS IN GERMANY AND SCANDINAVIA. THE VATICAN WILL ALSO CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH IN ISTANBUL IN AN ATTEMPT TO HEAL THE LATIN/ORTHODOX RIFT. VATICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKANS CAN BE USEFUL TO U.S. POLICY IF IT IS DIRECTED AT PROMOTING CATHOLIC/ORTHODOX
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8397
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------00B486 031723Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
COEXISTENCE. CONTINUED VATICAN CRITICISM OF “U.S. MATERIALISM AND COMMERCIALISM” COULD BE USED BY MANY IN EUROPE TO SUPPORT ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LIMITING U.S. INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z
¶19. (C) AREAS IN WHICH WE CAN WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE VATICAN DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS:
-- ETHNIC RECONCILIATION AND CIVIL CULTURE - IN JUNE, PD/ECA DAS BRIAN SEXTON MET WITH VATICAN AND SANT’EGIDIO OFFICIALS DURING A PD/ECA SPONSORED INTER-RELIGIOUS CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. EMBASSY VATICAN, WITH DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE, IS SEEKING TO DEVELOP FOLLOW-UP PROJECTS;
-- ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS -- POST HAS DEVELOPED TWO PROJECTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH CARITAS (THE VATICAN RELIEF NGO) AND WITH THE ARCHBISHOP OF PESCARA. THESE PROJECTS WILL OFFER EDUCATION, RESCUE, REHABILITATION, AND REPATRIATION TO VICTIMS AND POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKERS. WORKING WITH THE CURIA AND CARITAS THERE IS MUCH MORE GROUND TO BE COVERED IN THIS AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
-- BIOTECHNOLOGY AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE -- EMBASSY VATICAN HAS SPONSORED TWO DISCUSSIONS OF THIS THEME INVOLVING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS ATTACHED TO THE VATICAN. PROMOTING A MORE POSITIVE VATICAN APPROACH TO APPROPRIATE USE OF GMOS IN THIRD WORLD AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT COULD HELP MAKE GMOS MORE WIDELY ACCEPTED EVEN IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD.
¶20. (C) AREAS IN WHICH WE SHOULD EXPECT CONTINUED DIFFICULTIES DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS:
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z -- THE MIDDLE EAST - THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE U.S. EFFORTS TO ISOLATE SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE VATICAN WILL NOT SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS IN IRAQ, AND INVESTIGATE WAYS TO LIMIT VATICAN INTERFERENCE WITH OUR OBJECTIVES. IN ISRAEL, THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO INSERT ITSELF ON THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM;
-- DEATH PENALTY - THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY. STATEMENTS BY THE POPE ARE LIKELY TO BE USED BY MANY AROUND THE WORLD TO CONDEMN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONSIDER IF IT WANTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE, AND IF SO, WHAT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AVENUES TO USE. MMERANTE
CONFIDENTIAL
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2001VATICA03507 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BRASILIA2352 2006-11-08 18:06 2010-12-08 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO3690
OO RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #2352/01 3121834
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RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3234
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RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 5801
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 3278
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 8539
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002352
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR SOBEL PRESENTS CREDENTIALS TO PRESIDENT LULA, 7 NOVEMBER 2006
Classified By: ACTING DCM DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).
¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Sobel, who arrived in Brazil in August, presented his credentials to President Lula da Silva on 7 November, in a ceremony long delayed by Brazil's election campaign season. The 30-minute meeting with Lula was positive and substantive, with warm atmospherics. Prior to the credential ceremony, Lula,s chief of staff, Gilberto Carvalho, greeted the Ambassador personally, then later arranged for Mrs. Sobel to enter the meeting room for photos with Lula. Through these gestures and Lula,s remarks in the meeting, we received a continuation of the message we have been getting from the GOB since Lula,s re-election -- the GOB wants to refocus on and intensify relations with us. Key points of the meeting follow in para 2. End summary.
¶2. (C) Ambassador Sobel, along with ambassadors from Namibia, Vietnam and Mexico, presented credentials on 7 November at Planalto Palace. (Note: Brazil's foreign ministry (MRE) organizes presentation of ambassadorial credentials into groups of four, based on order of arrival in country. End note.) All of the 7 November group had been waiting several months for the credentials ceremony, owing to repeated delays caused by Brazil's presidential election season, which concluded with Lula's re-election victory on 29 October. Each ambassador met separately with Lula, who determined the length of the conversation. Lula conversed with Ambassador for approximately 30 minutes, and was accompanied by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim and Presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia. Ambassador was accompanied in the meeting by A/DCM and Management Counselor, and later joined by Mrs. Sobel for photos and to observe conclusion of the ceremony with Ambassador's review of the palace guard. Key points of the meeting with Lula follow below:
--Bio-fuels: Lula led with this and stayed with the subject throughout the first part of the conversation with Ambassador. Lula noted he had discussed bio-fuels extensively with President Bush. Lula stressed Brazil,s desire for partnerships with the USG and American firms in this, calling it a transformational technology that could dramatically improve lives throughout the world. Lula noted Brazil is bringing on line a total of 93 distilleries for bio-fuel processing in the next years. Ambassador Sobel confirmed President Bush's keen attention to the issue, and presented Lula with a photo, autographed by President Bush, from the G-8 St. Petersburg ministerial, where Lula presented information on Brazil's bio-fuels program to the President. Ambassador further explained that the USG continues to organize its interagency to address bio-fuels in a comprehensive policy format, and that Under Secretary Josette Sheeran recently had been given the USG lead on bio-fuels and is anxious to visit Brazil this year.
--Visit to U.S.: Lula noted that he spoken recently with President Bush, who asked him to visit the U.S. Lula expressed a desire to visit soon, though he quipped that he worried about the cold in Washington. Ambassador noted that he also had been in touch with the White House on the visit, and made himself available to Lula and his chief of staff to discuss windows of opportunity and venues.
--Strategic relationship: Lula noted that the GOB wants to send a new ambassador to Washington asap. (Note: Current MRE Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota has been presented for agrement vice Ambassador Roberto Abdenur). Lula seemed anxious to convey this as a positive signal. Lula then made a strong and direct declaration: "We intend to take all steps necessary to make clear, beyond any doubt, that the U.S. and Brazil have a strategic relationship." Ambassador welcomed this, and replied that the USG is not concerned with Brazil's "prioritization" of its relations with countries, but rather is focused on "what we can do together." In response, Lula and Amorim simultaneously weighed in to dismiss media speculation that GOB foreign policy priorities remain focused on south-south relations. Lula also noted that he wanted to re-invigorate the working groups established in various areas during his official visit to Washington at the beginning of his first term.
¶3. (C) Comment: The reception at Planalto and the conversation with Lula could not have been more positive. In the days following Lula's re-election, the signals continue to be clear and persistent that the GOB wants to move more our way in the second term. But we will remain in wait and see mode for now, staying attentive to other developments that would indicate whether this charm offensive translates into a meaningful shift in foreign policy for Brazil. SOBEL
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BUENOSAIRES1462 2006-06-29 15:03 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXRO4935
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DE RUEHBU #1462/01 1801546
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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5073
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES 001462
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
NSC FOR DAN FISK
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
USCINCSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: THE K-STYLE OF POLITICS
REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 01090
¶B. BUENOS AIRES 01403
¶C. BUENOS AIRES 02974
¶D. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141
¶E. 05 BUENOS AIRES 02835
¶F. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00115
Classified By: Ambassador Lino Gutierrez for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
------------------------
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
------------------------
¶1. (C) This cable is designed to examine President Nestor
Kirchner's unique operating and decision-making style that
has become known as the "K-Style." Given Kirchner's control
over all aspects of GOA policymaking, knowledge of Kirchner's
motivations and methods in arriving at decisions is essential
to understanding GOA actions.
¶2. (C) President Nestor Kirchner's personalistic, often
erratic operating and decision-making style defines current
Argentine policymaking and is characterized by an overarching
focus on the short-term and politically expedient
accumulation and maintenance of domestic political power.
Kirchner's domestic political style leaves no room for
dissent and utilizes divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken the
political opposition. While utilizing leftist, populist
rhetoric at times, in practice Kirchner has demonstrated that
his ideological leanings are always less important than the
practicalities of domestic politics. Studies show that
Kirchner's psychological profile includes a need to always be
in control, quick and decisive decision making, a constant
struggle against perceived enemies, and a tendency to respond
to challenges by lashing out, rather than negotiation.
Foreign policy in the Kirchner government is always
subservient to domestic political considerations. President
Kirchner is not skilled at international diplomacy and often
ignores basic protocol. Kirchner relies on an ever-shrinking
group of long-time advisors to make key decisions, many of
whom lack international, business and economic expertise.
END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
--------------------------------
THE K-STYLE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS
--------------------------------
¶3. (C) President Nestor Kirchner's personalistic, often
erratic operating and decision-making style defines current
Argentine policymaking and is characterized by an overarching
focus on the short-term and politically expedient
accumulation and maintenance of domestic political power.
Close Kirchner insiders have described Kirchner's
decision-making process to Emboffs as one in which Kirchner
consults with a small number of trusted advisors, generally
one-on-one, and then makes all of the final decisions
himself. The Argentine political system places a great deal
of authority into the hands of the President, and President
Kirchner is a strong president even in the Argentine
historical context. As a result, the "K-Style" defines the
GOA policymaking process and gives the policy process a
short-term focus. As Legal and Technical Secretary Carlos
Zannini, a close Kirchner advisor, told the DCM, "The
President and I get up every morning, look at the morning
papers, and try to figure out how to survive the day."
Another long-time Kirchner associate, former Santa Cruz
Governor Sergio Acevedo told us that Kirchner focuses very
much on day-to-day issues, but always with the long-term
strategic goal of retaining political power. (COMMENT:
Kirchner's focus on retaining political power leads us to
discount speculation that Kirchner will step aside in 2007
and make his wife Cristina the presidential candidate. For
2011, assuming Kirchner's health holds, we would expect him
to either modify the Constitution to allow him to run for a
third term, or to pass the mantel on to his wife. END
COMMENT.)
¶4. (C) Kirchner's domestic political style leaves no room
for dissent and utilizes divide-and-conquer tactics to weaken
BUENOS AIR 00001462 002 OF 005
the political opposition. Kirchner is quick to silence any
opposition to his policies from within his movement, as when
he recently expelled congresswoman Maria del Carmen Alarcon
from the presidency of the Lower House Agricultural Committee
and from Kirchner's Victory Front (FPV) after Alarcon
criticized the GOA beef policy (See Reftel A). Kirchner has
also proven adept at co-opting members of the opposition and
exploiting divisions within opposition parties. Through the
skillful use of his fiscal powers, Kirchner has been able to
draw in the majority of the Radical Civic Union (UCR)
governors, and many UCR mayors (See Septel on deteriorating
provincial finances and Kirchner's use of fiscal power for
political aims). He has also been able to co-opt the
political leadership from the now defunct center-left Frepaso
and most of the Peronists formerly aligned in opposition to
Kirchner with former President Eduardo Duhalde. Kirchner has
exploited divisions within the UCR by heavily courting
Mendoza Governor Julio Cobos, long-time rival of UCR
President Roberto Iglesias, even encouraging rumors that
Cobos may be Kirchner's running mate in 2007. Kirchner also
does not accept criticism from those outside of the political
arena, attacking the press, the Catholic Church and business
leaders that have been publicly critical of the GOA.
¶5. (C) While utilizing leftist, populist rhetoric at times,
in practice Kirchner has demonstrated that his ideological
leanings are always less important than the practicalities of
domestic politics. As Acevedo recently told us, President
Kirchner has no true ideology. For example, the issue of
human rights and his political affiliations in the 1970s were
non-issues in the 20 years of Kirchner's political life as
Mayor of Rio Gallegos and Governor of Santa Cruz province.
Acevedo said Kirchner's recent support for the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo and a renewed focus on human rights crimes
committed under the last dictatorship was driven by his need
to develop a core base of support within the left wing of the
Peronist movement. Kirchner was also a big proponent of the
1990s privatizations at the time they occurred, but has since
vehemently attacked them. This does not mean that Kirchner
does not have left-wing sympathies, but rather that these are
completely subordinate to his personal political interests
and ambition (See Reftel B). Kirchner's left-wing sympathies
have not stopped him from forming alliances of convenience
with center-right Peronist leaders, such as Luis Barrionuevo
of Catamarca, Cordoba Governor Jose Manuel de la Sota, or the
largely conservative Peronist political machine in Buenos
Aires province.
¶6. (C) Kirchner's style of policymaking has become more
pronounced after the October 2005 elections and November 2005
cabinet changes left Kirchner firmly in charge of all aspects
of GOA decision making (See Reftel C). Prior to the October
elections, Kirchner had to consider former President
Duhalde's opinion in making major decisions. Kirchner's
resounding victory in Buenos Aires province in the elections
left him in control of the Peronist Party (PJ) and banished
Duhalde from the center stage of the political scene. Before
Kirchner's November cabinet changes, Kirchner also had to
contend with his independent-minded Minister of the Economy,
Roberto Lavagna, in making economic policy decisions, and
with then-Foreign Minister Rafael Bielsa, who occasionally
exhibited an independent streak. Their replacements, Felisa
Miceli and Jorge Taiana are loyal soldiers who follow
presidential orders. For example, recently Miceli was give a
copy of a communique that had been issued to a news agency by
the Casa Rosada with Miceli's comments criticizing a recent
speech by Lavagna before Miceli had actually spoken. As
leading pollster Roberto Bacman told Poloff, "Never since the
return to democracy (1983) has Argentina had a President that
was also the Minister of the Economy."
---------------------------------------------
KIRCHNER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE SETS K-STYLE
---------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) According to recent studies, Kirchner's psychological
profile includes a need to always be in control, quick and
decisive decision making, and a constant struggle against
perceived enemies. Kirchner does not delegate policymaking,
BUENOS AIR 00001462 003 OF 005
making all of the important decisions himself. Kirchner only
consults with a narrow group of long-time advisors, who are
part of Kirchner's inner circle primarily because of their
loyalty, not their technical abilities (See Reftel D). He
often does not even consult or give warning to top GOA
officials before making major policy statements in their
respective areas of responsibility. According to Central
Bank officials, for example, Central Bank President Martin
Redrado found out that the GOA was going to use nearly 10 USD
billion in Central Bank reserves to pay off the IMF when
Kirchner publicly announced it. Casa Rosada insiders have
described Kirchner as prone to making quick, sometimes even
rash decisions. For example, Kirchner reportedly made a snap
decision to institute a six-month ban on beef exports after
learning that the price of beef had risen a significant
amount the previous day in the country's most important beef
market. Kirchner has lashed out at has perceived enemies,
both domestic and foreign, throughout his presidency.
Kirchner's targets have included the IMF, the U.S., the
media, the Catholic Church, the Argentine military, the
foreign and domestic business community, supermarkets,
foreign gas stations, anything that happened in the 1990s,
former Presidents Carlos Menem, Fernando de la Rua and
Eduardo Duhalde. Kirchner often targets unpopular groups or
individuals as a means to increase his own public approval
ratings.
¶8. (C) When confronted with a problem, Kirchner's first
instinct is to go on the offensive, rather than negotiate,
upping the ante if his initial efforts fail to win the
desired result. When Kirchner faced resistance from the
business and agricultural sector on his efforts to control
inflation earlier in the year, Kirchner instituted a ban on
the export of beef and appointed the unorthodox Peronist
economist Guillermo Moreno to run the GOA's anti-inflation
efforts through bullying and threatening individual producers
to lower their prices. When Uruguayan President Tabare
Vazquez did not respond well to Kirchner's insistence that
Uruguay halt the construction of two paper plants on the
Argentine border to conduct additional environmental studies,
Kirchner's rhetoric encouraged the residents of the affected
province to step up their blockade of the bridges connecting
the two countries, resulting in millions of dollars of lost
trade and tourism income for Uruguay. Faced with rising gas
prices in early 2005, Kirchner called for a national boycott
of Shell Oil and sent thousands of piqueteros to blockade
Shell Oil gas stations until they agreed to lower their
prices.
¶9. (C) Kirchner has a reputation for taking slights or any
perceived lack of respect from others personally, but is also
known for quick changes in temperament. Acevedo told the DCM
that once then-Governor Kirchner became enraged with his
Deputy Energy Minister for making a statement regarding Santa
Cruz energy policy he did not personally approve. Kirchner
called the Deputy Minister into his office and proceeded to
scream at him at the top of his lungs, ultimately effectively
throwing him out of his office physically. Everyone in the
provincial government leadership expected the Deputy Minister
to be fired. Kirchner did not speak to him for two weeks,
until he unexpectedly called him asking for some trout for a
dinner that Kirchner was hosting. Acevedo said this
individual had a reputation for knowing where to get the best
trout in Rio Gallegos. The Deputy Minister complied with the
request, and two days later Kirchner invited him for coffee.
Kirchner greeted him warmly, thanked him for the trout, and
proceeded to chat with him for a long period, as if the
previous incident had never happened, to the shock of
everyone else present, including the Deputy Minister. In the
end, the Deputy Minister was not fired, and Kirchner did not
raise the issue again.
¶10. (C) Kirchner's health condition exacerbates, and perhaps
helps define, Kirchner's emotions and psychology. President
Kirchner has reportedly suffered from irritable bowel
syndrome for many years. According to the American Medical
Association, the psychological effects of this condition
leads those who suffer from it to be "often rigid, methodical
persons who are conscientious, with obsessive-compulsive
BUENOS AIR 00001462 004 OF 005
tendencies." Kirchner also reportedly works himself to
exhaustion and needs to take frequent vacations to recover.
The AMA further states "Psychologic and social stresses are
often present in patients with irritable bowel syndrome, and
may be related in a temporal sense to the exacerbation of
symptoms." This may account for Kirchner's lack of attention
to protocol that involves long ceremonies or tight schedules,
where Kirchner would not have quick access to a bathroom.
-----------------------------------
FOREIGN POLICY NOT KIRCHNER'S FOCUS
-----------------------------------
¶11. (C) Foreign policy in the Kirchner government is always
subservient to domestic political considerations. Kirchner,
at least initially, took a hard line on the paper mills
dispute with Uruguay -- despite the damage to Mercosur and
regional relations -- because of the strong Argentine public
concern about the paper mills, particularly in
ruling-party-run Entre Rios province that is on the opposite
side of the river from the plants. Kirchner's explicit and
harsh criticism of the U.S. during his speech during the
Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata can only be
understood in the context of dismal public perceptions of the
U.S. and Kirchner's desire to appeal to his leftist political
base (See Reftel E). Kirchner's hardball tactics during
negotiations over Argentina's private sector debt and his
criticism of foreign companies that run major enterprises
that were privatized in the 1990s do not earn him any support
from foreign investors, but are popular with the Argentine
public. Likewise, Kirchner cut Argentine gas exports to
Chile in 2005 to cover shortages in the internal market
despite the existence of valid contracts between Chile and
local gas suppliers.
¶12. (C) President Kirchner is not skilled at international
diplomacy and often ignores basic protocol. Kirchner's
gaffes with foreign dignitaries are legendary. In June 2004,
Kirchner left Russian leader Vladimir Putin waiting at the
Moscow airport for a meeting that never happened, reportedly
because Cristina Kirchner wanted to spend more time shopping
at their previous stop in Prague. The GOA claimed that "bad
weather" had delayed their takeoff when weather reports
showed sunny conditions in Prague. Later that year,
President Kirchner failed to attend a state dinner he was
supposed to host for visiting Vietnamese President Tran Duc
Luong. In like fashion, Kirchner failed to attend a
reception in honor of the State visit of Queen Beatriz of
Holland in March of 2006. Kirchner also never receives new
Ambassadors, as state protocol would dictate, relegating this
responsibility to Vice President Daniel Scioli.
¶13. (C) Kirchner relies on an ever-shrinking group of
long-time advisors to make key decisions, many of whom lack
international, business and economic expertise (See Reftel
D). No one from the Foreign Ministry is part of Kirchner's
inner circle of advisors, and very few of Kirchner's close
associates had overseas experience before Kirchner became
President (See Reftel F). As a result, Kirchner often
receives poor advice on international issues, such as when
Legal and Technical Secretary Carlos Zannini reportedly
convinced Kirchner that taking a tough line publicly on
counter terrorism would, in the eyes of the USG, compensate
for being critical of the U.S. in other areas and opposing
the FTAA at the Summit of the Americas (See Reftel E).
------------------------------------
COMMENT -- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.
------------------------------------
¶14. (C) Kirchner's peculiar operating and decision-making
style defines Argentine policymaking, and in the coming year,
may lead to more challenges in the U.S.-Argentine
relationship, as Kirchner focuses on shoring up his
center-left political base for the 2007 elections. Given
poll numbers that show Argentines have the least positive
view of the U.S. out of all nations in the region, the U.S.
will be a convenient target for Kirchner. As during the 2003
presidential campaign, Kirchner will likely portray himself
BUENOS AIR 00001462 005 OF 005
as the lone true defender of Argentina in the world
community. The Casa Rosada has reportedly already begun an
effort to link Roberto Lavagna to the U.S., for example by
encouraging press articles that the U.S. approved and is
sponsoring a potential Lavagna campaign for President.
¶15. (C) Kirchner has a history of using international
disputes, like the paper mill conflict with Uruguay, to gain
domestic popular support. We have been told by our British
colleagues that relations between the U.K. and Argentina are
at their lowest point in 15 years because Kirchner has chosen
a confrontational attitude with the U.K. on the Falkland
Islands dispute, thereby making political use of an issue
that is at the core of Argentine national identity. As
leading political analyst Rosendo Fraga told Poloff, "This
year, Kirchner will use the U.K. and Uruguay as targets, and
next year, it will be the U.S." Kirchner has been described
to us by his close associates as someone who constantly
focuses on the costs and benefits of his political decisions.
During a recent trip to Spain, Kirchner criticized the
U.S.'s "absence" and lack of significant assistance to the
region. Former Minister Lavagna told the Ambassador that
Kirchner did this in order to counter the image that he had
been too forthcoming with Spanish multinationals during the
trip. As the 2007 presidential campaign approaches, we
cannot rule out occasional anti-U.S. diatribes by Kirchner in
order to placate his leftist supporters.
GUTIERREZ
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06CARACAS2367 2006-08-10 02:02 2010-12-15 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Caracas
VZCZCXRO6327
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHCV #2367/01 2220226
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100226Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5787
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6884
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5695
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 1390
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 2255
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0500
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 1399
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3945
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2340
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0966
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3695
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0943
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 0582
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0430
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0912
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 002367
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM VE CU
SUBJECT: CASTRO'S ILLNESS; IMPACT ON THE BRV, ON BRV-GOC
RELATIONS
CARACAS 00002367 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Classified by CDA Kevin Whitaker for reason 1.4(d.)
Summary
-------
¶1. (S/NF) BRV reaction to the announcement of Castro's
illness and recovery directly mirrored that of the Cuban
regime. There is no reason to believe that the fundamentals
of the Cuba-Venezuela relationship -- with Venezuela
providing huge resource flows, and the Cubans providing tens
of thousands of "advisors" -- will change through the medium
term. Castro's absence from the scene will deprive Chavez of
an avuncular presence and a proven crisis manager, which may
increase Chavez' vulnerability. In the event of Castro's
permanent departure from the scene, the mercurial Chavez may
become even more unpredictable. Chavez may believe his
regime's survival is tied to that of a Castroite successor
government, and under a conceivable set of circumstances
might even be willing to deploy Venezuelan military assets in
support of a successor regime. Embassy believes this would
be an apt moment to warn the BRV against intervening in Cuba
during its transition. End summary.
Initial BRV Reactions to Castro Announcement
--------------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Initial Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV)
reaction to the news of Castro's illness and temporary
hand-over of power has been limited to parroting the Cuban
line. Speaking on August 1 in Vietnam, Chavez seemed a bit
taken by surprise and uninformed, but said he had talked to
Cuban officials who assured him that Castro "would return to
his job in some weeks." The same day, the Venezuelan Foreign
Ministry announced that they "had received, with
satisfaction, news from Cuban authorities" that Castro was
recuperating. Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel similarly
said that he spoke with his Cuban counterpart Carlos Lage and
Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque, who assured him
that the Cuban leader was recovering normally.
¶3. (S/NF) Chavez returned to Caracas on August 3,
apparently without stopping in Havana. SIMO reports indicate
that he had wanted to do so, but the Cubans waved him off,
fearing that his presence would undercut their efforts to
convey a sense of normality. Chavez got the point; during
his August 6 "Alo Presidente," Chavez said he had learned out
that Castro was up and talking, and expressed his confidence
that the Cuban leader would be back in action soon.
Interestingly, Chavez did not suggest he'd spoken personally
to Castro. Too, he engaged in a lengthy digression about his
appreciation for being able to meet and work with a hero from
his youth. Certainly it was not his intention, but this part
of Chavez' comments took on the tone of an elegy.
Speculation on Raul-Chavez Relations
------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Regardless of whether Fidel is alive or not, it
would appear that Raul will continue to play a larger role
than in the past. Public and other sources have included
speculation about the lack of chemistry between Chavez and
Raul Castro. While we question the reliability of such
judgments, because it's unclear to us the basis for reaching
them, they are worth being aware of. Americo Martin, a
former Venezuelan Communist close to the Castros in the
1970s, told El Universal that the younger Castro views Chavez
with distrust and caution. Former Venezuelan Ambassador and
ubiquitous international relations analyst Julio Cesar Pineda
told poloff August 8 that he has heard that Chavez is close
to FM Perez Roque, and VP Lage, who it would appear are going
CARACAS 00002367 002.2 OF 004
to continue to play important roles in Cuba. Exiled Cuban
intellectual Carlos Alberto Montaner probably made the most
relevant observation in noting that Raul and Chavez lack the
emotional ties that bind Fidel and Chavez.
What Does it Mean for Venezuela?
--------------------------------
¶5. (C) While there are a number of unknowns in the
equation, there is no reason to believe much will change in
the bilateral relationship in the short to medium term. Both
countries derive benefits from the relationship. Cuba
benefits from the millions in oil and transfer payments for
services rendered; Venezuela benefits from the advice of
Castro and tens of thousands of "trainers" and doctors.
Apparent Cuban influence in Venezuela has grown dramatically,
to the point that opposition Venezuelans sardonically refer
to "Venecuba" or "Cubazuela" (both forms are acceptable).
Chavez relies heavily on Cuban advisors to implement programs
that are one of the keys to his political success. We assess
there could be as many as 40,000 Cubans currently in
Venezuela, managing, guiding, and implementing Chavez' social
missions (e.g., Barrio Adentro medical program, Mision
Robinson literacy program, Mercal state-owned grocery chain,
etc.) Rumors swirl about Cubans taking central roles in
sensitive government functions, including in Chavez' personal
security, the military, the National Electoral Council, the
national identification Office, even land titling offices.
None of that is going to change soon. The Bolivarian regime
is deriving political and organizational benefit from it, and
the Cubans are getting paid hard currency for it.
¶6. (S/NF) We judge that Chavez will also want to continue
Venezuela's generous petroleum support to Cuba, which we
currently estimate at 98,000 barrels per day, worth at least
$7 million a day, or $2.5 billion a year. SIMO reporting
indicates that Chavez directed that his staff find ways of
increasing resource flows to Cuba. We can think of two
motivations Chavez might have in increasing cash flow to
Cuba: first, to help a friend in need; the one thing he has
is cash, and he can give more of it. Second, it may also be
true that Chavez is looking to bump up transfer payments in
order to increase his influence in Cuba at this critical
moment. The economic assistance could become a problem,
however, if the egoistic, increasingly intrusive Chavez used
it to promote his own candidate in any ensuing power
struggle, prolonging the infighting and delaying a democratic
transition.
How Does Chavez Act if Castro is Debilitated or Dead?
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶7. (S/NF) Castro's prolonged convalescence or even death is
likely to cause headaches for the region and roil bilateral
relations. Some argue that Castro has had a moderating
influence on Chavez, and so he'll really let go if Castro is
gone. The predicate seems wrong to us. It's hard to see
much moderation in Chavez' recent behavior: open
interventionism and tendency to pick fights with leaders
throughout the hemisphere, his embrace of pariah states
(including especially the vote for Iran at the IAEA and the
apparent endorsement of the DPRK's July 4 missile launches),
and his government's relentless assault on basic freedoms
within Venezuela. It may be closer to the mark to observe
that Castro is one of the few people who could contradict
Chavez or give him news he didn't want to hear. We've
received numerous reports that Chavez is left surrounded by
yes-men, because he simply won't accept bad news or
criticism. The absence of Castro -- to Chavez, respected and
avuncular -- could make the mercurial Chavez even more
CARACAS 00002367 003 OF 004
unpredictable and radical.
¶8. (S/NF) Over time, Chavez will probably move toward
assuming the mantle as (in Castro's words) "my successor to
advance social revolution." Chavez will need to work this
issue slowly, as he does not wish to suggest prematurely that
Castro is dead and inadvertently cause problems for -- or
with -- any successor Castroite regime. That said, Chavez
has neither the intellectual candlepower nor the
international environment to replicate Castro's rise to
international prominence. That doesn't mean he won't try,
and he'll play his best card -- oil wealth -- whenever he
needs to. And whatever the force of his arguments, his
checkbook is going to speak loudly.
¶9. (S/NF) We should be particularly mindful that Chavez
will be a committed advocate of the continuation of a
repressive regime in Cuba. Chavez has been on a losing
streak, with the electoral results in Peru and (it seems) in
Mexico; were Cuba now to turn toward democracy, Chavez would
be increasingly isolated as the sole radical leftist in the
hemisphere. Chavez may believe that the survival of his
regime is tied to that of the Castro regime.
¶10. (S/NF) There are some even more troubling scenarios
that one can play out in this regard. Chavez has said as
recently as this April that he'd be willing to spill
Venezuelan blood to save the Cuban regime (although he was
speaking about a U.S. invasion). Were there to be an
internal civil conflict in Cuba, we believe it possible that
Chavez would consider intervening militarily on the side of
pro-regime elements. It is not clear to us that such an
intervention would be militarily effective, but the presence,
or even threat, of a Venezuelan force in Cuba would have
important implications for Cuba and for us. Perhaps the most
likely scenario would have the Venezuelans providing lift
capability to loyalist troops; the Venezuelan Armed Force
(FAV) does retain some fixed-wing and rotary lift capability.
That said, a Venezuelan navy troopship regularly plies
between Venezuela and Cuba, and could conceivably be used to
move FAV troops to the island.
(11. (C) Comment: As noted in previous email traffic,
Embassy suggests that this may be an apt time to warn the BRV
against intervening in Cuba.)
An Achilles' Heel?
------------------
¶12. (S/NF) These are some fairly gloomy scenarios. We can
conceive how Castro's absence might actually make Chavez more
vulnerable. Hugo Chavez is a master tactician, regularly
assessing the domestic political situation better and faster
than the opposition, and making moves to box in his
democratic opponents. What Chavez is less good at is crisis
management. To take a recent example, Chavez' first instinct
to go to Castro's sickbed was wrong, because it would have
undercut the regime's "all is well" line. There are
historical examples, of Chavez cracking under pressure. In
both the 1992 and the 2002 failed coups, evidence suggests
that Chavez lost his nerve at key moments. His military
colleagues were willing to fight on in 1992 when he was holed
up in the Military Museum, but he surrendered them all. In
2002, a weepy Chavez was reportedly ready to sign the letter
of resignation and flee to Cuba. Castro has proved his worth
to Chavez as a proxy crisis manager. It was Castro who told
Chavez to fight on in 2002, and it was Castro who worked the
phones to reassemble a pro-Chavez consensus in the armed
forces. In 2004, as the recall referendum approached, it was
Castro who conceived and executed the "misiones" plan to buck
CARACAS 00002367 004.2 OF 004
up Chavez' popularity. In Cuba, from the Cuban Missile
Crisis to Mariel to the Maleconazo to the Special Period,
Fidel Castro has proven himself to be a superb crisis
manager. Should Chavez confront a thorny crisis, especially
a domestic crisis, he may suffer significantly from the loss
of Castro's steady hand at his back. This, in turn, could be
an advantage for us in our efforts to urge a return to full
democracy in Venezuela.
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MOSCOW5645 2006-05-30 09:09 2010-12-01 23:11 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO0843
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #5645/01 1500927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 300927Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6600
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 MOSCOW 005645
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, RS
SUBJECT: CHECHNYA: THE ONCE AND FUTURE WAR
REF: MOSCOW 5461 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)
¶1. (C) Introduction: Chechnya has been less in the glare of constant international attention in recent years. However, the Chechnya conflict remains unresolved, and the suffering of the Chechen people and the threat of instability throughout the region remain. This message reinterprets the history of the Chechen wars as a means of better understanding the current dynamics, the challenges facing Russia, the way in which the Kremlin perceives those challenges, and the factors limiting the Kremlin’s ability to respond. It draws on close observation on the ground and conversations with many participants in and observers of the conflict from the moment of Chechnya’s declaration of independence in 1991. We intend this message to spur thinking on new approaches to a tragedy that persists as an issue within Russia and between Russia and the U.S., Europe and the Islamic world.
Summary
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¶2. (C) President Putin has pursued a two-pronged strategy to extricate Russia from the war in Chechnya and establish a viable long-term modus vivendi preserving Moscow’s role as the ultimate arbiter of Chechen affairs. The first prong was to gain control of the Russian military deployed there, which had long operated without real central control and was intent on staying as long as its officers could profit from the war. The second prong was “Chechenization,” which in effect means turning Chechnya over to former nationalist separatists willing to profess loyalty to Russia. There are two difficulties with Putin’s strategy. First, while Chechenization has been successful in suppressing nationalist separatists within Chechnya, it has not been as effective against the Jihadist militants, who have broadened their focus and are gaining strength throughout the North Caucasus. Second, as long as former separatist warlords run Chechnya, Russian forces will have to stay in numbers sufficient to ensure that the ex-separatists remain “ex.” More broadly, the suffering of an abused and victimized population will continue, and with it the alienation that feeds the insurgency.
¶3. (C) To deal effectively with Chechnya in the long term, Putin needs to increase his control over the Russian Power Ministries and reduce opportunities for them to profit from war corruption. He needs to strengthen Russian civilian engagement, reinforcing the role of his Plenipotentiary Representative. He needs to take a broad approach to combat the spread of Jihadism, and not rely primarily on suppression by force. In this context there is only a limited role for the U.S., but we and our allies can help by expressing our concerns to Putin, directing assistance to areas where our programs can slow the spread of Jihadism, and working with Russia’s southern neighbors to minimize the effects of instability. End Summary.
The Starting Point: Problems of the “Russianized” Conflict
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¶4. (C) Chechnya was only one of the conflicts that broke out in the former Soviet Union at the time of the country’s collapse. Territorial conflicts, most of them separatist, erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia, North Ossetia/Ingushetia, Abkhazia and Tajikistan. Russian troops were involved in combat in all of those conflicts, sometimes clandestinely. In all except Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian troops remain today as peacekeepers. Russia doggedly insists on this presence and resists pulling its forces out. Its diplomatic efforts have served to keep the conflicts frozen, with Russian troops remaining in place.
¶5. (C) Why is this? The charge is often made that Russia’s motive for keeping the conflicts frozen is geostrategic, or “neo-imperialism,” or fear of NATO, or revenge against Georgia and Moldova, or a quest to preserve leverage. Indeed, the continued deployments may satisfy those Russians who think in such terms, and expand the domestic consensus for sending troops throughout the CIS. However, while one or another of those factors may have been the original impulse, each of the conflicts has gone through phases in which the conflict’s perceived uses for the Russian state have changed. No one of these factors has been continuous over the life of any of the conflicts.
¶6. (C) We would propose an additional factor: the determination of Russia’s senior officer corps to remain deployed in those countries to engage in lucrative activity outside their official military tasks. Sometimes that
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activity has been as mercenaries -- for instance, Russian active-duty soldiers fought on both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 1991-92. Sometimes it has involved narcotics smuggling, as in Tajikistan. Selling arms to all sides has been a long-standing tradition. And sometimes it has meant collaborating with the mafias of both sides in conflict to facilitate contraband trade across the lines, as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The officers and their generals formed a powerful bloc in favor of all the deployments, especially under Yeltsin.
¶7. (C) This “military-entrepreneurial” bloc soon formed an autonomous institution, in some respects outside the government’s control. There are many illustrations of its autonomy. For instance, in 1993 Yeltsin reached an agreement with Georgia on peacekeeping in Abkhazia. When the Georgian delegation arrived in Sochi in September of that year to hammer out the details with Russia’s generals, they found the deal had changed. When they protested that Yeltsin had agreed to other terms, a Russian general replied, “Let the President sit in Moscow, drink vodka, and chase women. That’s his business. We are here, and we have our work to do.”
The Secret History of the Chechen War
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¶8. (C) The lack of central control over the military, as well as officers’ cupidity, may have been a prime cause of the first Chechnya War. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, energy prices in the “ruble zone” were 3 percent of world market prices. Government officials and their partners bought oil at ruble prices, diverted it abroad, and sold it on the world market. The military joined in this arbitrage. Pavel Grachev, then Defense Minister, reportedly diverted oil to Western Group of Forces commander Burlakov, who sold it in Germany.
¶9. (C) Chechnya was a major entrepot for laundering oil for this arbitrage. It appears to have been used both by the military (including Grachev) and the Khasbulatov-Rutskoy axis in the Duma. Dudayev had declared independence, but remained part of the Russian elite. Chechnya’s independence, oilfields, refineries and pipelines made Chechnya perfect for laundering oil. Planes, trains, buses and roads and pipelines to Chechnya were functioning, allowing anyone and anything to transit -- except auditors. In the early 1990’s millions of tons of “Russian” oil entered Chechnya and were magically transformed into “Chechen” oil to be sold on the world market at world prices. Some of the proceeds went to buy the Chechens weaponry, most of it from the Russian military, and another lucrative trade developed. Dudayev took much of his cut of the proceeds in weapons. The Groznyy Bazaar was notorious in the early 1990s for the quantity and variety of arms for sale, including heavy weaponry.
¶10. (C) Chechnya was the home of Ruslan Khasbulatov and served various purposes for his faction of the Russian elite. He took advantage of the army’s independence from Yeltsin’s control. An informed source believes that it was Khasbulatov, not the “official” Russian government, who facilitated the transfer of Shamil Basayev and his heavily-armed fighters from Chechnya into Abkhazia in 1992, and who ordered the Russian air force to bomb Sukhumi when Shevardnadze went there to take personal command of the Georgians’ last stand in July 1993. The Yeltsin government always denied that it bombed Sukhumi, despite Western eyewitness accounts confirming the bombing and the insignia on the planes. Given the confusion of those years, it could well be that the order originated in the Duma, not the Kremlin.
¶11. (C) After Khasbulatov and Rutskoy were written out of the Russian equation in October 1993, so was Dudayev. Clandestine Russian support for the Chechen political and military opposition to Dudayev began in the spring of 1994, according to participants. When that proved ineffective, Russian bombing was deployed. (One Dudayev opponent recounted that in 1994 a Russian pilot was given a mission to fire a missile into one of the top-floor corners of Groznyy’s Presidency building at a time when Dudayev was scheduled to hold a cabinet meeting there. Not knowing Groznyy, the pilot asked which building to bomb, and was told “the tallest one.” He bombed a residential apartment building.) When air power, too, proved ineffective, Russian troops were secretly sent in to reinforce the armed opposition. Dudayev’s forces captured about a dozen and put them on television -- and the Russian invasion began shortly thereafter.
¶12. (C) Given the gangsterish background of the war, it is no surprise that the military conducted the war itself as a profit-making enterprise, especially after the capture of
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Groznyy. By May 1995 an anti-Dudayev Chechen could lament, “When we invited the Russian army in we expected an army -- not this band of marauders.” Contraband trade in oil, weapons (including direct sales from Russian military stores to the insurgents), drugs, and liquor, plus “protection” for legitimate trade made military service in Chechnya lucrative for those not on the front lines. This profitability ended only with the August 1996 defeat of Russian forces in Groznyy at the hands of the insurgents and the subsequent Russian withdrawal -- a defeat made possible because the Russian forces were hollowed out by their officers’ corruption and pursuit of economic profit.
¶13. (C) Before they lost this “cash-cow” to their enemies, Russian officers went to great lengths to keep their friends from interfering with their profits. On July 30, 1995, the Russians and the Chechen insurgents signed a cease-fire agreement mediated by the OSCE. It would have meant the gradual withdrawal of Russian forces. Enforcing the cease-fire was a Joint Observation Commission (“SNK”). The head of the SNK was General Anatoliy Romanov, a competent and upright officer -- very much a rarity in Chechnya. After two months at this assignment he was severely injured by a mine inside Groznyy, and has been hospitalized ever since. Informed observers believe Romanov’s own colleagues in the Russian forces carried out this murder attempt. The cease-fire, never enforced, broke down.
¶14. (C) When the second war began in September 1999, Russian forces again started profiteering from a trade in contraband oil. Western eyewitnesses reported convoys of Russian army trucks carrying oil leaving Groznyy under cover of night. Eventually the Russian forces reached an understanding with the insurgent fighters. Seeing one such convoy, a Western reporter asked his guerrilla hosts whether the fighters ever attacked such convoys. “No,” the leader replied. “They leave us alone and we leave them alone.”
No Exit for Putin
-----------------
¶15. (C) Sometime between one and two years after Russian forces were unleashed for a second time on Chechnya, Putin appears to have realized that they were not going to deliver a neat victory. That failure would make Putin look weak at home, the human rights violations would estrange the West, and the drain on the Russian treasury would be punishing (this was before the dramatic rise in energy prices). Putin could not negotiate a peace with Maskhadov: he had already rejected that course and could not back down without appearing weak. The Khasavyurt accords that ended the first war were the result of defeat; a new set of accords would be seen as a new defeat. In any case, the history of the war (and the fate of General Romanov) made clear that negotiations without the subordination of the military were a physical impossibility.
¶16. (C) Putin thus found himself without a winning strategy and had to develop one. He has taken a two-pronged approach. One prong was subordinating the military. The appointment of Sergey Ivanov as Defense Minister appears to have been aimed at subjecting the military to the control of the security services. A series of reassignments and firings is the surface evidence of the struggle to subordinate the military in Chechnya. Southern Military District commander Troshev, who led the 1999 invasion, refused outright the first orders transferring him to Siberia in November 2002, and went on television to publicize his mutiny. He was finally removed in February 2003. Chief of the Defense Staff Kvashnin, who had held the Southern District command during the first Chechen war, hung on in a combative relationship with Ivanov for three years until he, too, was replaced in 2004 (and also sent to Siberia as the Presidential Representative in Novosibirsk). The spring 2005 dismissal of General Viktor Kazantsev, Putin’s Plenipotentiary Representative in the Southern Federal District, was reportedly the final link in the chain. Military corruption, and feeding at the trough of Chechnya, has not ended, but the corruption has reportedly been “institutionalized” and more closely regulated in Kremlin-controlled channels.
Chechenization, Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov, and the Salafists
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¶17. (C) The second prong of Putin’s strategy was to hand the fighting over to Chechens. “Chechenization” differs from Vietnamization or Iraqification. In those strategies, a loyalist force is strengthened to the point at which it can carry on the fight itself. Chechenization, in contrast, has meant handing Chechnya over to the guerrillas in exchange for their professions of loyalty, the formal retention of Chechnya within the Russian Federation, and an uneasy
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cooperation with Federal authorities that in practice is constantly re-negotiated.
¶18. (C) Chechenization is associated with Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov, the insurgent commander and chief Mufti of separatist Chechnya. After he defected to the Russians, Putin put him in charge of the new Russian-installed Chechen administration. Chechenization was reportedly agreed between Kadyrov and Putin personally. But the seeds of the policy were sown by a split in the insurgent ranks dating to the first war. That split that took the form of a religious dispute, though it masked a power struggle among warlords. The split is the direct result of the introduction of a new element: Arab forces espousing a pan-Islamic Jihadist religious ideology.
¶19. (C) The traditional Islam of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia is based on Sufism, or Islamic mysticism. Though nominally the Sufi orders were the same as those predominant in Central Asia and Kurdistan -- Naqshbandi and Qadiri -- Sufism in the Northeast Caucasus took on a unique form in the 18th-19th century struggle against Russian encroachment. It is usually called “muridism.” Murids were armed acolytes of a hieratic commander, the murshid. Shaykh Shamil, the Naqshbandi murshid who led the mountaineers’ resistance to the Russians until his capture in 1859, was both a spiritual guide and a military commander. He also exercised government powers. The largest Sufi branch (“vird”) in Chechnya is the Kunta-Haji “vird” of the Qadiris, founded and led by the charismatic Chechen missionary Kunta-Haji Kishiyev until his exile by the Russians in 1864. Although the historical Kunta-Haji died two years later, his followers believe that Kunta-Haji lives on in occultation, like the Shi’a Twelfth Imam.
¶20. (C) When Arab fighters joined the Chechen conflict in 1995, they brought with them a “Salafist” doctrine that attempts to emulate the fundamental, “pure” Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors, especially ‘Umar, the second Caliph. It holds that mysticism is one of the “impurities” that crept into Islam after the first four Caliphs, and considers Sufis to be heretics and idolaters. The idea that Kunta-Haji adepts could believe their founder is still alive -- and that they worship the grave of his mother -- is an abomination to Salafis, who believe that marked graves are a form of pagan ancestor worship (Muhammad’s grave in Arabia is not marked).
¶21. (C) Wahhabism-based forms of Islam started appearing in Chechnya by 1991, as Chechens were able to travel and some went to Saudi Arabia for religious study. But the true influx of Salafis (usually lumped together with Wahhabis in Russia) came during the first Chechen war. In February 1995 Fathi ‘Ali al-Shishani, a Jordanian of Chechen descent, arrived in Chechnya. A veteran of the war in Afghanistan, he was now too old to be a combatant, but was a missionary for Salafism. He recruited another Afghan veteran, the Saudi al-Khattab, to come to Chechnya and lead a group of Arab fighters.
¶22. (C) Al-Khattab’s fighters were never a major military factor during the war, but they were the key to Gulf money, which financed power struggles in the inter-war years. Al-Khattab forged close links with Shamil Basayev, the most famous Chechen field commander. Basayev himself was from a Qadiri family, but he was too Sovietized to view Islam as anything more than part of the Chechen and Caucasus identity. In his early interviews, Basayev showed himself to be motivated by Chechen nationalism, not religion, though he paid lip-service -- e.g., proclaiming Sharia law in Vedeno in early 1995 -- to attract Gulf donors. Basayev’s initial interest in al-Khattab, as indeed with other jihadists starting even before the first war, was purely financial.
¶23. (C) After the first war, al-Khattab set up a camp in Serzhen-Yurt (“Baza Kavkaz”) for military and religious indoctrination. It provided one of the few employment opportunities for demobilized Chechen fighters between the wars. Young Chechens had traditionally engaged in seasonal migrant construction work throughout the Soviet Union, but after the first war that was no longer open to them. The closed international borders also precluded smuggling -- another pre-war source of employment and income. The fighters had no money, no jobs, no education, no skills save with their guns, and no prospects. Al-Khattab’s offer of food, shelter and work was inviting. As a result, between the wars Salafism spread quickly in Chechnya. (Al-Khattab also invited missionaries and facilitators who set up shop in Chechnya, Dagestan and Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, whose Kist residents are close relatives of the Chechens.)
Battle Lines in Peacetime
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¶24. (C) Chechen society is distinguished by its propensity to unite in war and fragment in peace. It is based on opposing dichotomies: the Vaynakh peoples are divided into Chechens and Ingush; the Chechens are divided into highlanders (“Lameroi”) and lowlanders (“Nokhchi”); and these are further divided into tribal confederations and exogamous tribes (“teyp”) and their subdivisions. Each unit will unite with its opposite to combat a threat from outside. Two lowland teyps, for example, will drop quarrels and unite against an intruding highland teyp. But left to themselves, they will quarrel and split. After the Khasavyurt accords, when Russia left the Chechens alone, the wartime alliance between Maskhadov and Basayev split and the two became enemies. Other warlords lined up on one side or the other -- the Yamadayev brothers of Gudermes, for example, fighting a pitched battle against Basayev in 1999. But the rise of Basayev and al-Khattab undermined Maskhadov’s authority and prevented him from exercising any real power.
¶25. (C) This power struggle took on a religious expression. Since Basayev was associated with al-Khattab and Salafism, Maskhadov positioned himself as champion of traditional Sufism. He surrounded himself with Sufi shaykhs and appointed Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov, a strong adherent of Kunta-Haji Sufism, as Chechnya’s Mufti. Kadyrov had spent six years in Uzbekistan, allegedly at religious seminaries in Tashkent and Bukhara, and seems to have developed links to other enemies of Basayev, including the Yamadayevs.
¶26. (C) The religious division dictated certain policies to each side. The Sufi tradition of Maskhadov and Kadyrov had been associated for over two centuries with nationalist resistance. Basayev, with his new-found commitment to al-Khattab’s Salafism, adopted the Salafi stress on a pan-Islamic community (“umma”) fighting a worldwide jihad, notionally without regard for ethnic or national boundaries. Al-Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan in August 1999, avowedly in pursuit of a Caucasus-wide revolt against the Russians. They brought on a Russian invasion that threw Maskhadov out of Groznyy.
Chechenization Begins
---------------------
¶27. (C) The second Russian invasion did not unite the Chechens, as previous pressure had. Perhaps the influence of al-Khattab and his Salafists, as well as the devastation of the first war, had rent the fabric of Chechen society too much to restore traditional unity in the face of the outside threat. (We should also remember that unity is relative. Only a small percentage of the Chechens actually fought in the first war, and many supported the Russians out of disgust with Dudayev.) Kadyrov and the Yamadayevs separately broke with Maskhadov and defected to the Russians. Kadyrov began to recruit from the insurgency non-Salafist nationalist fighters who were highly demoralized and disoriented by the disastrous retreat from Groznyy in late 1999. Kadyrov began to preach what Kunta-Haji had preached after the Russian victory over Imam Shamil in 1859: to survive, the Chechens needed tactically to accept Russian rule. His message struck a chord, and fighters began to defect to his side.
¶28. (C) Putin appears to have stumbled upon Kadyrov, and their alliance seems to have grown out of chance as much as design. But they were able to forge a deal along the following lines: Kadyrov would declare loyalty to Russia and deliver loyalty to Putin; he would take over Maskhadov’s place at the head of the Russian-blessed government of Chechnya; he would try to win over Maskhadov’s fighters, to whom he could promise immunity; he would govern Chechnya with full autonomy, without interference from Russian officials below Putin’s level; and he would try to exterminate Basayev and Al-Khattab.
¶29. (C) If the objective of Chechenization was to win over fighters who would carry on the fight against Basayev and the Arab successors to Khattab (who was poisoned in April 2002), it has to be judged a success. The real fighting has for several years been carried out by Chechen forces who fight the war they want to fight -- not the one the Russian military wants them to -- and who appear happy to kill Russians when they get in the way. The Russian military is “just trying to survive,” as one officer put it. Not all the pro-Moscow Chechen units are composed of former guerrillas. Said-Magomed Kakiyev, commander of the GRU-controlled “West” battalion, has been fighting Dudayev and his successors since 1993. But at the heart of the pro-Moscow effort are fighters who defected from the anti-Moscow insurgency.
The Military Overstays Its Welcome
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----------------------------------
¶30. (C) The development of Kadyrov’s fighting force, along with that of the Yamadayev brothers, left the stage clear for a drawdown of Russian troops, certainly by early 2004 (leaving aside a permanent garrison presence). But those troops, still not fully responsive to FSB control, did not want to leave. Especially now that Chechens had taken over increasing parts of the security portfolio, the Russian officers were free to concentrate on their economic activities, and in particular oil smuggling.
¶31. (C) Kadyrov could not be fully autonomous until he -- not the Russians -- controlled Chechnya’s oil. He therefore demanded the creation of a Chechen oil company under his jurisdiction. That would have severely limited the ability of federal forces to divert and smuggle oil. On May 9, 2004, Kadyrov was assassinated by an enormous bomb planted under his seat at the annual VE Day celebration. The killing was officially ascribed to Chechen rebels, but many believe it was the Russian Army’s way of rejecting Kadyrov’s demand. Under the circumstances, one cannot exclude that both versions are true.
In the Reign of Ramzan
----------------------
¶32. (C) Kadyrov’s passing left power in the hands of his son Ramzan, who was officially made Deputy Prime Minister. The President, Alu Alkhanov, was a figurehead put in place because Ramzan was underage. The Prime Minister, Sergey Abramov, was tasked with interfacing between Kadyrov and Moscow below the level of Putin.
¶33. (C) Ramzan Kadyrov has none of the religious or personal prestige that his father had. He is a warlord pure and simple -- one of several, like the Yamadayev family of warlords. He is lucky, however, in that his father left him a sufficient fighting force of ex-rebels. Though they may have been lured away from the insurgency for a variety of reasons, it is money that keeps them. Kadyrov feels little need for ideological or religious prestige, though he makes an occasional statement designed to appeal to Muslims, and makes a point of supporting the pilgrimage to the tomb of Kunta-Haji’s mother in Gunoy, near Vedeno (though that is in part to show he is stronger than Basayev, whose home and power base are in the Vedeno region). Kadyrov must only satisfy his troops, who on occasion have shown that, if offended or not given enough, they are willing to desert along with their kinsmen and return to the mountains to fight against him. He must also guard against the possibility, as some charge, that some of the fighters who went over to Federal forces did so under orders from guerrilla commanders for whom they are still working.
¶34. (C) Kadyrov is also fortunate in that the FSB, with whom he has close ties, has by this time emasculated the military as “prong one” of Putin’s strategy. Kadyrov has slowly but surely also taken over most of the spigots of money that once fed the army, and like his father he has started agitating for overt control over Chechnya’s oil (while prudently ensuring that others take the lead on that in public). Kadyrov is at least as corrupt as the military, but the money he expropriates for himself from Moscow’s subsidies is accepted as his pay-off for keeping things quiet. And indeed Kadyrov and the other warlords are capable of maintaining a certain degree of security in Chechnya. The showy “reconstruction” developments they have built in Groznyy and their home towns demonstrate that the guerrillas cannot or at least do not halt construction and economic activity. Moreover, there is enough security to end Putin’s worries about a secessionist victory. That has allowed Putin to demonstrate a new willingness to be increasingly overt in support of separatism in other conflicts (e.g., Abkhazia, Transnistria) when that advances Russian interests.
¶35. (C) Despite its successes to date, however, Putin’s strategy is far from completed. He still needs to keep forces in the region as a constant reminder to Kadyrov not to backtrack on his professed loyalty to the Kremlin. Ideally, that force would be small but capable of intervening effectively in Chechen internal affairs. That is unrealistic at present. The current forces, reportedly over 25,000, are bunkered and corrupt. When they venture on patrol they are routinely attacked. One attempt to redress this is to position Russian forces close but “over the horizon” in Dagestan, where a major military base is under construction at Botlikh. However, that may only add to the instability of Dagestan. A Duma Deputy from the region told us that locals are vehemently opposed to the new military base, despite the economic opportunities it represents, on grounds that the soldiers will “corrupt the morals of their children.”
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¶36. (C) Another approach is the Chechenization of the Federal forces themselves. Recently “North” and “South” battalions of ethnically Chechen special forces -- drawn from Kadyrov’s militia -- were created to supplement the “East” and “West” battalions of Sulim Yamadayev and Said-Magomed Kakiyev. Those formations are officially part of the Russian army. The Kremlin strategy appears to be to check Kadyrov by promoting warlords he cannot control, and to check the FSB from becoming too clientized by allowing the MOD to retain a sphere of influence. In Chechnya, that is a recipe for open fighting. We saw one small instance of that on April 25, when bodyguards of Kadyrov and Chechen President Alkhanov got into a firefight. According to one insider, the clash originated in Kadyrov’s desire to get rid of Alkhanov, who now has close ties with Yamadayev.
What Can We Expect in the Future?
---------------------------------
¶37. (C) The Chechen population is the great loser in this game. It bears an ever heavier burden in shake-downs, opportunity costs from misappropriation of reconstruction funds, and the constant trauma of victimization and abuse -- including abduction, torture, and murder -- by the armed thugs who run Chechnya (reftels). Security under those circumstances is a fragile veneer, and stability an illusion. The insurgency can continue indefinitely, at a low level and without prospects of success, but significant enough to serve as a pretext for the continued rule of thuggery.
¶38. (C) The insurgency will remain split between those who want to carry on Maskhadov’s non-Salafist struggle for national independence and those who follow the Salafi-influenced Basayev in his pursuit of a Caucasus-wide Caliphate. But the nationalists have been undercut by Kadyrov. Despite Sadullayev’s efforts, the insurgency inside Chechnya is not likely to meet with success and will continue to become more Salafist in tone.
¶39. (C) Prospects would be poor for the nationalists even if Kadyrov and/or Yamadayev were assassinated (and there is much speculation that one will succeed in killing the other, goaded on by the FSB which supports Kadyrov and the GRU which supports Yamadayev). The thousands of guerrillas who have joined those two militias have by now lost all ideological incentive. Since they already run the country, they feel themselves, not the Russians, to be the masters, and are not responsive to Sadullayev’s nationalist calls; Basayev’s Salafist message has even less appeal to them. Even if their current leaders are eliminated, all they will need is a new warlord, easily generated from within their organizations, and they can continue on their current paths.
¶40. (C) We expect that Salafism will continue to grow. The insurgents even inside Chechnya are reportedly becoming predominantly Salafist, as opposition on a narrowly nationalist basis offers less hope of success. Salafis will come both from inside Chechnya, where militia excesses outrage the population, and from elsewhere in the Caucasus, where radicalization is proceeding rapidly as a result of the repressive policies of Russia’s regional satraps. There are numerous eyewitness accounts from both Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria that elite young adults and university students are joining Salafist groups. In one case, a terrorist killed in Dagestan was found recently to have defended his doctoral dissertation at Moscow State University -- on Wahhabism in the North Caucasus. These young adults, denied economic opportunities, turn to religion as an outlet. They find, however, that representatives of the traditional religious establishments in these republics, long isolated under the thumb of Soviet restrictions, are ill-educated and ill-prepared to deal with the sophisticated theological arguments developed by generations of Salafists in the Middle East. Most of those who join fundamentalist jamaats do not, of course, become terrorists. But a percentage do, and with that steady source of recruits the major battlefield could shift to outside Chechnya, with armed clashes in other parts of the North Caucasus and a continuation of sporadic but spectacular terrorist acts in Moscow and other parts of Russia.
¶41. (C) Outside Chechnya, the most likely venue for clashes with authorities is Dagestan. Putin’s imposition of a “power vertical” there has upset the delicate clan and ethnic balance that offered a shaky stability since the collapse of Soviet power. He installed a president (the weak Mukhu Aliyev) in place of a 14-member multi-ethnic presidential council. Aliyev will be unable to prevent a ruthless struggle among the elite -- the local way of elaborating a new balance of power. This is already happening, with assassinations of provincial chiefs since Aliyev took over.
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In one province in the south of the republic, an uprising against the chief appointed by Aliyev’s predecessor was suppressed by gunfire. Four demonstrators were shot dead, initiating a cycle of blood revenge. In May, in two Dagestani cities security force operations against “terrorists” resulted in major shootouts, with victims among the bystanders and whole apartment houses rendered uninhabitable after hits from the security forces’ heavy weaponry. It is not clear whether the “terrorists” were really religious activists (“Whenever they want to eliminate someone, they call him a Wahhabi,” the MP from Makhachkala told us). But the populace, seeing the deadly over-reaction of the security forces, is feeling sympathy for their victims -- so much so that Aliyev has had to make public condemnations of the actions of the security forces. If this chaos deepens, as appears likely, the Jihadist groups (“jamaats”) may grow, drift further in Basayev’s direction, and feel the need to respond to attacks from the local government.
¶42. (C) Local forces are unreliable in such cases, for clan and blood-feud reasons. Wahhabist jamaats flourished in the strategic ethnically Dargin districts of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi in the mid-1990s, but Dagestan’s rulers left them alone because moving against them meant altering the delicate ethnic balance between Dargins and Avars. Only when the jamaats themselves became expansive during the Basayev/Khattab invasion from Chechnya in the summer of 1999 did the Makhachkala authorities take action, and then only with the assistance of Federal forces. Ultimately, if clashes break out on a wide scale in Dagestan, Moscow would have to send in the Federal army. Deploying the army to combat destabilization in Dagestan, however, could jeopardize Putin’s hard-won control over it. Unleashing the army against a “terrorist” threat is just that: allowing the army off its new leash. Large-scale army deployments to Dagestan would be especially attractive to the officers, since the border with Azerbaijan offers lucrative opportunities for contraband trade. The army’s presence, in turn, would further destabilize Dagestan and all but guarantee chaos.
¶43. (C) Indeed, destabilization is the most likely prospect we see when we look further down the road to the next decade. Chechenization allows bellicose Chechen leaders to throw their weight around in the North Caucasus even more than an independent Chechnya would. A case in point is the call on April 24 by Chechen Parliament Speaker Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov for unification of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, implicitly under Chechen domination (the one million Chechens would constitute a plurality in the new republic of 4.5 million). The call soured slowly normalizing relations between Chechnya and Ingushetia, according to a Chechen official in Moscow, though the Dagestanis treated the proposal as a joke.
What Should Putin Be Doing?
---------------------------
¶44. (C) Right now Putin’s policy towards Chechnya is channeled through Kadyrov and Yamadayev. Putin’s Plenipotentiary Representative (PolPred) for the Southern Federal District, Dmitriy Kozak, appears to have little influence. He was not even invited when Putin addressed the new Parliament in Groznyy last December. Putin needs to stop taking Kadyrov’s phone calls and start working more through his PolPred and the government’s special services. He also needs to increase Moscow’s civilian engagement with Chechnya.
¶45. (C) Putin should continue to reform the military and the other Power Ministries. Having asserted control through Sergey Ivanov, Putin has denied the military certain limited areas in which it had pursued criminal activity -- but left most of its criminal enterprises untouched. He has done little if anything to form the discipline of a modern army deployable to impose order in unstable regions such as the North Caucasus. Recent hazing incidents show that discipline is still equated with sadism and brutality. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has undergone even less reform. The Chechenization of the security services, despite its obvious drawbacks, has shown that locals can carry out security tasks more effectively than Russian troops.
¶46. (C) Lastly, Putin should realize that his current policy course is not preventing the growth of militant, armed Jihadism. Rather, every time his subordinates try to douse the flames, the fire grows hotter and spreads farther. Putin needs to check the firehose; he may find they are spraying the fire with gasoline. He needs to work out a credible strategy, employing economic and cultural levers, to deal with the issue of armed Jihadism. Some Russians do “get it.” An advisor to Kozak gave a lecture recently that showed he understands in great detail the issues surrounding the growth
MOSCOW 00005645 009 OF 010
of militant jihadism. Kozak himself made clear in a recent conversation with the Ambassador that he appreciates clearly the deep social and economic roots of Russia’s problems in the North Caucasus -- and the need to employ more than just security measures to solve them. We have not, however, seen evidence that consciousness of the true problem has yet made its way to Moscow from Kozak’s office in Rostov-on-Don.
¶47. (C) We need also to be aware that Putin’s strategy is generating a backlash in Moscow. Ramzan Kadyrov’s excesses, his Putin-given immunity from federal influence, and the special laws that apply to Chechnya alone (such as the exemption of Chechens from military service elsewhere in Russia) are leading to charges by some Moscow observers that Putin has allowed Chechnya de facto to secede. Putin is strong enough to weather such criticism, but the ability of a successor to do so is less clear.
Is There a Role for the U.S.?
-----------------------------
¶48. (C) Russia does not consider the U.S. a friend in the Caucasus, and our capacity to influence Russia, whether by pressure, persuasion or assistance, is small. What we can do is continue to try to push the senior tier of Russian officials towards the realization that current policies are conducive to Jihadism, which threatens broader stability as well; and that shifting the responsibility for victimizing and looting the people from a corrupt, brutal military to corrupt, brutal locals is not a long-term solution.
¶49. (C) Making headway with Putin or his successor will require close cooperation with our European allies. They, like the Russians, tend to view the issue through a strictly counter-terrorism lens. The British, for example, link their “dialogue with Islam” closely with their counter-terrorist effort (on which they liaise with the Russians), reinforcing the conception of a monolithic Muslim identity predisposed to terrorism. That reinforces the Russian view that the problem of the North Caucasus can be consigned to the terrorism basket, and that finding a solution means in the first instance finding a better way to kill terrorists.
¶50. (C) We and the Europeans need to put our proposals of assistance to the North Caucasus in a different context: one that recognizes the role of religion in North Caucasus cultures, but also emphasizes our interest in and support for the non-religious aspects of North Caucasus society, including civil society. This last will need exceptional delicacy, as the Russians and the local authorities are convinced that the U.S. uses civil society to foment “color revolutions” and anti-Russian regimes. There is a danger that our civil society partners could become what Churchill called “the inopportune missionary” who, despite impeccable intentions, sets back the larger effort. That need not be the case.
¶51. (C) Our interests call for an understanding of the context and a positive emphasis. We cannot expect the Russians to react well if we limit our statements to condemnations of Kadyrov, butcher though he may be. We need to find targeted areas in which we can work with the Russians to get effective aid into Chechnya. At the same time, we need to be on our guard that our efforts do not appear to constitute U.S. support for Kremlin or local policies that abuse human rights. We must also avoid a shift that endorses the Kremlin assertion that there is no longer a humanitarian crisis in Chechnya, which goes hand-in-hand with the Russian request that the UN and its donors end humanitarian assistance to the region and increase technical and “recovery” assistance. We and other donors need to maintain a balance between humanitarian and recovery assistance.
¶52. (C) Aside from the political optic, a rush to cut humanitarian assistance before recovery programs are fully up and running would leave a vacuum into which jihadist influences would leap. The European Commission Humanitarian Organization, the largest provider of aid, shows signs of rushing to stress recovery over humanitarian assistance; we should not follow suit. Humanitarian assistance has been effective in relieving the plight of Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia. It has been less effective inside Chechnya, where the GOR and Kadyrov regime built temporary accommodation centers for returning IDPs, but have not passed on enough resources to secure a reasonable standard of living. International organizations are hampered by limited access to Chechnya out of security concerns, but where they are able to operate freely they have made a great difference, e.g., WHO’s immunization program.
¶53. (C) Resources aimed at Chechnya often wind up in private pockets. Though international assistance has a better record
MOSCOW 00005645 010 OF 010
than Russian assistance and is more closely monitored, we must also be wary of assistance that lends itself to massive corruption and state-sponsored banditry in Chechnya: too much of the money loaned in a microfinance program there, for example, would be expropriated by militias. Presidential Advisor Aslakhanov told us last December that Kadyrov expropriates for himself one third off the top of all assistance. Therefore, while we continue well-monitored humanitarian assistance inside Chechnya, we should broaden our efforts for “recovery” to other parts of the region that are threatened by jihadism: Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, and possibly Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Among these, we need to try to steer our assistance ($11.5 million for FY 2006) to regional officials, such as President Kanokov of Kabardino-Balkaria, who have shown that they are willing to introduce local reforms and get rid of the brutal security officials whose repressive acts feed the Jihadist movement.
¶54. (C) We also need to coordinate closely with Kozak (or his successor), both to strengthen his position vis--vis the warlords and to ensure that everything we do is perceived by the Russians as transparent and not aimed at challenging the GOR’s hold on a troubled region. The present opposite perception by the GOR may be behind its reluctance to cooperate with donors, the UN and IFIs on long-term strategic engagement in the region. For example, the GOR has delayed for months a 20-million-Euro TACIS program designed with GOR input.
¶55. (C) The interagency paper “U.S. Policy in the North Caucasus -- The Way Forward” provides a number of important principles for positive engagement. We need to emphasize programs in accordance with those principles which are most practical under current and likely future conditions, and which can be most effective in targeting the most vulnerable, where federal and local governments lack the will and capacity to assist, and in combating the spread of jihadism both inside Chechnya and throughout the North Caucasus region. There are areas -- for example, health care and child welfare -- in which assistance fits neatly with Russian priorities, containing both humanitarian and recovery components.
¶56. (C) We can also emphasize programs that help create jobs and job opportunities: microfinance (where feasible), credit cooperatives and small business development, and educational exchanges. U.S. sponsored training programs for credit cooperatives and government budgeting functions have been very popular. Exchanges, through the IVP program and Community Connections, are an especially effective way of exposing future leaders to the world beyond the narrow propaganda they have received, and to generate a multiplier effect in enterprise. In addition to the effects the programs themselves can have in providing alternatives to religious extremism, such assistance can also have a demonstration effect: showing the Russians that improved governance and delivery of services can be more effective in stabilizing the region than attempts to impose order by force.
¶57. (C) Lastly, we need to look ahead in our relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia to ensure that they become more active and effective players in helping to contain instability in the North Caucasus. That will serve their own security interests as well. Salafis need connections to their worldwide network. Strengthening border forces is more important than ever. Azerbaijan, especially, is well placed to trade with Dagestan and Chechnya. The ethnic Azeris, Lezghis and Avars living on both sides of the Azerbaijan-Dagestan border and friendly relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are tools for promoting stability.
Conclusion
--------
¶58. (C) The situation in the North Caucasus is trending towards destabilization, despite the increase in security inside Chechnya. The steps we believe Putin must take are those needed to reverse that trend, and the efforts we have outlined for ourselves are premised on a desire to promote a lasting stabilization built on improved governance, a more active civil society, and steps towards democratization. But we must be realistic about Russia’s willingness and ability to take the necessary steps, with or without our assistance. Real stabilization remains a low probability. Sound policy on Chechnya is likely to continue to founder in the swamp of corruption, Kremlin infighting and succession politics. Much more probable is a new phase of instability that will be felt throughout the North Caucasus and have effects beyond. BURNS
---
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07LAPAZ3153 2007-11-30 23:11 2010-12-03 21:09 SECRET Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHLP #3153/01 3342314
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FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5844
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7362
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4730
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8637
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5864
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3082
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 0486
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3284
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3718
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 5067
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 5719
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0326
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0749
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T LA PAZ 003153
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR VE CU BL
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE?
REF: A. LA PAZ 3013
¶B. LA PAZ 3119
Classified By: Ecopol Counselor Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 b and d.
¶1. (C) Summary. A common cry among opposition circles is
that Hugo Chavez is pulling Evo's strings, particularly as
Morales forcefully pushes forward to adopt a new constitution
that would provide for indefinite reelection. Evo for his
part does nothing to hide his admiration for Chavez; on the
contrary he acts like a smitten school girl when he is with
Chavez and constantly touts their personal/ideological bond.
But, how much influence does Chavez have? Is Venezuelan
money buying loyalty within the Bolivian armed forces? Are
there sizable numbers of Venezuelan troops in country? Is
Venezuela smuggling arms into Bolivia? While it is difficult
to separate fact from fiction, there is little doubt here
that Evo listens to Chavez, and that the Venezuelan and Cuban
Ambassadors here play a central advisory role. We have heard
enough to indicate that Venezuela is impatient with the pace
of change in Bolivia and is pushing Morales hard to
consolidate his hold on power. The results of Venezuelan
December 2 constitutional referendum may impact Evo's
thinking on how he should proceed with a similar referendum
in Bolivia. End summary
Alleged Venezuelan Coaching on Constituent Assembly
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -
¶2. (C) While the opposition sometimes exaggerates Chavez'
influence over Morales, Brazilian and Peruvian diplomats
based in La Paz assert that it is becoming increasingly
evident that Chavez is pushing Evo to follow Venezuela's
script. These diplomats recounted a GRULAC dinner hosted by
the Cuban Ambassador on November 26, attended by President
Morales (who arrived with the Venezuelan Ambassador), during
which Evo told the group that "there is no going back."
Morales expressed displeasure with how his MAS party handled
the Constituent Assembly process in Sucre but was vehement
that a new constitution must go forward. To the astonishment
of the Latin American diplomats present, the Venezuelan
Ambassador then launched into a 30-minute ramble about the
common history Bolivia and Venezuela share and how their
futures are linked.
¶3. (S) According to the Brazilian political counselor, an
"extremely reliable" source had reported that the Venezuelan
Ambassador was at an Evo cabinet meeting November 29 as the
MAS-led Constituent Assembly was proceeding in Sucre.
Apparently, when a couple of ministers expressed concern
about moving forward unilaterally with the Constituent
Assembly, the Venezuelan Ambassador urged that the government
go ahead. Comment: While we are quite skeptical that the
Venezuelan Ambassador would actually attend a cabinet
meeting, ROAL sources independently place the Venezuelan at
the Palace that day. Whether or not the Venezuelan
Ambassador actually attended the cabinet meeting, Evo meets
regularly with him and undoubtedly seeks his advice. End
Comment.)
Venezuelan Military Presence in Beni Department
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶4. (C) In a discussion with Peruvian, German, Argentine and
Brazilian diplomats here, all expressed concern about a known
Venezuelan military presence in the northeastern Beni
department (bordering Brazil). It is quite public and in
fact touted that a Venezuelan engineer company is building
levies around the Beni capital of Trinidad. Beni local
authorities are, however, convinced that the Venezuelans are
also training Bolivian military in special operations and
have sizable arms caches for a possible further deployment.
The German reported that without a doubt there is a
Venezuelan base in San Borja, but the other diplomats were
dismissive of this information and argued that the Beni
authorities tend to greatly exaggerate. We cannot confirm
that there is a "secret" Venezuelan base at that location and
suspect that the opposition is exaggerating and/or is simply
expressing concern about the Venezuelan military presence.
Our Defense Attach was told by the Mayor of Trinidad on
November 26 that there are 200 to 300 Venezuelans in
Trinidad. The group of diplomats affirmed that the number of
Venezuelans is about 300, but no one is completely certain.
We understand that the Venezuelans have exclusive control
over Venezuelan flights and cargo, and exercise an inordinate
amount of control over the military portion of the Trinidad
airport.
Beni on Venezuelan Mystery Flights:
We're Not Gonna Take It, Anymore
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (S) Defense Attach also met with Trinidad Mayor Moises
Shiriqui following a meeting between Beni Department Prefect
Ernesto Suarez and Beni Mayors. The Mayor brought up the
0100 arrival of a Venezuela C-130 cargo plane at the Beni
airport November 24, which local authorities suspected was
shuttling arms. After unloading seven large wooden crates,
the plane immediately departed. Authorities told the media,
which were forced to leave shortly after the landing, that
the boxes contained medical supplies. (Note: We have not
been able to determine what is in the crates. End note.)
¶6. (C) Prefect Suarez announced publicly November 29 that
Venezuelan planes would not be allowed to land at Trinidad.
If provided advance landing notice from the government, local
authorities plan to block the runway with vehicles in order
to prevent any Venezuelan plane from landing or taking off.
(Note: Official Airport hours are between 0800 and 2200.
There is a history of opposition accusations the Venezuelans
are shipping in arms, perhaps destined for nefarious
pro-government groups. The opposition also complained about
an early morning Beni stopover by Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez as an affront to Bolivian sovereignty. Ref A. End
Note.)
Will Evo Turn To Comandante Chavez?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) The Peruvian political counselor was extremely
concerned that Venezuela, at Evo's invitation, would
intervene militarily in Bolivia to back Morales should he be
unable to exercise control over the opposition departments of
Beni, Pando, Tarija and Santa Cruz. The Peruvian believes,
and the Brazilian agreed, that the rank-and-file military
will not/not use lethal force against fellow Bolivians. We
too share this assessment (Ref B). The Peruvian and
Brazilian both commented that funds coming in from Venezuela
to the Bolivian military do not flow down from the senior
ranks, and therefore, there is much resentment. The top
military commanders, however, are opportunists that will
follow Evo's orders out of self-interest. In fact, Generals
Vargas, Bersatti and Trigo are reportedly fighting to stay in
their jobs, causing further disgruntlement among those who
would like to move into their positions. So, there are
strong indications that the military is split and could be
quite reticent to follow orders. Hence, with no Bolivian
military to enforce Evo's will, Peru fears he will turn to
Chavez.
Chavez Stirs the Pot
- - - - - - - - - -
¶8. (SBU) Chavez's November 27 statement that the U.S.
"empire" is "promoting violence" in order to overthrow the
Morales administration builds on a constant barrage of
inflammatory statements indicating a willingness, or perhaps
an eagerness, to send Venezuelan troops to Bolivia to bolster
his erstwhile ally. Chavez's October 14 threat to turn
Bolivia into Vietnam should "oligarchs" attack Morales
provided the opposition with traction for long-standing
complaints of Venezuelan "imperialist" designs. Morales
defended the remarks in November 4 magazine article. Both
leaders reiterated and expanded upon the Vietnam remarks
during their November 10 addresses at the Ibero-American
Conference in Chile, where Chavez warned Bolivian supporters
of the United States ("pitiyanquies") that any attempt to
remove Morales would be met with "a thunder of rifles and
machine guns." Questions over possible Venezuelan
involvement in the October 18 Bolivian military takeover of
Santa Cruz's Viru Viru Airport further ignited criticism of
the Bolivian-Venezuelan relationship. Venezuelan
"imperialism" has stayed in the headlines since, fed by
heated exchanges between opposition and government officials,
an alleged attack on the Venezuelan consulate in Santa Cruz,
and a scandal involving $11 million in missing Venezuelan
micro-credit loans.
Comment
- - - -
¶9. (C) The opposition's cries of Chavez the big bad wolf are
over the top, but they are right when they express concern
that Evo is getting advice from the Venezuelans and Cubans.
With checks and doctors, the Venezuelan and Cuban ambassadors
are doing what they can to bolster Evo and push his change
program. For example, it is estimated that Evo has
distributed around $60-80 million in Venezuelan checks to
municipalities since he came to office. That said, beyond the
financial support and advisory role, we find little hard
evidence to support the prospect of actual Venezuelan
military intervention in Bolivia. The opposition will
continue to point to Chavez to discredit Evo and are hoping
that a victory for the "no" vote in Venezuela's referendum
will give Evo pause about proceeding with his. Likewise, the
opposition fears that if Chavez wins, he will embolden Evo to
push ahead
GOLDBERG.
---
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW5154 2007-10-26 02:02 2010-12-01 23:11 SECRET Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO9740
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #5154/01 2990225
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 260225Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4848
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 005154
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS PREL, ECON, MARR, MASS, PARM, PINR, PINS, RS
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING RUSSIAN ARMS SALES
REF: A. STATE 137954 B. MOSCOW 3207 C. MOSCOW 3139 D. MOSCOW 3023 E. MOSCOW 557 F. MOSCOW 402
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: FM Lavrov’s disinterest in establishing an expert level dialogue on arms sales begs the question of how best to address our concerns over Russia’s arms export policy. Russian officials are deeply cynical about our motives in seeking to curtail Russian arms exports to countries of concern and the threatened imposition of U.S. sanctions has not proven successful so far in modifying Russian behavior. Russia attaches importance to the volume of the arms export trade, to the diplomatic doors that weapon sales open, to the ill-gotten gains that these sales reap for corrupt senior officials, and to the lever it provides the Russian government in stymieing American interests. While Russia will reject out of hand arguments based on the extraterritorial application of American sanctions, Russian officials may be more receptive to a message couched in the context of Russian international obligations and domestic legislation, the reality of American casualties, and the backlash to Russian strategic interests among moderate Sunni governments. In making our argument, we should remember that Russian officialdom and the public have little, if any, moral compunction about the arms trade, seeing it instead as a welcome symbol of Russia’s resurgent power and strength in the world. End Summary
-------------------------
Russian Arms Sales Matter
-------------------------
¶2. (C) Russian arms sales are consequential, totaling approximately USD 6.7 billion in 2006, according to official figures. This amount reflects a 12 percent increase over 2005, and a 56 percent increase since 2003. Russian arms sales are expected to total at least USD 8 billion in 2007. Russia has made a conscious effort to improve after-sales customer service and warranties, which has added to the attractiveness of its weapons. As a result, Russian weapons command higher prices than previously. Russia is ranked second only to the United States in arms sales to the developing world, and a sizeable portion of its arms trade is with countries of concern to us.
¶3. (C) While no sales were reported in 2006 to Iran, Syria, or Sudan, in 2007 Iran reportedly paid Russia USD 700 million for TOR-M1 air defense missile systems. While Syrian economic conditions are a natural brake on trade with the Russians, as a matter of principle the GOR is prepared to sell “defensive” equipment such as anti-tank missiles and Strelets (SA-18) surface-to-air missiles, as well as upgrade MiG-23 fighters. The GOR barred the sale of Iskander-E tactical missiles to Syria only after intense international pressure. Venezuela remains a growth market, with arms transfers in 2006 totaling more than USD 1.2 billion, including 24 Su-30MK2 fighter-bombers and 34 helicopters. Russia has an “open arms” approach to Venezuela, and whether it’s the transfer of more than 72,000 AK-103 assault rifles or negotiations for the prospective sale of three Amur class submarines (valued at USD 1 billion), Russia is prepared to entertain Chavez’s grandiose regional visions.
¶4. (C) Defense experts emphasize that the American and European domination of traditional NATO markets and capture of new entrants (and old Soviet customers) from Central and Eastern Europe means that Russia must court buyers that fall outside the U.S. orbit. By definition, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela are good markets for Russia because we don’t compete there.
¶5. (C) While concrete numbers are hard to come by, our best figures indicate that Russian arms sales to its traditional big-ticket customers -- China and India -- are growing. Russian experts, however, predict a declining trajectory in the medium term. In 2006, Russia completed approximately USD 1.4 billion in sales to China, including eight diesel submarines and 88 MI-171’s, which means the PRC only narrowly edged out Chavez as Russia’s most important customer. Russian defense experts underscore that as China’s technological sufficiency and political influence grow, the PRC will develop increasing military self-sufficiency and greater ability to challenge Russia as a supplier. At the same time, sales to India totaled only USD 360 million. Russia and India, in fact, have signed arms deals worth USD
MOSCOW 00005154 002 OF 004
2.6 billion, but not all deliveries and payments have been made. While Russian experts still downplay the ability of the U.S. to displace Russia in the Indian arms market, for reasons of cost and the legacy of decades’ old dependence, they recognize increasing American inroads and growing influence. Other notable Russian markets include Algeria, Czech Republic, Vietnam, South Korea and Belarus.
-----------------------
A Legalistic World View
-----------------------
¶6. (S) As the recent 2 2 consultations confirmed, Russian officials defend arms sales to countries of concern in narrow legal terms. In answering our demarches, MFA officials always identify whether the transfer is regulated by one of the multilateral arms controls regimes (e.g. Wassenaar Group, MTCR, etc.), UN resolutions, or Russian law. Senior officials maintain that Russia does take into account the impact on the stability of the region in determining whether to sell weapons and shares our concern about weapons falling into terrorists’ hands. This Russian decision-making process has led to a defacto embargo on weapons transfers to Iraq, where Russia is concerned over leakages to Iraqi insurgents and Al-Qaida; to a hands-off policy towards Pakistan, the country Russia views as the greatest potential threat to regional stability (with then-Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov ruling out weapons sales to Pakistan as far back as 2003); and to a moratorium on “offensive” systems to Iran and Syria. Concern over leakage has prompted Russia to tighten its export controls, with the recent institution of new provisions in arms sale contracts for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) that require end-user certificates and provide Russia the right to inspect stockpiles of weapons sold.
¶7. (S) What Russia has not done is accept our strategic calculus and rule out the possibility of sales to Iran, Syria, Sudan, or Venezuela. The arguments made are broadly similar:
-- With Iran, we are told that that Russia will not sell any weapon that violates a multilateral or domestic regime, nor transfer any item that could enhance Iranian WMD capabilities. Sales, such as the TOR-M1 air defense missile system, are justified as being defensive only, and limited by their range of 12 kilometers. While DFM Kislyak told us October 18 that he was unaware of any plans to sell Iran the S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system, MFA officials previously told us that such sales, while under review, would not violate any Russian laws or international regimes.
-- With Syria, Russia also argues that its transfers are defensive in nature, and points to its decision to halt the sale of MANPADS. The MFA maintains that Russian weapons used by Hizballah in 2006 were not a deliberate transfer by the Syrian government, but involved weapons left behind when Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon. Russia argues that tightened end-user controls will prevent any future transfers.
-- With Sudan, the GOR denies any current arms trade with the regime, and maintains that Russia has not violated UN sanctions or Putin-initiated decrees. However, based on our demarches, it is clear that -- in contrast to Syria -- Russia has adopted a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to Sudan’s adherence to its end-use requirements for its existing inventory of Russian/Soviet weapons.
-- With Venezuela, both MFA officials and Russian experts believe that a “Monroe doctrine” mentality, and not real concerns over regional stability, is behind U.S. demarches.
-----------------------------------
What Is Behind the Russian Calculus
-----------------------------------
¶8. (C) A variety of factors drive Russian arms sales, but a compelling motivation is profit - both licit and illicit. As former Deputy Prime Minister and senior member of the Duma Defense Committee Anatoliy Kulikov told us, “Russia makes very bad cars, but very good weapons,” and he was among the majority of Russian defense experts who argued that the laws of comparative advantage would continue to propel an aggressive arms export policy. While Russian defense budgets have been increasing 25-30 per cent for the last three years, defense experts tell us that export earnings still matter. The recent creation of RosTechnologiya State Corporation, headed by Putin intimate Sergey Chemezov, which consolidates under state control RosOboronExport (arms exports), Oboronprom (defense systems), RusSpetsStal (specialized steel production), VSMPO (titanium producer), and Russian
MOSCOW 00005154 003 OF 004
helicopter production, is further proof of the importance the Putin government places on the industry.
¶9. (C) Likewise, it is an open secret that the Russian defense industry is an important trough at which senior officials feed, and weapons sales continue to enrich many. Defense analysts attribute Russia’s decision to sell weapons that the Venezuelan military objectively did not need due to the interest of both Venezuelan and Russian government officials in skimming money off the top. The sale of Su-30MK2 fighter-bombers was cited as a specific example where corruption on both ends facilitated the off-loading of moth-balled planes that were inadequate for the Venezuelan Air Force’s needs.
¶10. (C) A second factor driving the Russian arms export policy is the desire to enhance Russia’s standing as a “player” in areas where Russia has a strategic interest, like the Middle East. Russian officials believe that building a defense relationship provides ingress and influence, and their terms are not constrained by conditionality. Exports to Syria and Iran are part of a broader strategy of distinguishing Russian policy from that of the United States, and strengthening Russian influence in international fora such as the Quartet or within the Security Council. With respect to Syria, Russian experts believe that Bashar’s regime is better than the perceived alternative of instability or an Islamist government, and argue against a U.S. policy of isolation. Russia has concluded that its arms sales are too insignificant to threaten Israel, or to disturb growing Israeli-Russian diplomatic engagement, but sufficient to maintain “special” relations with Damascus. Likewise, arms sales to Iran are part of a deep and multilayered bilateral relationship that serves to distinguish Moscow from Washington, and to provide Russian officials with a bargaining chip, both with the Ahmedinejad regime and its P5 1 partners. While, as a matter of practice, Russian arms sales have declined as international frustration has mounted over the Iranian regime, as a matter of policy, Russia does not support what it perceives as U.S. efforts to build an anti-Iranian coalition.
¶11. (C) A third and related factor lurking under the surface of these weapons sales is Russia’s inferiority complex with respect to the United States, and its quest to be taken seriously as a global partner. It is deeply satisfying to some Russian policy-makers to defy America, in the name of a multipolar world order, and to engage in zero-sum calculations. As U.S. relations with Georgia have strengthened, so too have nostalgic calls for Russian basing in Latin America (which Russian officials, including Putin, have swat down). While profit is still seen by experts as Russia’s primary goal, all note the secondary thrill of causing the U.S. discomfort by selling weapons to anti-American governments in Caracas and Damascus.
----------------------------
Taking Another Run At Russia
----------------------------
¶12. (C) As FM Lavrov made clear during the 2 2 consultations, Russia will not engage systematically at the expert level on its arms export regime. While the prospect of Russia changing its arms export policy in response to our concerns alone is slim, we can take steps to toughen our message and raise the costs for Russian strategic decisions:
-- Although U.S. sanctions are broad brush, the more we can prioritize our concerns over weapons sales that pose the biggest threat to U.S. interests, the more persuasive our message will be. Demarches that iterate all transactions, including ammunitions sales, are less credible. Since Lavrov has rejected an experts-level dialogue on arms transfers, it is important to register our concerns at the highest level, and to ensure that messages delivered in Moscow are reiterated in Washington with visiting senior GOR officials.
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PARIS2725 2007-06-26 07:07 2010-12-01 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO5721
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #2725/01 1770754
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260754Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8471
INFO RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Friday, 26 October 2007, 02:25
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 005154
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS PREL, ECON, MARR, MASS, PARM, PINR, PINS, RS
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING RUSSIAN ARMS SALES
REF: A. STATE 137954 B. MOSCOW 3207 C. MOSCOW 3139 D. MOSCOW 3023 E. MOSCOW 557 F. MOSCOW 402
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: FM Lavrov’s disinterest in establishing an expert level dialogue on arms sales begs the question of how best to address our concerns over Russia’s arms export policy. Russian officials are deeply cynical about our motives in seeking to curtail Russian arms exports to countries of concern and the threatened imposition of U.S. sanctions has not proven successful so far in modifying Russian behavior. Russia attaches importance to the volume of the arms export trade, to the diplomatic doors that weapon sales open, to the ill-gotten gains that these sales reap for corrupt senior officials, and to the lever it provides the Russian government in stymieing American interests. While Russia will reject out of hand arguments based on the extraterritorial application of American sanctions, Russian officials may be more receptive to a message couched in the context of Russian international obligations and domestic legislation, the reality of American casualties, and the backlash to Russian strategic interests among moderate Sunni governments. In making our argument, we should remember that Russian officialdom and the public have little, if any, moral compunction about the arms trade, seeing it instead as a welcome symbol of Russia’s resurgent power and strength in the world. End Summary
-------------------------
Russian Arms Sales Matter
-------------------------
¶2. (C) Russian arms sales are consequential, totaling approximately USD 6.7 billion in 2006, according to official figures. This amount reflects a 12 percent increase over 2005, and a 56 percent increase since 2003. Russian arms sales are expected to total at least USD 8 billion in 2007. Russia has made a conscious effort to improve after-sales customer service and warranties, which has added to the attractiveness of its weapons. As a result, Russian weapons command higher prices than previously. Russia is ranked second only to the United States in arms sales to the developing world, and a sizeable portion of its arms trade is with countries of concern to us.
¶3. (C) While no sales were reported in 2006 to Iran, Syria, or Sudan, in 2007 Iran reportedly paid Russia USD 700 million for TOR-M1 air defense missile systems. While Syrian economic conditions are a natural brake on trade with the Russians, as a matter of principle the GOR is prepared to sell “defensive” equipment such as anti-tank missiles and Strelets (SA-18) surface-to-air missiles, as well as upgrade MiG-23 fighters. The GOR barred the sale of Iskander-E tactical missiles to Syria only after intense international pressure. Venezuela remains a growth market, with arms transfers in 2006 totaling more than USD 1.2 billion, including 24 Su-30MK2 fighter-bombers and 34 helicopters. Russia has an “open arms” approach to Venezuela, and whether it’s the transfer of more than 72,000 AK-103 assault rifles or negotiations for the prospective sale of three Amur class submarines (valued at USD 1 billion), Russia is prepared to entertain Chavez’s grandiose regional visions.
¶4. (C) Defense experts emphasize that the American and European domination of traditional NATO markets and capture of new entrants (and old Soviet customers) from Central and Eastern Europe means that Russia must court buyers that fall outside the U.S. orbit. By definition, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela are good markets for Russia because we don’t compete there.
¶5. (C) While concrete numbers are hard to come by, our best figures indicate that Russian arms sales to its traditional big-ticket customers -- China and India -- are growing. Russian experts, however, predict a declining trajectory in the medium term. In 2006, Russia completed approximately USD 1.4 billion in sales to China, including eight diesel submarines and 88 MI-171’s, which means the PRC only narrowly edged out Chavez as Russia’s most important customer. Russian defense experts underscore that as China’s technological sufficiency and political influence grow, the PRC will develop increasing military self-sufficiency and greater ability to challenge Russia as a supplier. At the same time, sales to India totaled only USD 360 million. Russia and India, in fact, have signed arms deals worth USD
MOSCOW 00005154 002 OF 004
2.6 billion, but not all deliveries and payments have been made. While Russian experts still downplay the ability of the U.S. to displace Russia in the Indian arms market, for reasons of cost and the legacy of decades’ old dependence, they recognize increasing American inroads and growing influence. Other notable Russian markets include Algeria, Czech Republic, Vietnam, South Korea and Belarus.
-----------------------
A Legalistic World View
-----------------------
¶6. (S) As the recent 2 2 consultations confirmed, Russian officials defend arms sales to countries of concern in narrow legal terms. In answering our demarches, MFA officials always identify whether the transfer is regulated by one of the multilateral arms controls regimes (e.g. Wassenaar Group, MTCR, etc.), UN resolutions, or Russian law. Senior officials maintain that Russia does take into account the impact on the stability of the region in determining whether to sell weapons and shares our concern about weapons falling into terrorists’ hands. This Russian decision-making process has led to a defacto embargo on weapons transfers to Iraq, where Russia is concerned over leakages to Iraqi insurgents and Al-Qaida; to a hands-off policy towards Pakistan, the country Russia views as the greatest potential threat to regional stability (with then-Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov ruling out weapons sales to Pakistan as far back as 2003); and to a moratorium on “offensive” systems to Iran and Syria. Concern over leakage has prompted Russia to tighten its export controls, with the recent institution of new provisions in arms sale contracts for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) that require end-user certificates and provide Russia the right to inspect stockpiles of weapons sold.
¶7. (S) What Russia has not done is accept our strategic calculus and rule out the possibility of sales to Iran, Syria, Sudan, or Venezuela. The arguments made are broadly similar:
-- With Iran, we are told that that Russia will not sell any weapon that violates a multilateral or domestic regime, nor transfer any item that could enhance Iranian WMD capabilities. Sales, such as the TOR-M1 air defense missile system, are justified as being defensive only, and limited by their range of 12 kilometers. While DFM Kislyak told us October 18 that he was unaware of any plans to sell Iran the S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system, MFA officials previously told us that such sales, while under review, would not violate any Russian laws or international regimes.
-- With Syria, Russia also argues that its transfers are defensive in nature, and points to its decision to halt the sale of MANPADS. The MFA maintains that Russian weapons used by Hizballah in 2006 were not a deliberate transfer by the Syrian government, but involved weapons left behind when Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon. Russia argues that tightened end-user controls will prevent any future transfers.
-- With Sudan, the GOR denies any current arms trade with the regime, and maintains that Russia has not violated UN sanctions or Putin-initiated decrees. However, based on our demarches, it is clear that -- in contrast to Syria -- Russia has adopted a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to Sudan’s adherence to its end-use requirements for its existing inventory of Russian/Soviet weapons.
-- With Venezuela, both MFA officials and Russian experts believe that a “Monroe doctrine” mentality, and not real concerns over regional stability, is behind U.S. demarches.
-----------------------------------
What Is Behind the Russian Calculus
-----------------------------------
¶8. (C) A variety of factors drive Russian arms sales, but a compelling motivation is profit - both licit and illicit. As former Deputy Prime Minister and senior member of the Duma Defense Committee Anatoliy Kulikov told us, “Russia makes very bad cars, but very good weapons,” and he was among the majority of Russian defense experts who argued that the laws of comparative advantage would continue to propel an aggressive arms export policy. While Russian defense budgets have been increasing 25-30 per cent for the last three years, defense experts tell us that export earnings still matter. The recent creation of RosTechnologiya State Corporation, headed by Putin intimate Sergey Chemezov, which consolidates under state control RosOboronExport (arms exports), Oboronprom (defense systems), RusSpetsStal (specialized steel production), VSMPO (titanium producer), and Russian
MOSCOW 00005154 003 OF 004
helicopter production, is further proof of the importance the Putin government places on the industry.
¶9. (C) Likewise, it is an open secret that the Russian defense industry is an important trough at which senior officials feed, and weapons sales continue to enrich many. Defense analysts attribute Russia’s decision to sell weapons that the Venezuelan military objectively did not need due to the interest of both Venezuelan and Russian government officials in skimming money off the top. The sale of Su-30MK2 fighter-bombers was cited as a specific example where corruption on both ends facilitated the off-loading of moth-balled planes that were inadequate for the Venezuelan Air Force’s needs.
¶10. (C) A second factor driving the Russian arms export policy is the desire to enhance Russia’s standing as a “player” in areas where Russia has a strategic interest, like the Middle East. Russian officials believe that building a defense relationship provides ingress and influence, and their terms are not constrained by conditionality. Exports to Syria and Iran are part of a broader strategy of distinguishing Russian policy from that of the United States, and strengthening Russian influence in international fora such as the Quartet or within the Security Council. With respect to Syria, Russian experts believe that Bashar’s regime is better than the perceived alternative of instability or an Islamist government, and argue against a U.S. policy of isolation. Russia has concluded that its arms sales are too insignificant to threaten Israel, or to disturb growing Israeli-Russian diplomatic engagement, but sufficient to maintain “special” relations with Damascus. Likewise, arms sales to Iran are part of a deep and multilayered bilateral relationship that serves to distinguish Moscow from Washington, and to provide Russian officials with a bargaining chip, both with the Ahmedinejad regime and its P5 1 partners. While, as a matter of practice, Russian arms sales have declined as international frustration has mounted over the Iranian regime, as a matter of policy, Russia does not support what it perceives as U.S. efforts to build an anti-Iranian coalition.
¶11. (C) A third and related factor lurking under the surface of these weapons sales is Russia’s inferiority complex with respect to the United States, and its quest to be taken seriously as a global partner. It is deeply satisfying to some Russian policy-makers to defy America, in the name of a multipolar world order, and to engage in zero-sum calculations. As U.S. relations with Georgia have strengthened, so too have nostalgic calls for Russian basing in Latin America (which Russian officials, including Putin, have swat down). While profit is still seen by experts as Russia’s primary goal, all note the secondary thrill of causing the U.S. discomfort by selling weapons to anti-American governments in Caracas and Damascus.
----------------------------
Taking Another Run At Russia
----------------------------
¶12. (C) As FM Lavrov made clear during the 2 2 consultations, Russia will not engage systematically at the expert level on its arms export regime. While the prospect of Russia changing its arms export policy in response to our concerns alone is slim, we can take steps to toughen our message and raise the costs for Russian strategic decisions:
-- Although U.S. sanctions are broad brush, the more we can prioritize our concerns over weapons sales that pose the biggest threat to U.S. interests, the more persuasive our message will be. Demarches that iterate all transactions, including ammunitions sales, are less credible. Since Lavrov has rejected an experts-level dialogue on arms transfers, it is important to register our concerns at the highest level, and to ensure that messages delivered in Moscow are reiterated in Washington with visiting senior GOR officials.
-- In the context of potential violations of international regimes and UNSCR resolutions, Russia needs to hear the concerns of key European partners, such as France and Germany. (In the wake of the Litvinenko murder and subsequent recriminations, UK influence is limited.) EU reinforcement is important for consistency (although Russia tends to downplay the “bad news” that European nations prefer to deliver in EU channels, rather than bilaterally).
-- Regional actors should reinforce our message. Russian weapon sales that destabilize the Middle East should be protested by the Sunni Arab governments that have the most to lose. Given Russia’s competing interest in expanding sales
MOSCOW 00005154 004 OF 004
to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the protests of our moderate Arab partners could also carry a price tag for Russian defiance. The same is true for Latin America, whose leaders to date have not made sales to Chavez an issue on their bilateral agenda with the Russians.
-- The appearance of Russian weapons in Iraq, presumably transferred by Syria, and the prospect of American and coalition casualties as a result could change the calculus of Russian sales to Damascus. The more evidence that we can provide, the more Russia may take steps to restrict the Asad regime. At the same time, we need to be prepared for the Russian countercharge that significant numbers of weapons delivered by the U.S. have fallen into insurgent hands.
-- Finally, providing the Russians with better releasable intelligence when arguing against weapons transfers to rogue states is essential. Our Russian interlocutors are not always impressed by the evidence we use to prove that their arms are ending up in the wrong hands. While we doubt Russia will terminate all its problematic sales for the reasons described above, more compelling evidence could lead the GOR to reduce the scope of its arms transfers or tighten export controls.
------------
Final Caveat
------------
¶13. (C) There are few voices in Russia who protest the sale of weapons to countries of concern and no domestic political constraints that tie the hands of Russian policymakers on this score. The pride that Russian officialdom takes in the arms industry as a symbol of Russia’s resurgence is largely shared by average Russians. American concerns are interpreted cynically, as the disgruntled complaints of a competitor, and viewed through the prism of a 1990’s story line in which the West seeks to keep Russia down, including by depriving it of arms markets. Burns.
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SINGAPORE1932 2007-10-19 08:08 2010-12-12 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Singapore
VZCZCXRO3881
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC
DE RUEHGP #1932/01 2920841
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190841Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4263
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1998
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1842
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4105
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5723
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1359
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 001932
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CH TW BM SN
SUBJECT: LEE KUAN YEW ON BURMA'S "STUPID" GENERALS AND THE
"GAMBLER" CHEN SHUI-BIAN
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold. Reasons 1.4(b)(d)
¶1. (C) Summary: ASEAN should not have admitted Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam into the organization in the
1990's, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew told visiting EAP DAS
Christensen and the Ambassador October 16. Expressing his
scorn for Burma's leaders, MM Lee called them "dense" and
"stupid." After discussing China's influence over Burma, he
suggested that Indonesian President Yudhoyono, as a former
general, could potentially be an interlocutor with the
regime. Turning to cross-Strait relations, MM Lee
characterized President Chen Shui-bian as a "gambler" who was
ready to "go for broke" on independence. He thought that
Japan might be willing to speak out publicly to constrain
Taiwan now that Yasuo Fukuda was prime minister. China's
strategy for Southeast Asia was simple -- "come grow with me"
because China's rise is inevitable. MM Lee urged the United
States to pursue more Free Trade Agreements to give the
region options besides China. End Summary.
ASEAN's Problematic Newer Members
---------------------------------
¶2. (C) Regional stability will be enhanced the more ASEAN is
able to "get its act together," Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew
told visiting EAP DAS Christensen and the Ambassador during
an October 16 meeting. However, ASEAN should not have
admitted Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam as members in the
1990's, Lee argued. The older members of ASEAN shared common
values and an antipathy to Communism. Those values had been
"muddied" by the new members, and their economic and social
problems made it doubtful they would ever behave like the
older ASEAN members.
¶3. (C) MM Lee was most optimistic about Vietnam. He
characterized the Vietnamese as "bright, fast learners" who
will contribute to ASEAN's development. Vietnam also does
not want to see China's influence in Southeast Asia become
too great. Cambodia has not recovered yet from its difficult
history and the political system is too personalized around
Prime Minister Hun Sen. MM Lee dismissed Laos as an outpost
for China, saying Laos reports back to China on theQproceedings from all ASEAN
meetings.
Burma's Generals: "Dense" and "Stupid"
--------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Turning to Burma, MM Lee expressed his scorn for the
regime's leadership. He said he had given up on them a
decade ago, called them "dense" and "stupid" and said they
had "mismanaged" the country's great natural resources. He
asserted that China had the greatest influence over the
regime and had heavily penetrated the Burmese economy. China
was worried that the country could "blow up" which would
endanger its significant investments, pipelines, and the
approximately two million Chinese estimated to be working in
the country. India was worried about China's influence in
Burma and was engaged with the regime in an attempt to
minimize China's influence. India lacked China's finer grasp
of how Burma worked, however.
Resolving the Crisis in Burma
-----------------------------
¶5. (C) MM Lee thought one possible solution to the crisis in
Burma would be for a group of younger military officers who
were less "obtuse" to step forward and recognize that the
current situation was untenable. They could share power with
the democracy activists, although probably not with Aung San
Suu Kyi, who was anathema to the military. It would be a
long process. He said that Burma's ambassador in Singapore
had told MFA that Burma could "survive any sanctions" due to
its natural resources. Lee said dealing with the regime was
like "talking to dead people."
SBY as Envoy?
-------------
¶6. (C) Asked about the possibility of ASEAN naming a Burma
envoy, MM Lee said an envoy could not be from Singapore,
because Singapore is seen as too close to the United States.
He suggested that Indonesian President Yudhoyono could
potentially be an interlocutor. As a former general, SBY
SINGAPORE 00001932 002 OF 003
might be able to meet with Senior General Than Shwe and get
him to listen. Furthermore, SBY is "keen to play the role of
peacemaker," but the challenge would be getting someone who
is not too close to the United States to ask him to do it.
MM Lee said that Vietnam was a possibility.
Chen Shui-bian: The Gambler
---------------------------
¶7. (C) MM Lee told DAS Christensen his September 11 speech to
the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council set the right "balance" and
made it clear to both sides where the United States stands.
He criticized President Chen Shui-bian for being a "gambler."
Chen had discredited himself with his corruption scandals
and the only card he had left was promoting Taiwan
independence; with nothing left to lose, Chen was ready to
"go for broke." MM Lee asserted that Chen feared a
post-election criminal investigation regardless of whether
the KMT or DPP won and had to "consolidate his position."
Chen wanted to secure his legacy and avoid becoming a mere
"footnote" in Taiwan history.
¶8. (C) Lee said he had told Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang in
separate meetings earlier this year that Taiwan would gain
nothing from pursuing independence and would pay a great cost
if it did. They responded that if Taiwan did nothing, it
would be reunified with the mainland; they did not want to be
a part of the PRC under any circumstances. Lee said he
understood their negative history with the KMT but found
their "antipathy, hatred, and revulsion" toward China to be
"unbelievable."
A Role for Japan
----------------
¶9. (C) Japan should speak out to restrain Taiwan from making
provocative moves towards independence, MM Lee said. He
asked what Japan had agreed to do in response to the proposed
referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan. DAS
Christensen noted that Japan has expressed its opposition
privately with President Chen, but did not agree to make any
public statements opposing the referendum. MM Lee suggested
that Japan might be willing to make a public statement now
with Yasuo Fukuda serving as prime minister. Fukuda has
close ties to the KMT and his father even risked China's ire
to attend former President Chiang Ching-kuo's funeral in
1988, according to Lee.
Dealing with a Rising China
---------------------------
¶10. (C) The more fundamental issue was how to deal with a
rising China, MM Lee observed. The intellectual resources of
the United States were being "sucked away" by the problems in
the Middle East, making it difficult for the United States to
focus on China. Over the next several decades, China wants
to concentrate on its internal economic development and to
avoid a conflict over Taiwan, Lee averred. However, if
Taiwan declared independence, China would have no choice but
to respond with force because its leaders have left
themselves no "loopholes." China hopes that the Taiwan issue
will be resolved on its own over the next fifty years when
Taiwan's economy becomes "totally embedded" into China. He
pointed to the case of Hong Kong, where the economy has been
booming in recent years due to its greater access to China's
market and the influx of tourists from the PRC.
ASEAN and China
---------------
¶11. (C) China's strategy for Southeast Asia was fairly
simple, MM Lee claimed. China tells the region, "come grow
with me." At the same time, China's leaders want to convey
the impression that China's rise is inevitable and that
countries will need to decide if they want to be China's
friend or foe when it "arrives." China is also willing to
calibrate its engagement to get what it wants or express its
displeasure. In the case of Singapore, China took "great
umbrage" over then-Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's
July 2004 visit to Taiwan. China froze bilateral talks, and
the proposed bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has not
progressed. However, China did not "squeeze" any of
Singapore's investors and China remains the largest
SINGAPORE 00001932 003 OF 003
destination for Singapore's FDI. MM Lee urged the United
States to pursue more FTAs with ASEAN, or at least key
members of ASEAN, which would give the region more options.
He said Malaysia's unwillingness to bend on its "bumiputera"
policy had been an impediment to a U.S.-Malaysia FTA.
¶12. (U) DAS Christensen has cleared this message.
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
HERBOLD
---
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TALLINN366 2007-06-04 14:02 2010-12-06 21:09 SECRET Embassy Tallinn
VZCZCXRO4489
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHTL #0366/01 1551427
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041427Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9880
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2513
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1194
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 0480
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TALLINN 000366
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/NB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD NATO RS EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIA'S CYBER ATTACKS: WORLD'S FIRST VIRTUAL
ATTACK AGAINST NATION STATE
REF: A) TALLINN 276 B) TALLINN 280 C) TALLINN 347 D)
LEE-GOLDSTEIN EMAIL 05/11/07
Classified By: Ambassador S. Dave Phillips for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
¶1. (S) Summary. Since April 27, Estonia has been the
victim of the world's first coordinated cyber attacks
against a nation state and its political and economic
infrastructure. The sensational nature of the story,
combined with the highly technical details of the subject
matter, has led to a good deal of misinformation in the
public domain. Although GOE and international analysis
is ongoing, these attacks have highlighted the
vulnerability of both government and private sector
internet infrastructure to attacks of this nature. For
over a month, government, banking, media, and other
Estonian websites, servers, and routers came under a
barrage of cyber attacks. Defense against the attacks
was extremely expensive for both GOE and the private
sector. GOE and private cyber defense experts cite the
nature and sophistication of the attacks as proof of
Russian government complicity in the attacks. End
Summary.
Virtual Shots Heard Round the World
-----------------------------------
¶2. (C) Cyber attacks against Estonian websites began on
April 27. They came in the wake of rioting in Tallinn
triggered by the Government of Estonia's (GOE)
preparations for relocating the so called "Bronze
Soldier", a Soviet-era World War II monument (Refs A and
B). The attacks initially targeted GOE websites
including those of the Estonian President, Prime
Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of
Justice (MOJ), and Parliament, among others. According
to XXXXXXXXXXXX the initial attacks were
technically unsophisticated and "seemed more like a cyber
riot than a cyber war." However, all our Estonian
interlocutors clearly recognized these attacks as
political in nature. Russian-language internet chat
forums held discussions exhorting people to attack
Estonian sites and supplied downloadable software tools
to carry out the attacks. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, these
initial attacks were limited to spam (a barrage of
unsolicited emails) and cyber vandalism (e.g., Prime
Minister Andrus Ansip's photo was defaced on the Estonian
Reform Party's website) and appeared to be nothing more
than a virtual mob reaction to the Bronze Soldier issue.
Estonian media and press commentators were quick to
accuse Moscow of being responsible, interpreting these
attacks as part of Russian retribution for moving the
Bronze Soldier (Ref C).
¶3. (S) However, on April 30, a broader range of cyber
attacks -- from simple spam postings to coordinated DDoS
(Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks -- began against
GOE sites. (Note. A DDoS attack is when a flood of
bogus queries are made to a specific server or network of
computers in order to over-saturate the target and
prevent access by legitimate users. End Note.) For
example, the Presidential website, which normally has a 2
million Mbps (megabits per second) capacity, was flooded
with nearly 200 million Mbps of traffic. While none of
the technology involved in the attacks was new, tactics
and tools routinely shifted to prevent Estonian
authorities from blocking the attacks. One of the most
pernicious tools in these attacks was "bots." (Note.
Bots are computers and/or servers under the control of a
third party. End Note.) These bot attacks came from
ISPs (internet service providers) around the world (e.g.,
the United States, Canada, Russia, Turkey, Germany,
Belgium, Egypt, Vietnam, etc.). Attacks routinely came
from one set of bots, subsided and then resumed again
using another set of bots with different ISPs. According
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the attacks ranged from a single
minute to many hours in length. The longest attacks lasted
TALLINN 00000366 002 OF 004
over ten hours and unleashed a crushing 90 million Mbps of
traffic on targeted endpoints. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX,
the GOE's assessment was that a small but unknown number
of individuals were behind these more sophisticated cyber
attacks, which quickly dwarfed the traffic volume of the
initial cyber rioters.
¶4. (S) On May 3, the cyber attacks expanded beyond GOE
sites and servers to private sites. Hansabank and SEB,
Estonia's two largest banks, faced the most significant
problems. Swedish-owned Hansabank and SEB account for
almost 75% of all online banking in Estonia. (Note:
Approximately 90% of all money transfers and bill
payments in Estonia are done online. End Note.)
Hansabank was well prepared with powerful servers,
alternate sites to mirror content (thus making it more
difficult for DDoS attacks), and the ability to
reallocate access lines from foreign to domestic
customers. However, even though Hansabank's site
remained online, XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that it came
at a cost - - at least 10 million Euros ($13.4 million)
Hansabank also had to temporarily block access to its site by all
foreign ISPs so that there was enough broadband capacity
for its domestic clients. However, Hansabank was able to
create alternate access mechanisms for its largest
foreign customers. Correcting much of the press coverage
in the early days of the attacks, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that while the cyber attacks against Hansabank and SEB were a
challenge, there was no serious danger of Estonia's
banking sector being shut down.
¶5. (S) This second wave of cyber attacks also hit the
websites of Postimees, Estonia's paper of record, and
Eesti Paevaleht, a leading Estonian-language daily, which
over two-thirds of Estonians regularly visit for their
news. "Imagine if you can the psychological effect,"
XXXXXXXXXXXX asked us, "when an Estonian tries to
pay his bills but can't or get the news online but can't." As
one of the most wired countries on the planet, GOE
interlocutors viewed the evolution of the attacks as a
frightening threat to key economic and societal
infrastructure.
¶6. (S) The attacks reached their apex on May 9, the
Russian anniversary of the end of World War II. To cope
with the rising volume of attacks, the GOE increased its
broadband capacity from two Gbps (Gigabites per second)
to eight Gbps. Hansabank, SEB, Postimees, and others
also added servers to increase broadband capacity. A
EUCOM cyber defense expert described it as a "cyber arms
race" where the Estonians repeatedly increased their
broadband capacity to match the increasing volume of
cyber attacks (Ref D). XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that XXXXXXXXXXXX
increased the "broadband pipe" for both government and private
clients at a frantic pace to keep up with the attacks.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that one GOE ministry increased
its original server capacity of 30 Mbps to 1 Gbps (1 Gbps
equals 1000 Mbps). XXXXXXXXXXXX said that this defensive
response by the GOE and the private sector was ultimately
successful, but it was extremely expensive.
¶7. (S) The number of attacks steadily declined after May
9 and 10, allowing GOE and private sites to reduce their
broadband capacity. However, on May 15, there was an
unexpected spike in attacks that focused on Hansabank and
SEB. In two separate and coordinated 15 minute attacks,
these two sites were hit with over 400 bot attacks
(roughly half the number of bot attacks recorded on May
10) from multiple ISPs. The attacks temporarily crashed
SEB's site for 30 minutes. Since the May 15 spike, the
number of attacks has declined and is now hovering
slightly above pre-April 27 numbers.
No Smoking Gun
TALLINN 00000366 003 OF 004
¶8. (S) On May 2, Foreign Minister Urmas Paet released a
statement that the MFA had proof that some of the attacks
originated from GOR ISPs. The Estonian and international
press carried Paet's claim, but XXXXXXXXXXXX interlocutors
distanced themselves from the accusation.
XXXXXXXXXXXX privately said to us that no "smoking gun"
incriminating Moscow has turned up and likely won't.
The use of bots, proxies, and spoofing tactics makes it
extremely difficult to determine with any certainty the origin
of the attacks. Press reports suggested that a million
computers were involved in the attacks. However,
XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that due to Estonia's poor
monitoring capability, XXXXXXXXXXXX could only speculate on the
number of computers and servers attacking Estonia, and had
even less specific information on the origins of the attacks.
(Note. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the one million figure
used by the press and the GOE was from a quote to the press
taken out of context in which he tried to explain how he could
only speculate a number ranging from a 1000 to a million
computers. End Note.)
¶9. (S) The GOE believes it has enough circumstantial
evidence to link Moscow with the attacks. As President
Ilves told the Ambassador, renting the large number of
bots used in these attacks is an expensive business.
Moreover, as XXXXXXXXXXXX repeatedly asked us in
conversations, "Who benefits from these attacks?" He
speculated that the probing nature of the attacks on
specific government and strategic private sector targets
through the use of anonymous proxies fit the modus
operandi of the Putin regime testing a new "weapon."
XXXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the GOE now feels that their original
assessment of a "cyber riot" may have been incorrect.
"Looking at the patterns of the attacks, it is clear that
there was a small, core of individuals who intended to
launch their attack on May 9," XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, "but
when the MOD announced its plans to move the Bronze
Soldier on April 27, they moved up their plans to try to
link the attacks with the monument's removal." Estonian
analysis of these later sophisticated attacks and
organization through Russian-language internet forums has
led them to believe that the key individuals tried to
disguise their initial attacks as a cyber riot. "You
don't expect spontaneous, populist cyber attacks to have
a pre-determined list of targets and precise dates and
times for coordinated attacks," said XXXXXXXXXXX.
¶10. (S) GOE interlocutors expressed their frustration
that their requests for information from the GOR or
action on Russian-based ISP attacks were not answered or
acted upon. XXXXXXXXXXX complained that cooperation
with Russia's CERT was almost nonexistent. Even at the height
of the Bronze Soldier controversy, GOE interlocutors who
regularly work with their Russian counterparts (e.g., law
enforcement, customs and tax, border guards, etc.) tell
us that working level cooperation was positive. In
comparison, the lack of responsiveness by the GOR and
Russian CERT personnel only diminished Russia's claims of
innocence in the eyes of the Estonians.
¶11. (S) On May 29, Konstantin Koloskokov, Commissar of
the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi in Transnistria,
claimed responsibility for some of the early cyber
attacks. While not discounting the possibility of his
involvement, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that some of the
attacks were extremely sophisticated; beyond the technical
abilities of an amateur. To illustrate the point, XXXXXXXXXXXX
and XXXXXXXXXXXX described an attack that used a mysterious
data packet to crash a GOE and Elion router so quickly that
the Estonians are still uncertain how it was done.
XXXXXXXXXXXX described in detail a number of
additional attacks using different tools and techniques
and targets to argue that an organized group with deep
financial backing was the likeliest culprit. "Koloskokov is
window dressing," said XXXXXXXXXXXX, "a convenient
set-up by the real perpetrators."
TALLINN 00000366 004 OF 004
PHILLIPS
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIJING125 2008-01-11 11:11 2010-12-09 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO9750
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0125/01 0111128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111128Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4403
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
Friday, 11 January 2008, 11:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000125
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/MLS, P, DRL
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2028
TAGS PREL, PHUM, CH, BM
SUBJECT: MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA’S EFFORTS ON BURMA
REF: 07 BEIJING 7197
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) Summary: China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current “standstill” in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw China’s attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) MFA Asia Department Counselor Yang Jian and Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Asia scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang met HFAC professional staff members Eric Richardson and Dennis Halpin and SFRC professional staff member Frank Januzzi on January 10-11.
“Bold Measures” Necessary to Prevent Further Turmoil
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶3. (C) Counselor Yang Jian told the HFAC and SFRC staff members January 11 that China would like to see the Burmese Government take “bold measures” to improve the livelihood of the Burmese people and achieve national reconciliation through dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy supporters as well as ethnic minority groups. Counselor Yang stated that the Chinese accept the Burmese regime’s so-called “roadmap” to democracy as the best route to democracy and national reconciliation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said the Burmese government exerts control over society only on the surface and the potential for “lots of trouble” persists. Zhai said the regime’s inept handling of the economy costs it legitimacy. Even if the Burmese generals and Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a healthy dialogue, economic problems could throw the country into turmoil.
Encouraging Signs but Current Standstill
----------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Yang said despite the potential for further trouble, the Chinese government is encouraged by a number of developments since the disturbances in August and September, including the visits of UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, the appointment of Labor Minister Aung Kyi (who Yang believes is “close to the core” of the Burmese regime) as a liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, and the release of detainees. Yang said that during VFM Wang Yi’s November 2007 visit to Burma (reftel), Wang shared with senior Burmese leaders China’s analysis, again suggesting more attention to the livelihood of the Burmese people, dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, and more interaction with ASEAN. Yang said that, based on the regime’s positive language about the dialogue, China had been optimistic it would succeed. In light of the current “standstill” in Burma, however, China is thinking about what other steps now to take with the regime.
China’s “Extraordinary” Efforts
-------------------------------
¶5. (C) Yang recounted China’s efforts to improve the situation in Burma. She said that after China and Russia in January 2007 vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan traveled to Burma in February to hold “extraordinary” discussions with the regime’s senior leaders. Tang suggested that Senior General Than Shwe and other Burmese leaders improve Burma’s domestic and international situation. Yang said lower level Burmese officials, hesitant to approach senior leaders with critical advice, were pleased with China’s approach to Than Shwe.
¶6. (C) Scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang January 10 separately echoed the view that China is making great efforts to influence Burma positively while adhering to its policy of non-interference. Zhai said China has delivered indirect but clear signals to Asian countries and the United States on the need for greater openness in Burma. Zhai highlighted Premier Wen Jiabao’s November 19 speech at the National University of Singapore. (Note: Wen’s speech included the following: “Only an open and inclusive nation can be strong and
BEIJING 00000125 002 OF 003
prosperous; cutting off contacts with the outside world can make a country backward.”)
Direct U.S.-Burma Dialogue
--------------------------
¶7. (C) During the Wang Yi visit, Burmese leaders expressed interest in more discussions with the United States. Noting that USG officials have suggested Burmese officials contact our Embassy in Rangoon, Yang said Burma preferred the format of the June 2007 talks in Beijing. China views the June meetings between the Burmese delegation and State Department officials as a “bilateral confidence building measure,” Yang said.
Continued Support for Gambari
-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Yang said China will continue to support UN Special Advisor Gambari’s mission, though she noted that the Burmese Government is unhappy with Gambari because Burmese leaders believe they followed Gambari’s suggestions during his first visit but then received only further opprobrium. Yang said Burmese leaders are unhappy about the UN “Group of Friends” on Burma. While China is open to multilateral means to address the situation in Burma, China believes Burma’s acceptance of these means is the key to success. For example, China would like ASEAN to play a more constructive role, Yang said, but ASEAN is divided over how to address Burma. Older ASEAN member countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, favor a hard-line approach. Newer ASEAN members, such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, support a more moderate stance towards Burma.
No Sanctions
------------
¶9. (C) MFA’s Yang reiterated that China remains opposed to additional sanctions, which she said will not spur further dialogue, but instead make the regime look further inward and give it an excuse for hard-line polices. Despite China’s opposition to sanctions, Yang stressed that the United States and China have similar goals for Burma, including stability, democracy and development. Therefore, China and the United States should show unity, particularly in the UN, in addressing the situation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said that because China foremost values stability in Burma, China does not wish to see a sudden change in the Burmese regime. In that light, China fears the pressure of more sanctions may only bring further civil unrest.
China’s attention drawn away from Burma
---------------------------------------
¶10. (C) CICIR’s Zhai said China would like to see ASEAN play a larger role on Burma partly because domestic events in China, including the National People’s Congress in March and the Olympics in August, are increasingly consuming China’s attention. Zhai said recent protests in Vietnam over the South China Sea and the turmoil in Pakistan have also drawn China’s and international attention away from Burma.
Including democracy supporters slows down roadmap
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶11. (C) Zhai said that including the democratic opposition and ethnic groups in the so-called roadmap to democracy at this stage would slow down the process, yet Zhai asserted that “if Senior General Than Shwe is rational,” he will include the democratic opposition to increase the legitimacy of the current regime.
USG should assure safe future for Burmese generals
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶12. (C) CICIR’s Zhang said that the United States should “play two hands” with the Burmese Government. Zhang said the United States has been sufficiently critical of the regime and now should send messages, via China if necessary, to reassure Burmese military leaders that their personal security would not be imperiled in a democratic transition. Zhang said that guaranteeing the safe future of the current military leadership is the key to “unlocking the deadlock.”
¶13. (U) HFAC and SFRC staff members did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.
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RANDT..
---
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING22 2009-01-06 08:08 2010-12-04 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO0309
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0022/01 0060841
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060841Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1691
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIJING 000022
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY, DEPUTY SECRETARY, EAP A/S
HILL, S/P, EAP/CM
NSC FOR DWILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, MARR, MASS, CH
SUBJECT: LOOKING AT THE NEXT 30 YEARS OF THE U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONSHIP
Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
¶1. (C) January 1, 2009, marked the 30th Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. This anniversary followed the PRC commemoration of roughly 30 years of China’s “reform and opening” policy under Deng Xiaoping, which led to China’s staggering economic growth.
¶2. (C) Thirty years ago, China was just emerging from the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution and 30 years of fratricidal misrule. China’s economy was crippled by years of disastrous policies like the Great Leap Forward. The population was coming to terms with the world’s most draconian population controls enacted in 1976 after decades of Maoist state-subsidies encouraging large families. Chinese foreign relations tended to be more influenced by ideological yardsticks than economic links since China had very few commercial links with the outside world. In 1979, Chinese urbanites on average made the equivalent of five dollars per month.
¶3. (C) Just as no one in 1979 would have predicted that China would become the United States’ most important relationship in thirty years, no one today can predict with certainty where our relations with Beijing will be thirty years hence. However, given the current significance of the bilateral relationship and the risk of missing opportunities to jointly address ongoing and predictable future challenges, below we look at trends currently affecting China with an eye to how those trends might affect relations. Several issues leap out, including China’ insatiable resource needs, our growing economic interdependence, China’s rapid military modernization, a surge in Chinese nationalism, China’s demographic challenges, and the PRC’s increasing influence and confidence on the world stage.
¶4. (C) China has been plagued over the millennia by unforeseen events that devastated formerly prosperous regimes. Mongol invasion, the Black Death, uncountable peasant uprisings, warlords, tax revolts, communist dictatorship, colonialism, famine, earthquakes and other plagues were largely unforeseen by the China watchers of the past. This report focuses generally on more optimistic projections. Given China’s history, however, the United States should also gird itself for the possibility that China will fall short of today’s mostly sanguine forecasts.
Resource Consumption
--------------------
¶5. (C) Popular and scholarly works in recent years highlight China’s growing demand for natural resources and the possible impact that China’s pursuit of resources will have on its foreign policy. Since economic reforms began in the late 1970s, industrial and exchange rate policies have fueled investment in resource-intensive heavy industries in China’s coastal region, which currently account for approximately 55 percent of the country’s total energy consumption today. A construction boom over the past decade has also stimulated growth in heavy industries. China is now a leading steel producer and currently accounts for 50 percent of the world’s annual cement production. Reflecting China’s emphasis on resource-intensive industries, China’s energy utilization rate grew faster than its GDP between 2002 and 2006. In 1990, China consumed 27 quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTUs) of energy, accounting for 7.8 percent of global consumption. In 2006, it consumed 68.6 quadrillion BTUs or 15.6 percent of the global total. According to U.S. Department of Energy statistics, by 2030 China will account for 145.5 quadrillion BTUs or 20.7 percent of global energy consumption.
¶6. (C) China’s oil demand has grown substantially over the last 30 years. In 1980, China consumed 1.7 million barrels of oil per day, almost all of which was produced domestically. In 2006, China consumed 7.4 million barrels per day, second only to the United States. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China’s oil consumption will reach 16.5 million barrels per day in 2030. More than two thirds of the increased demand will come from the
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transport sector as vehicle ownership rates rise. China became a net importer of oil in 1993, and it now relies on imports to meet a growing portion of its fossil fuel needs. The IEA forecasts that China’s oil import dependence will rise from 50 percent this year to 80 percent by 2030, as domestic oil production peaks early in the next decade. To strengthen the country’s future energy security, the Chinese Government has adopted a “go out” policy that encourages national oil companies (NOCs) to acquire equity stakes in foreign oil and gas production. Today, state-owned Chinese oil giants CNPC/PetroChina, CNOOC, and Sinopec can be found in Sudan, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Venezuela, Angola, and the Caspian Basin.
¶7. (C) China has also increased its reliance on imported minerals, and many analysts have attributed the global commodities boom of recent years in part to China’s growing demand. Between 1980 and 2006, China became the world’s largest consumer of iron, copper and aluminum. Chinese conglomerates are ubiquitous in sub-Saharan Africa exploiting mineral wealth there, and Chinese multinationals have significant investments in Australian mineral and uranium production.
¶8. (C) China’s reliance on coal has come at an appalling environmental cost. This year, China surpassed the United States in carbon emissions, and it will soon become the world’s biggest energy consumer. Between now and 2030, the IEA estimates, China will need to add 1,312 gigawatts of power generating capacity, more than the total current installed capacity in the United States. Coal-fired power generation, a major source of air pollution, accounts for approximately 78 percent of China’s total electricity supply, and it will likely remain the predominant fuel in electricity generation for at least the next 20 years. Analysts predict that domestic coal production will peak in the next 15 to 25 years. China already became a net importer of coal in 2007, and coal imports are expected to grow in the coming decades to meet growing demand in China’s coastal provinces.
¶9. (C) The Chinese Government recognizes the need to reduce dependence on coal, and it is pursuing policies to diversify its energy mix. China is already the largest producer of renewable energy in the world, with major investments in large-scale hydro and wind power projects. Nuclear and natural gas power will also account for a greater proportion of energy production, but under current projections, efforts to diversify China’s energy mix will not have a large enough impact to curb greenhouse gas emissions growth.
¶10. (C) China’s energy intensive growth has also had tragic consequences for public health. By most measurements, at least half of the world’s most polluted major cities are in China. Rural residents, in particular farmers, have been affected by water pollution and dwindling water supplies, which are frequently redirected for industrial use. Respiratory disease, water-borne illness and tainted food scares are facts of modern life in the country. According to a recent WHO study, diseases caused by indoor and outdoor air pollution kill 656,000 Chinese citizens every year. Another 95,600 deaths are attributed annually to polluted drinking water.
¶11. (C) China’s increasing reliance on imported natural resources has foreign policy ramifications and provides opportunities for the United States. A China that is increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil might be more likely to support policies that do not destabilize the Middle East. Take Iran, for instance. We have long been frustrated that China has resisted (with Russia) tough sanctions aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program. In the future, a China increasingly dependent on foreign energy supplies may recalculate the risk a nuclear Iran would pose to the greater Persian Gulf region’s capacity to export oil.
¶12. (C) Another opportunity presented by China’s increasing resource consumption is in the joint development of technological responses to reduce carbon emissions and to diminish the public health impact of industrial growth. Scientific publications around the world conclude that the projected rate of global energy and natural resource
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consumption is unsustainable. Experts warn that we must find alternative forms of energy in order to avert calamities posed by global climate change. International efforts to develop and significantly utilize renewable energy, clean up our shared global environment, and conserve our remaining raw materials will not be effective without meaningful Chinese participation. As the world’s preeminent technological power and as a leader in multilateral energy and scientific organizations, the United States is in a unique position to work with China to overcome these challenges.
Economic Interdependence and Chinese Demographics
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶13. (C) In the next fifteen years, while China’s overall population is predicted to stabilize, its urban population will likely grow to almost 1 billion, an increase (of 300 million people) equal to the entire current population of the United States. China plans to build 20,000 to 50,000 new skyscrapers over the next two decades -- as many as ten New York cities. More than 170 Chinese cities will need mass transit systems by 2025, more than twice the number now present in all of Europe. China is now surpassing Germany as the world’s third largest economy and is projected to overtake Japan within the next five years. By the end of the next thirty years, China’s economy could rival the United States in overall scale (although its per capita income will likely only be one quarter of the United States’).
¶14. (C) Behind these outward symbols of success will be an increasingly complicated economic picture. Since 1979, by reversing the misguided economic policies of the Mao era, liberalizing labor markets and prices, opening to foreign investment, and taking advantage of the West’s consumer-driven policies, China has maintained fast growth. However, the set of circumstances that allowed such impressive growth rates will no longer exist in the future.
¶15. (C) Many speculate that China has reached the limit to easy productivity gains by rationalizing the state-planned economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects China’s annual growth to slow from around 10 percent in the last 30 years to 4.5 percent by 2020. After 2015 when the labor force peaks as a share of the population, labor costs will rise faster. This will increasingly make other countries like India and Vietnam more attractive for labor-intensive investment. In addition, workers will have to support a growing number of retirees. Early retirement ages combined with the urban one-child limits creates the so-called “4-2-1” social dilemma: each worker will have to support four grandparents, two parents and one child. Savings rates will start falling as the elderly draw down their retirement funds.
¶16. (C) China will have to manage an economy increasingly dependent on domestic consumption and service industries for growth. Already, urbanites are buying 1,000 new cars per day, making China the world’s largest Internet and luxury goods market, and traveling abroad in growing numbers. By 2025, China will have the world’s largest middle class, and China will likely have completed the transition from the majority rural population of today to a majority urban population. These consumers of tomorrow will likely flock to products from around the world as their North American, European and Japanese counterparts do today, providing new opportunities for American business. If incomes continue to grow, it is likely that the Chinese middle class will react like educated urbanites in other countries by exerting pressure on the Government to improve its dismal performance on environmental protection, food and product safety. We are already seeing increased public activism over such issues today.
¶17. (C) China will face a challenge in the next thirty years encouraging this urban consumption while dealing with the social equality issues inherent in a rural population where over 200 million people still live on less than a dollar a day. China will also have to find a way to improve the lot of between 150 and 230 million migrant workers who today must leave their children and aging parents behind in their home villages to travel to the industrial centers of the
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relatively developed coastal regions to work in factories or on construction projects.
¶18. (C) With China’s phenomenal growth has come increased economic interdependence. This will likely increase, although some of the less-balanced elements of China’s economic interactions should be mitigated. Rising consumption rates should work to lower China’s trade surplus as well as its overabundance of foreign exchange reserves. More assets controlled by corporations and individuals, as opposed to the government, will diversify outward investment, reducing political control by Beijing, but also the utility of political suasion for U.S. policymakers interested in effecting the flow of capital to international hotspots.
Chinese Nationalism and Confidence on the International Stage
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
¶19. (C) As one of two main pillars of post-Mao Chinese Communist Party rule (the other being sustained economic growth), Chinese nationalism is growing and should be monitored closely. As witnessed during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Chinese are increasingly proud of the tremendous strides their country has made in recent years. More and more young people see China as having “arrived” and might possess the confidence and willingness to assume the responsibilities of a major power. However, as was evident during protests over the 1999 mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2004 protests over Japanese textbooks, and more recently the anti-France diatribes that followed the roughing-up of a disabled Olympic torch bearer in Paris by Free Tibet supporters, this nationalism can also lead to jingoism. Chinese leaders of a system with few outlets to express political sentiments are faced with trying to give vent to the occasional uprising of nationalistic anger without letting it get out of hand or allowing it to focus on the failings of the central leadership.
¶20. (C) With notable exceptions like Zhou Enlai, Chinese foreign policy practitioners thirty years ago had little practical experience dealing with the West. Since then, Chinese diplomats and subject matter experts are increasingly well-educated, well-traveled and well-respected. Chinese diplomats at international fora such as the UN and the WTO have become adept at using procedural rules to attain diplomatic or commercial ends. This trend will likely continue in the coming decades, increasing the likelihood of American decision makers finding more able adversaries when we disagree on issues, but also more able partners where we can agree to jointly tackle a problem of mutual concern such as nonproliferation, alternative energy or pandemic influenza.
¶21. (C) While still reluctant to claim China is a global leader, Chinese officials are gradually gaining confidence as a regional power. By the end of the next 30 years, China should no longer be able to portray itself as the representative of lesser developed countries. This does not mean that it will necessarily identify with the more developed, mainly Western countries; it well might choose to pursue some uniquely Chinese path. In the coming 30 years, a U.S. President might be involved in negotiations with a Chinese leader seeking to reshape global financial institutions like the IMF or the WTO or establish rival institutions for non-Western countries in order to mitigate domestic Chinese concerns. Even so, China’s growing position as a nation increasingly distinct from the less-developed world may expand our common interests and make it easier for the United States to convince China to act like a responsible global stakeholder.
¶22. (C) Foreign assistance coordination is another area of opportunity. China is rapidly ramping up its global economic presence, not only via resource extraction ventures and cheap exports, but increasingly via direct investment and assistance. This investment and assistance are welcome in most less-developed countries, whether in Africa or Southeast Asia, and particularly in countries where China’s longstanding policy of “no strings attached no political interference” appeals to democratically-challenged dictators
BEIJING 00000022 005 OF 007
and kleptocrats. However, China is already facing blowback as a result of its more cavalier approach to issues that more scrupulous donors have wrestled with for decades. Scant attention paid to worker safety, job opportunities for local people, environmental protection, and political legitimacy has had negative consequences for China on multiple occasions, from a tarnished international image and being used as a political whipping boy by opposition groups in democratic countries to unpaid loans, expropriated investments, and even the deaths of Chinese expatriates. As a result, China is beginning to understand the merits of international assistance standards not for altruistic reasons, but for achieving China’s own bottom-line imperatives of a more secure international position and better-protected economic interests in third countries. This realization, coupled with China’s growing economic clout on the world stage, make it quite possible that, in the next 30 years, China will come to be identified by the average citizen in less developed countries not as “one of us” but as “one of them.”
¶23. (C) In all likelihood, a new-found (if still somewhat grudging) PRC interest in internationally accepted donor principles such as transparency, good governance, environmental and labor protections, and corporate social responsibility will have matured in 30 years’ time, making China a reliable partner for the United States, other donor countries, and international organizations in alleviating poverty, developing infrastructure, improving education and fighting infectious disease. And as one of the world’s premier economic powers, China can be expected to have all but discarded its over-worn and outdated “non-interference” rhetoric in the face of massive Chinese investment assets and other economic interests abroad.
¶24. (C) As evidenced by Chinese policies toward pariah states like Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma and Iran, China is still willing to put its need for markets and raw materials above the need to promote internationally accepted norms of behavior. However, the possible secession of southern Sudan (where much of the country’s oil is found) from the repressive Khartoum-based Bashir regime, the erratic treatment of foreign economic interests in Zimbabwe by Robert Mugabe, the dangers to regional safety and stability posed by Burma’s dysfunctional military junta, and the threat to China’s energy security that a nuclear-armed Iran would represent have given Beijing cause to re-calibrate its previously uncritical stance toward these international outlaws. If China’s integration into global economic and security structures continues apace, we would expect its tolerance for these sorts of disruptive players to decrease proportionately.
¶25. (C) China’s work in the Six-Party Talks and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization may provide guidance as to how to accelerate this trend. China plays a leading and often responsible and constructive role in both of these multilateral groups. Future U.S. policy-makers might usefully consider additional international mechanisms that include both U.S. and Chinese membership such as the proposed Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism that may grow out of the Six-Party Talks. The Chinese themselves have suggested a Six-Party Talks-like grouping to address the Iran nuclear issue, perhaps a P5-plus-1-plus-Iran. In the future, we may wish to consider the United States joining the East Asia Summit (EAS).
¶26. (C) Likewise, as the Chinese economy takes up a larger portion of the global economy, it inevitably will become increasingly affected by the decisions of international economic and financial institutions. Similarly, China’s economic decisions will have global implications, and its cooperation will become essential to solving global-scale problems. Drawing China constructively into regional and global economic and environmental dialogues and institutions will be essential. More and more experts see the utility of establishing an Asia-Pacific G-8, to include China, Japan, and the United States plus India, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Russia; others say the time is ripe to include China as a member of a G-9. Giving China a greater voice is seen as a way to encourage China to assume a larger burden in
BEIJING 00000022 006 OF 007
supporting the international economic and financial system.
Role of the Military
--------------------
¶27. (C) The disparate possibilities exist that in the coming decades the PLA will evolve into a major competitor, maintain only a regional presence or become a partner capable of joining us and others to address peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, humanitarian relief and disaster mitigation roles around the world. China may be content to remain only a regional power, but Deng Xiaoping’s maxim urging China to hide its capabilities while biding its time should caution us against predicting that the PLA’s long-term objectives are modest. In the years to come, our defense experts will need to closely monitor China’s contingency plans and we will need to use every diplomatic and strategic tool we have to prevent intimidating moves toward Taiwan. In the coming years, Chinese defense capabilities will continue to improve. The PLA thirty years from today will likely have sophisticated anti-satellite weapons, state-of-the-art aircraft, aircraft carriers and an ability to project force into strategic sea lanes.
¶28. (C) Thirty years ago the PLA was a bloated political organization with antiquated equipment and tactics. Today, the PLA is leaner and is becoming a modern force. Chinese military and paramilitary units have participated in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions in East Timor, Kosovo, Haiti and Africa. In December 2008, for the first time, the PLA Navy deployed beyond the immediate waters surrounding the country to participate in anything beyond a goodwill tour to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. It is likely that China will continue to support UN-sponsored PKOs, and if the piracy expedition is successful, China might follow up with expeditions to future piracy hotspots such as the Strait of Malacca or elsewhere.
¶29. (C) Over the past thirty years, Chinese officials have come to begrudgingly acknowledge the benefits to East Asia resulting from the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, especially the extent that a U.S. presence in the Pacific is an alternative to a more robust Japanese military presence. A peaceful resolution of the threat posed by North Korea might cause China to call for an end to the U.S. base presence on the Korean Peninsula. Perceived threats to China’s security posed by Japan’s participation in missile defense or by future high-tech U.S. military technologies might cause tomorrow’s Chinese leaders to change their assessment and to exert economic pressures on U.S. allies like Thailand or the Philippines to choose between Beijing and Washington.
¶30. (C) Whatever the state of our future relations with China, we will need to understand more about the Chinese military. Multilateral training and exercises are constructive ways to promote understanding and develop joint capabilities that could be used in real-life situations. In the coming years, the Chinese may be called upon to participate in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief exercises. Some of these could be handled under UN auspices, but others could be bilateral or multilateral. For instance, Cobra Gold, which is held every year in Thailand, is America’s foremost military exercise in Asia. It has a peacekeeping component and since the December 2004 tsunami in Indian Ocean has included a humanitarian relief element. With proper buy-in by the Pentagon and PACOM, we could create a program to engage the PLA more directly both with our military and with friendly militaries in the region. Modest efforts at expanding search and rescue capabilities on the high seas, developing common forensic techniques for use in mass casualty events, conducting exercises with PLA units tasked with responding to civil nuclear emergencies, or table-top exercises for U.S. and Chinese junior officers could be steps that promote trust with little risk. At the same time, more frequent, regularly scheduled high-level reciprocal visits between Chinese and U.S. security officials might eventually lead to a constructive strategic security policy dialogue on nonproliferation, counterterrorism and other issues.
BEIJING 00000022 007 OF 007
Taiwan and Human Rights
------------------------
¶31. (C) Taiwan was the most vexing issue holding up the establishment of relations 30 years ago and remains the toughest issue for U.S.-China relations despite significant improvement in cross-Strait relations since the election of Taiwan President Ma. It will remain a delicate topic for the foreseeable future. We should continue to support Taiwan and Mainland efforts to reduce tension by increasing Taiwan’s “international space” and reducing the Mainland’s military build-up across from Taiwan.
¶32. (C) Thirty years ago, the Chinese state interfered in virtually every aspect of its citizens’ lives. An individual’s work unit provided housing, education, medical care and a burial plot. Reeducation sessions and thought reform were common, churches and temples were closed, and average citizens had little access to the outside world. Today, Chinese have far greater ability to travel, read foreign media and worship. Nonetheless, the overall human rights situation falls well short of international norms. Today, China’s growing cadre of well-educated urbanites generally avoids politics and seems more interested in fashion and consumerism than in ideology; after all, outside-the-box political thinking, much less activism, remains dangerous. However, any number of factors in the future ranging from rising unemployment among recent college graduates, or growing discontent over the income divide separating rich urbanites from poor peasants, to discontent among the mass of migrant workers could lead to unrest and increased political activism. The Chinese Government still responds with brutal force to any social, religious, political or ideological movement it perceives as a potential threat. Chinese political leaders’ occasional nods toward the need for political reform and increased democracy suggest a realization that the current one-party authoritarianism has its weak points, but do not promise sufficient relaxation of party control to create a more dynamically stable polity in the long term.
¶33. (C) While the U.S. model of democracy is not the only example of a tolerant open society, we should continue to push for the expansion of individual freedoms, respect for the rule of law and the establishment of a truly free and independent judiciary and press as being necessities for a thriving, modern society and, as such, in China’s own interests. Someday, China will realize political reform. When that day comes, we will want to be remembered by Chinese for having helped China to advance. Randt..
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BERLIN1360 2009-10-29 06:06 2010-11-28 18:06 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXRO3059
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHRL #1360/01 3020636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290636Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5600
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BERLIN 001360
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR EUR/CE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR GM
SUBJECT: THE NEW GERMAN CABINET - AN OVERVIEW
Ref: Berlin 1337, Berlin 1340, Berlin 1167
BERLIN 00001360 001.2 OF 004
¶1. (SBU) Chancellor Merkel's new Cabinet emerged early on October 24
after a month of intense media speculation about its make-up; it
contained several surprises. Perhaps the most unexpected
announcements were that of former Interior Minister Schaeuble as
Finance Minister and former Economics Minister Karl-Theodor zu
Guttenberg as the new Defense Minister. The Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) will run the Chancellery as well as six ministries and
have a minister without portfolio, the Free Democratic Party (FDP)
will hold five as well as the Vice Chancellorship, and the Christian
Social Union (CSU), three. The ministerial competencies and their
names remain unchanged. Following is a short description of
Merkel's new Cabinet, which was formally sworn in on October 28:
Chief of the Chancellery and Minister
Without Portfolio: Ronald Pofalla (CDU)
--------------------------------------
Pofalla, 50, takes over from Thomas de Maiziere as the Chancellor's
chief of staff. Pofalla is a lawyer and since 2005 served as CDU
Secretary General. He is known as a close confidant of Angela
Merkel. As Secretary General, he had been criticized as lacking a
public profile and not being aggressive enough. From 2004-2005 he
served as deputy caucus leader for economics and labor issues in the
Bundestag. Also within the Chancellery, Merkel's security and
foreign policy advisor Christoph Heusgen remains, as do Maria
Boehmer as Minister of State for Migration, Refugees and Integration
and Bernd Neumann, Minister of State for Culture and Media. Eckart
von Klaeden (CDU and a Merkel confidant) becomes State Minister in
the Chancellery for coordination with the federal states and
parliamentary contacts.
Foreign Affairs: Guido Westerwelle (FDP)
---------------------------------------
Westerwelle, 47, becomes Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor -- as
expected. Economic Assistance will not be included in the Foreign
office, but the FDP will also control that ministry. Minister of
State within the MFA will be Werner Hoyer, who already served in
that function under Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel from 1994-1998.
He also was Westerwelle's foreign policy adviser in the election
campaign. He will cover all divisions apart from "culture" and
"economics and sustainable development." The other Minister of
State is Cornelia Pieper, deputy FDP chairperson, who has no
experience in this field and will reportedly focus on cultural and
communication issues. Martin Biesel, Westerwelle's Bundestag chief
of staff, will become a State Secretary within the MFA to coordinate
the work of the FDP ministries with the Chancellery. Westerwelle
has described Biesel as his closest advisor.
Defense: Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU)
----------------------------------------
The CSU's rising star, zu Guttenberg, 37, seemed certain to remain
in the cabinet. However, there was speculation that his Economics
Ministry seat would be up for grabs. When Economics went to the FDP
and Finance to Schaeuble, zu Guttenberg's best fit was in Defense.
The DefMin job gives zu Guttenberg the opportunity to work on
foreign and security issues again, which was his main area of
interest as a parliamentarian. He is seen as a good and capable
replacement for Jung, who was widely criticized for being overly
cautious and inarticulate in explaining security and defense issues
to the German public. Zu Guttenberg is expected to improve the
Defense Ministry's image, prestige and weight within the cabinet
through his popularity and public relations talents. His
appointment has already boosted morale among working level officials
in the MOD, who believe that zu Guttenberg will make MOD a real
player once again in German security policy debates. He is a
transatlanticist and well known in Washington. He will likely give
the Defense Ministry a higher profile. He will retain the current
Parliamentary State Secretaries Thomas Kossendey (CSU) and Christian
Schmidt (CSU).
Interior: Thomas de Maiziere (CDU)
---------------------------------
De Maiziere, 55, a lawyer, is a confidant of Angela Merkel and has
served as her chief of staff in the Chancellery for four years. He
had been mentioned as a potential finance minister, but reportedly,
his personal preference was interior. He brings some experience to
the job, since he served as state interior minister in Saxony
2004-2005 and as state minister of justice 2002-2004. However, some
of the issues he will face as federal interior minister, namely
international terrorism, are topics he has less exposure to. De
Maiziere is known to be a consensus builder who works the
interagency process well and is a good problem solver.
BERLIN 00001360 002.2 OF 004
Finance: Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU)
---------------------------------
Merkel wanted a political heavy weight in this difficult position
during the financial and economic crisis. Schaeuble, 67, is an
experienced, strong and well established politician from Germany's
southwest, who is expected to fill his new role quite well. He has
by far the longest federal government experience in Merkel's
cabinet. Confined to a wheel chair since he was shot during a
campaign rally in 1990, the conservative politician from the German
southwest is not known as a close friend of Chancellor Merkel's. A
member of the Bundestag since 1972, he is pragmatic, copes well with
pressure, and is known for his fierce loyalty. He does not shy away
from confrontation and will be ready to pursue unpopular or
controversial measures. In light of his age and his political
standing, he does not have to fear any consequences for his future
career, which a younger candidate would take into consideration.
While he had to give up the Interior Ministry (which he reportedly
liked very much), he is being compensated by running one of the most
influential ministries in the cabinet. While he cooperated well
during the coalition talks, political observers would have expected
major clashes with FDP Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger
over domestic security issues if he had remained in the Interior
Ministry.
Economics and Technology: Rainer Bruederle (FDP)
--------------------------------------------- --
Bruederle, 64, has been deputy caucus chief and economic spokesman
of the FDP in the Bundestag. He already served as economic minster
in Rhineland Palatinate 1987-1998, where he strongly promoted
wine-growers, trade, and small and midsize business. Since 1983 he
has been state chairman of the FDP in Rhineland Palatinate and
member of the national executive committee and since 1995 deputy
national party chairman. Hans-Joachim Otto and Ernst Burgbacher
(both FDP) will become State Secretaries within that Ministry.
Labor and Social Affairs: Franz-Josef Jung (CDU)
--------------------------------------------- --
Defense Minister Jung, 60, was unexpectedly switched to the Labor
and Social Affairs ministry. Jung had fallen victim to much
criticism during his tenure as Defense Minister and Merkel had been
pressured to replace him. Merkel, however, had to find another
cabinet post for Jung to maintain a proportional regional
representation in the cabinet - Jung's state of Hesse had to be
represented. Another reason for Merkel to keep Jung in the cabinet
in spite of his weaknesses and previous failures is his loyalty as a
minister.
Justice: Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP)
--------------------------------------------- --
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, 58, is FDP chairperson and caucus chief
in Bavaria. She successfully ran the 2008 FDP election campaign in
that state, where the FDP reentered the state parliament after 14
years of absence. She was the FDP's chief negotiator on Justice in
the coalition talks. She previously served as Justice Minister
under Chancellor Kohl from 1992-1996, but resigned in opposition to
legislation allowing electronic eavesdropping of private residences,
which was planned by her own government. She has a strong focus on
civil rights and data protection, and has been critical of what she
views are overly intrusive wiretapping and other electronic
surveillance measures (see ref C).
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women
and Youth: Ursula von der Leyen (CDU)
--------------------------------------
Von der Leyen, 51, a medical doctor and mother of seven, had
indicated a strong interest in moving to the health portfolio and
worked out that respective section of the coalition agreement for
the CDU. Merkel reportedly was not interested, however, in the CDU
controlling the health ministry in light of the necessary but
unpopular reforms and increasing costs of health care for citizens.
Since the health ministry went to the FDP, von der Leyen will remain
in her current position. In the past few years, von der Leyen has
successfully modernized the family policy of the CDU and thus its
image in this sector. She is one of Germany's most popular
politicians according to public opinion polls.
Health: Philipp Roesler (FDP)
----------------------------
Roesler, 36, is the youngest member of the cabinet and his
nomination was a surprise. He is sharp and dynamic and a rising
star of the FDP. He was state secretary general, state party
chairman and eventually economics minister in Lower-Saxony. He was
born in Vietnam and was adopted by a German family. Both Roesler
BERLIN 00001360 003.2 OF 004
and his wife are medical doctors, which gives him some practical
background for his new portfolio. Roesler negotiated the health
section of the coalition agreement for the FDP.
Environment, Nature Conservation and
Nuclear Safety: Norbert Roettgen (CDU)
-------------------------------------
Roettgen, 44, a close confidant of Chancellor Merkel had also been
named as potential chief of staff at the Chancellery. He has worked
closely with the Chancellor since her days as caucus chairman
2002-2005. Merkel reportedly appreciates his loyalty and analytical
talents. During the financial crisis he became one of her closest
advisors. While he does not have a reputation for expertise in his
new portfolio, Merkel obviously wanted to position many of her
confidants in the new cabinet. Environmental issues, especially
climate change, will figure prominently for Merkel.
Education and Research: Annette Schavan (CDU)
---------------------------------------------
Schavan, 54, will keep her current cabinet position. Even though
she did not have a prominent record, as a confidant of Angela
Merkel, it was assumed that she would stay on as a member of the
cabinet.
Transportation, Building, and Urban
Development: Peter Ramsauer (CSU)
-----------------------------------
Since November 2005, Ramsauer, 55, has served as head of the CSU
group in the Bundestag and deputy CDU/CSU caucus chief. As minister
for construction, housing and transportation, he will have a huge
budget to work with.
Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection:
Ilse Aigner (CSU)
-------------------------------------------
Aigner, 44, only became Minister for Agriculture and Consumer
Protection in October 2008. She came to this job as an expert on
research issues and new to the realities of production agriculture.
In her tenure, some parts of the German agriculture community have
been critical of her performance, particularly her close
relationship to Bavarian Minister President Horst Seehofer. The CSU
was interested in keeping this portfolio since agriculture continues
to play an important and tactical role in Bavaria.
Economic Cooperation and Development: Dirk Niebel (FDP)
--------------------------------------------- -----
Niebel, 46, has been Secretary General of the FDP since May 2005 and
belongs to the inner leadership circle of the FDP. He was named as
a potential minister since he made strong contributions to the
electoral success of the FDP. His actual expertise would have been
labor and social affairs. However, that portfolio went to the CDU.
The FDP sought in the coalition talks to have the Ministry of
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) merged with the MFA, but
failing that, having control of both ministries goes a long way to
meeting its concern that BMZ development policy be in line with MFA
priorities, especially on key issues like Afghanistan. Media
commentary has focused on Niebel's lack of previous experience in
development assistance, and how he may essentially serve as a
department head under Foreign Minister Westerwelle.
Comment
-------
¶2. (SBU) With five ministries in the new cabinet, the FDP is
arguably one of the most powerful junior coalition partners in
recent German history in terms of both the number and quality of
their cabinet appointments. The Greens had three, mostly junior,
ministries in their coalition with the Social Democrats from
1998-2005. The FDP has one more than it had during its last
coalition with the CDU. This is due in part to the election outcome
in which the FDP had its strongest-ever performance, with 14.6
percent of the vote. CDU officials also describe the appointments
as partial compensation for the policy concessions the FDP made
during coalition negotiations. The CDU/CSU will have the popular
and competent Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg as Defense Minister,
balancing the FDP's control over Foreign Affairs and Development
Assistance. Zu Guttenberg -- a strong transatlanticist -- is
well-connected in Washington and already has a strong background in
foreign and security policy. There has been some criticism that the
new Cabinet does not have any representation from eastern states.
Merkel responded to the criticism reminding that in fact the
Chancellor herself counts as representing the East. End comment.
BERLIN 00001360 004.2 OF 004
¶3. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulates Frankfurt,
Leipzig, Munich, Hamburg and Duesseldorf.
Murphy
--------------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1113 2009-09-04 21:09 2010-12-17 07:07 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO9330
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBR #1113/01 2472103
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 042103Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5017
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9890
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8151
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4501
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 001113
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, T, WHA, PM, ISN, NEA, EEB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD EFIN KNNP XM XF IR BR
SUBJECT: AUGUST 4-5 VISIT OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
TO BRAZIL
REF: A. BRASILIA 1038
¶B. BRASILIA 1092
¶C. BRASILIA 1094
BRASILIA 00001113 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. LISA KUBISKE, REASON 1.4(B) and
(D)
¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 4-5 visit to Brasilia dominated
by Brazilian concerns over USG intentions and the regional
implications of expanded U.S. access to Colombian military
bases, National Security Advisor General James L. Jones
assured senior GOB officials that President Obama desires a
transparent relationship with Brazil and wants to expand our
bilateral cooperation. The GOB encouraged greater U.S.
dialogue and engagement with Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba,
and more forceful U.S. action against the de facto government
in Honduras. In discussions concerning the Middle East peace
process, Iran, and non-proliferation, General Jones made
clear to Brazilian officials that Brazil,s growing
international role implied taking greater responsibility.
GOB officials described a Brazil that is seeking ways to
expand its global economic reach: ready to become an IMF
creditor, to finalize a global trade agreement, to engage in
bilateral and regional cooperation on energy, and to tackle
the difficult issues surrounding climate change. Although
the Colombia bases issue caused longstanding regional
security concerns to resurface, GOB officials were
complimentary of the new Administration,s initial approach
to Latin America and expressed interest in looking for new
ways to cooperate. End summary.
- - - Colombia Bases Dominate, with Venezuela Sub-Text - - -
¶2. (SBU) General Jones, joined by State U/S for Arms Control
and International Security Ellen Tauscher, Defense U/S for
Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter, and NSC
Director for South America Luis Rosello, met with Foreign
Minister Celso Amorim, Presidential Foreign Policy Marco
Aurelio Garcia, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, Casa Civil
Minister (Chief of Staff) Dilma Rousseff, Mines and Energy
Minister Edison Lobao, Petrobras CEO Sergio Gabrielli,
Central Bank President Henrique Meirelles, and a number of
other MRE, Defense, Energy, and Presidency officials, as well
as senior opposition and business figures. Ref B addressed
energy issues discussed during the visit.
¶3. (C) The Amorim, Garcia, Rousseff, and Jobim meetings all
included lengthy discussions of the Colombia bases issue.
Amorim ran through a series of questions that the news of the
bases had raised, recalling alleged statements in the past by
(unnamed) U.S. military officers suggesting that the
Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay tri-border area might be a
"legitimate U.S. target" if terrorist activity were
discovered there, and that "U.S. Congressional reports"
accusing Venezuela of supporting drug trafficking (a
reference to a recent GAO report), combined with the stated
counternarcotics mission of the bases, raised concern that
they might be used to launch actions against Venezuela.
Amorim said that what for the United States was "business as
usual" was exacerbating tensions in a sensitive (and in
Chavez's case, hypersensitive) region.
¶4. (C) Garcia said he appreciated the frankness of the
dialogue and expected that we would overcome the current
"malaise." He noted that President Lula would meet Colombian
President Uribe later that week, and that Garcia had spoken
with Venezuelan President Chavez about the issue; in his
view, Chavez did not see it as a big problem, but the issue
"smelled of Cold War" and was surprising to the GOB after the
"very positive" overtures by the Administration and
considering that, in his view, the FARC had never been so
weak and the only security threat to the United States in
Latin America comes from Mexico. Garcia dismissed the
discovery in FARC hands of Swedish anti-tank weapons that had
been sold to the Venezuelan government as overblown noting
that the weapons were old and that, in any case, they would
be of limited value since "there are no tanks in insurgency
conflicts." Garcia added that he did not believe the GOV was
supporting the FARC because "the FARC is involved in drug
trafficking, and everyone knows that involvement with the
drug trade is destructive." He noted that the current crisis
is the continuation of a longstanding love-hate relationship
between Colombia and Venezuela, and that this was the third
BRASILIA 00001113 002.2 OF 004
Colombia-Venezuela crisis that he had had to deal with.
Garcia stressed that Brazil's overriding interest is in
ensuring a peaceful region that can live with the differences
among countries, and cited this as the reason Brazil supports
the Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
¶5. (C) Dilma Rousseff told Gen. Jones that the GOB finds it
disconcerting to be faced with questions from the press
regarding why the United States needs such bases. According
to Rousseff, issues such as this open the door for radicals
who want to create problems in the region. Gen. Jones
emphasized Colombia's need for assistance in maintaining its
security against drug traffickers and the FARC, and then
recounted Uribe's concerns that his fight against the FARC
was made more difficult because of FARC positions in other
countries. In all three meetings, Gen. Jones explained the
nature of the agreement as largely formalizing the current
relationship. He said he was willing to send a team of USG
civilian and military officials to provide additional
information, but stressed that it was unfortunate that others
were playing up this issue in the press since USG officials
including himself were available to talk whenever GOB
officials had concerns about USG actions.
¶6. (C) Jobim told Gen. Jones that Brazil has great
expectations of the Obama Administration, noting that
transparency was a very important component of the U.S.
relationship with South America. He noted that issues like
the Colombia bases become more difficult when the GOB learns
of them through the press, but added that Brazil, too, is
often surprised by the sensitivities of "Spanish America"
regarding issues that would be considered innocuous
elsewhere. Gen. Jones encouraged Jobim to call if there were
further doubts about U.S. intentions.
¶7. (C) While insisting they did not want to engage in
mediation between the USG and GOV, both Garcia and Amorim
used the opportunity to encourage the United States to
establish "a direct channel of communication with President
Chavez." Amorim suggested that a good USG-GOV dialogue would
have an impact on the domestic situation in Venezuela, as
well, because much of the opposition to Chavez has ties to
the United States.
- - - Other Regional Issues on Brazil,s Mind - - -
¶8. (C) With regard to Honduras, Amorim said that Chavez had
wanted to make President Zelaya "a martyr," but the GOB had
convinced him that "only the United States can influence what
happens in Honduras" and needed to be consulted. Amorim said
he had declined OAS SYG Insulza's request to participate in a
foreign ministers' group, saying that the prospects had
"slipped" since the Arias initiative had begun. He felt that
the possibility of the de facto government rejecting yet
another initiative made it too risky. Amorim described USG
actions against the de facto government as "surface
scratches" that were not deep enough to do damage. There had
been enough concessions to Micheletti, he said. The United
States needs to tell him in clear terms that he must allow
Zelaya back. The situation in Honduras needs a resolution
that is "both quick and peaceful," Amorim said, although he
recognized the difficulty of achieving both. For his part,
Garcia noted that President Zelaya would be coming to Brazil
shortly, and encouraged the USG to apply stronger pressure on
the de facto government to allow Zelaya to be restored to
power quickly*he suggested revoking more visas. Garcia
stressed that Zelaya "is not a dangerous revolutionary," that
returning him to power to run the elections "will not lead to
significant changes," and that the de facto government cannot
be allowed to run elections.
¶9. (C) Garcia said that Brazil is seeking to increase its
investment in Bolivia, and particularly to compensate for
Bolivia's lost ATPDEA benefits. Amorim called removal of
ATPDEA benefits "a mistake." Garcia said that there no
longer appeared to be grave problems in Bolivia, but stressed
that it was important for the USG to build a positive agenda
with Bolivia.
¶10. (C) Garcia said that the USG "embargo" (sic) on
Brazilian sales of Super Tucano aircraft in the region was
"very negative" and raised serious questions in Brazil
regarding defense cooperation with the United States. If the
BRASILIA 00001113 003.2 OF 004
United States is going to place limits on what Brazil can do,
then partnership "is no good" for Brazil. Tauscher and
Carter explained to Garcia, as well as to Amorim and
Rousseff, that the Administration recognized the need to
overhaul the procedure for protecting technology. Tauscher
stressed that there is no embargo and that, going forward,
such decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis taking
into account the impact they might have on Brazil.
¶11. (C) Jobim stressed the importance of regional stability
for Brazil, but cautioned that Brazil resists being labeled
the regional leader because they do not see it as helpful in
resolving problems. Brazil's concessions to Paraguay on the
Itaipu dam were an example of Brazil putting stability
interests over commercial interests, an approach that many in
Brazil criticized.
¶12. (C) Discussing Cuba, Garcia and his deputy, Amb. Marcel
Biato, laid out their view that Raul Castro is more pragmatic
and less ideological than Fidel, with a focus on getting
short-term economic results. They see Cuba as taking a path
similar to that of Vietnam under Raul, whom they acknowledged
was a transitional leader. Given that the United States has
a relationship with Vietnam, Garcia said, there is no reason
the United States can't have a similar relationship with
Cuba. In their view, Brazilian support for Cuba and efforts
to "create a new niche" for Cuba in the hemisphere open
additional space that Raul needs to engage the United States.
They noted that their plans to help Cuba construct a
deep-water port at Mariel only make sense on the assumption
that Cuba and the United States will eventually develop a
trading relationship.
- - - Middle East, Iran, Non-Proliferation - - -
¶13. (C) FM Amorim and MRE Under Secretary for the Political
Affairs II Roberto Jaguaribe told Gen. Jones that they had
heard from the Palestinians how pleased they were with his
appointment and listened keenly to his assessment of the
situation following his trip to the region the previous week.
Jaguaribe said it is the GOB's view that the
Israel-Palestine conflict is the key to resolving most
questions in the Middle East. He stressed that Brazil was
pleased with the Annapolis process, but acknowledged that
neither Israel nor the Arabs seemed to want it to continue.
Referring to his trip to the Middle East in 2008, Amorim
highlighted the importance of engaging Syria in the process.
¶14. (C) Amorim praised the "excellent" opening to Iran made
by President Obama--"If they don't respond," he asked, "then
what do they want?" Amorim described the Brazil-Iran
relationship as "not deep, but pragmatic" and dominated by
commercial concerns. He said the nature of the relationship
should not be "overvalued"--"we are not buddies"--but that
there is a channel between them, and Brazil was willing to
help if it can, although "not just to pressure" Iran.
Petrobras CEO Gabrielli told Gen. Jones that Petrobras is
terminating exploratory activity in Iran, although a small
office will be left open. Amorim and other officials
expressed concern that there might be an effort to prevent
Iran from pursuing enrichment even for peaceful purposes, and
Amorim said, in particular, that the "zero-for-zero" approach
"did not sound right." Gen. Jones told both Garcia and
Amorim that we would be pleased to share our views on Iran as
the process moves forward.
¶15. (C) All GOB interlocutors stressed the importance of the
President's initiative on disarmament, which Amorim
characterized as "the best argument for non-proliferation."
U/S Tauscher noted the importance of Brazil in the 2010
review conference on the NPT and asked for Brazil's
assistance in making it productive. (Note: See also ref A
on State/NSC discussions with GOB officials on
non-proliferation. End note.)
- - - Prospects for Defense Partnership - - -
¶16. (C) Jobim highlighted the fact that Brazil's new
National Defense Strategy was crafted to ensure the defense
sector would be an "enabler of development." Brazil is no
longer an "off the shelf" buyer of defense equipment.
Rather, it wants to be a partner in joint ventures with
countries that want to sell equipment. Jobim said that, as a
BRASILIA 00001113 004.2 OF 004
lawyer and judge, he is inclined to look at precedents when
considering the possibilities for technology transfer. The
U.S. precedents "are not very encouraging." Tauscher and
Carter acknowledged the complexity and history attached to
the relationship, suggesting we focus on the way forward: a
relationship of full partnership that allows both parties to
prosper. (See ref C for additional reporting on their
meetings.)
- - - A Dissenting View - - -
¶17. (C) Former Brazilian ambassador to London and Paris and
communications minister Sergio Amaral and former agricultural
minister Roberto Rodrigues criticized GOB foreign policy for
being too ideological. Arguing that foreign policy had
become politicized under Lula to compensate for his orthodox
economic policies, Amaral described it as too lenient with
South American neighbors, favoring leftist governments in the
region rather than remaining in a position to resolve
disputes, and focused too heavily on South-South relations
and too little on relations with the United States.
Rodrigues criticized Brazil's rejection of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), saying it had hurt the Brazilian
economy.
- - - Trade and Finance - - -
¶18. (SBU) Noting the excellent relations President Lula had
with President Bush, Garcia stressed the "enormous
expectations" that Brazil has for President Obama, adding
that he saw "extraordinary possibilities" for the United
States coming out of the current economic crisis.
¶19. (C) Amorim commented that countries had gone a long way
toward concluding the Doha trade round, but criticized the
current U.S. position, saying it seemed to be identical to
that of the last Administration. Gen. Jones stressed that
the United States wants to see a "balanced and ambitious"
Doha agreement, and U/S Tauscher noted the difficulty the
President faced in recasting the trade agenda to the American
people in the midst of a recession. Amorim said he believed
the last Administration had "lost sight of the big picture,"
and encouraged greater political-level involvement from the
USG, saying that "trade negotiations cannot be left to the
trade negotiators."
¶20. (SBU) Brazilian Central Bank Governor Henrique Meirelles
told Gen. Jones he anticipated the September G20 meeting
would focus on regulation of the global financial system, and
confirmed that although Brazil had not yet made its USD 10
billion disbursement to the IMF, "it will happen." Regarding
the global financial crisis, Meirelles credited Brazil's
relatively strong position in part to strong domestic demand.
He also pointed to the fiscal austerity law, passed
following the financial crisis of the 1990s, which brought
down domestic debt and allowed Brazil to become a net foreign
exchange creditor. He indicated that the bigger surprise was
that Brazil had been affected as much as it was; a fact he
attributed to Brazilian reliance on foreign commercial credit
for financing. This problem however, had been mitigated by
the low level of credit in Brazilian society, previously as
low as 22 percent of GDP, now at 43 percent, compared to over
200 percent in the United States.
¶21. (C) In response to a question from Ambassador Sobel
regarding the increasing discussion around countries
abandoning the dollar in favor of local currencies in
bilateral trade transactions, Meirelles commented that "it is
happening and is operationally positive." Meirelles noted
that, due to the large number of goods traded internationally
that are priced in dollars, the volume of goods traded in
local currency is never going to be too high.
KUBISKE
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09HAVANA706 2009-11-24 13:01 2010-12-17 22:10 CONFIDENTIAL US Interests Section Havana
VZCZCXRO7150
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHUB #0706/01 3281333
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241333Z NOV 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4943
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0005
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 0160
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 000706
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CCA
STATE FOR DRL CNEWLING
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU
SUBJECT: FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA’S RECORD OF
BULLYING OTHERS TO SILENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: A. HAVANA 619 (RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR) B. HAVANA 592 (GOC SIGNALS “READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD”) C. VATICAN 117 (“VATICAN TWO-STEP WITH CUBA”)
HAVANA 00000706 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Poloff Joaquin F. Monserrate for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. The Cuban Government has been able to stonewall its independent civil society from foreign visitors who have, for the large part, been all too ready to give in to Cuban bullying and give up on these encounters. A series of recent visits has shown the different approaches that foreign governments have taken to highlight, or not, Cuba’s sorry human rights record. The Asutralian Foreign Minister, Switzerland’s Human Rights Special Envoy and the Canadian Cabinet-level Minister of the Americas not only failed to meet with non-government Cubans, they didn’t even bother to publicly call for more freedoms after visiting Cuba in November. Though also shunning NGOs, recent emissaries from the Vatican and the EU, at least called out publicly for greater rights. Some holdouts remain, refusing to bring anyone of note if the Cubans insist on conditioning access. Regardless of the approach, the result tends to be the same. There is little of substance to be gained from a “friends-at-all-costs” approach to Cuba. End Summary.
THE “BEST-FRIENDS-FOREVER” APPROACH: DO, SAY NOTHING
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) Practitioners of this approach to Cuba include most countries, including all Latin Americans and Africans, Russians and Chinese, and many Europeans. The Brazilian Polcouns in Havana best summed up this style: “We don’t raise (human rights) in public or private.” No wonder, the U.K. number-two in Havana grumbled, that “Cuba would love nothing more than to have the same relationship with us that they have with Brazil.” Most of these countries would not raise human rights even if the Government of Cuba (GOC) did not object to them doing so. This group apparently now includes the Swiss and Australians.
¶3. (C) The Swiss Human Rights Special Envoy Rudolf Knoblauch met with his Cuban counterparts on November 12, government-organized groups (GONGOs) and the Catholic Cardinal. He did not meet with civil society leaders nor make any public reference to Cuba’s human rights record (“not the Swiss way to do things,” they told us). More surprisingly, however, the Swiss admitted that Knoblauch did not raise Cuba’s human rights situation in private. As part of the “Periodic Review,” under their bilateral Dialogue, the Swiss and the Cubans discussed multilateral human rights issues, such as accession to international conventions and the UNCHR, but did not touch upon Cuba’s political prisoners, access to prisons or the still-unscheduled visit of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture (Ref A). They invited Cuban officials to tour Swiss jails, something the Swiss said “had worked” in their relations with Vietnam.
¶4. (C) Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith met with Cuba’s Vice President Jose Ramon Machado and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez on November 23. According to Australian press reports, Smith said how “pleased” he was with Australia-Cuba relations and praised bilateral “friendship and cooperation,” while Rodriguez thanked Australia for its support against the U.S. embargo at the United Nations, the Cuban press reported. Nothing was said in public about political or economic reforms, or human rights.
THE “KEEP-IT-PRIVATE” APPROACH: SAY NOTHING PUBLICLY
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶5. (C) It is hard to gauge how many countries really bring up
HAVANA 00000706 002.3 OF 003
the tough subjects when they meet in private with the Cubans, but many claim to do so. Although nothing of substance stops visitors from engaging with civil society quietly (the way, for instance, we managed to do with our U.S. visitors in September, Ref B), most countries opt to shun meetings altogether, bowing to Cuban pressure. Spain falls mostly in this group, although to their credit, Foreign Minister Moratinos spoke of the need for “gestures” after his meetings here in September. Canada laid a claim on this group after the November visit of Americas Minister Peter Kent.
¶6. (C) The Canadians also failed to meet with the independent civil society or make public pronouncements after the visit of Minister Kent. This was surprising, since Kent and Prime Minister Harper had been publicly critical of Cuba’s human rights record, something that led the GOC to cancel Kent’s visit last April. Canadian officials in Havana told us that Kent raised the issue of Cuba’s political prisoners but that the GOC had immediately turned the discussion into one of definitions. (Note: The GOC claims all of its prisoners of conscience are common criminals. Its stock answer to the topic is to deny it holds political prisoners.) It’s an interesting debate, our Canadian counterparts claimed, “If someone takes money from the U.S., does that make him a political prisoner?”
¶7. (C) In his meetings with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, Kent reportedly asked also about the visit of the Special Rapporteur, but again the Cubans changed the subject. “How many Rapporteur visits has Canada had?,” Rodriguez was said to have shot back. Kent left town saying little, a style that “works better for the (GOC),” our northerly neighbors assured us.
THE “WE-RESPECTFULLY-DISAGREE” APPROACH: GOING PUBLIC
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶8. (C) The missions that air their concerns publicly are in the minority. Although the official press ignores it, the GOC frowns upon these utterances and often acts offended. Countries that go public usually also meet with civil society, but others don’t. Outspoken visitors sometimes step out of their missions’ carefully managed talking points, as was apparently the case, for instance, of the latest high-level visitors to Cuba from the European Union and the Holy See.
¶9. (C) The EU Commission in Havana sits snuggly in the “Best-Friends-Forever” camp. Their functionaries share with us their reproach of the “radical” Swedes and Czechs, with their human rights priorities, and can’t wait for “moderate” Spain to take over the EU Presidency. The former Development Commissioner, Louis Michel, keenly followed that line during his visits to Cuba. Not so his successor.
¶10. (C) On an early November visit to Cuba, the Belgian Karel de Gucht put aside Cuban equivocations and declared that “there is a set of fundamental rights that are universal,” and called on Cuba to “create the right conditions” to enact these rights. In respectful tones and emphasizing that the EU was not after “regime change,” De Gucht put the GOC on notice that, if it did not begin to improve its human rights record, it could give up any hope of normalizing relations with the EU. Despite this, in a November 23 interview with CNN, de Gucht seemed to soften this line and called for normalization without demanding prior gestures from Cuba.
¶11. (C) The Vatican’s Social Communications Council President Archbishop Claudio Cello, a grizzled veteran of China-Vatican negotiations, also mixed praise with tough love. Originally calling on the GOC to allow further radio access to Cuban churches, Celli went off script, and called on greater information and internet access for all Cubans. He even
HAVANA 00000706 003.3 OF 003
singled out Cuba’s blogger community for praise, something the GOC “didn’t like at all,” according to Holy See diplomats in Havana (leading Celli to “clarify” his comments upon his return to Rome).
THE “TAKE-YOUR-VISIT-AND-SHOVE-IT” APPROACH: LITTLE LOST
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶12. (C) Some countries refuse to let the GOC dictate to them when it comes to visitors. Although they will accommodate GOC petulancy by hosting dual national day ceremonies (and spare Cuban officials the “affront” of sharing space with Cubans it deems unworthy) and cordon off their ambassadors from civil society engagement, the holdout countries resist pressure to disengage from civil society altogether. In many cases they have chosen to keep their principals at home if the price is kowtowing to the GOC. Germany, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom may pay a price in terms of lost business and access from their principled stance. Others who stand in this camp have less to lose from sticking it to the Cubans, and include Poland and Sweden.
¶13. (C) In November, the Ambassador for the Order of Malta (a Catholic church NGO given diplomatic status by the GOC) took the “take-it-and-shove” it approach to new heights. After the GOC told him that he could only bring in the Belgian Ambassador (firmly in the “BFF” camp) but not the USINT Chief of Mission to a humanitarian event he was organizing at a leper hospital, he cancelled the event and left town.
¶14. (C) COMMENT. The Cuba overwhelming majority of the 100 foreign missions in Havana do not face a human rights dilemma in their dealings with the Cubans. These countries wouldn’t raise the issue anyway. The rest, a group that includes most of Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and the United States, claim to employ different approaches to address their human rights concerns in Cuba -- but the truth is that most of these countries do not press the issue at all in Cuba. The GOC does not like to talk about its human rights situation, and even less to be lectured publicly. It deploys considerable resources to bluff and bully many missions and their visitors into silence. For the most part the rewards for acquiescing to GOC demands are risible: pomp-full dinners and meetings and, for the most pliant, a photo-op with one of the Castro brothers. In terms of substance or economic benefits, they fare little better than those who stand up to the GOC. FARRAR
----------------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KUWAIT110 2009-02-05 16:04 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Kuwait
VZCZCXRO3981
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0110/01 0361636
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051636Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2777
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
ID: 190648
ORIGIN: 09KUWAIT110
DATE: 2009-02-05 16:36:00
SOURCE: Embassy Kuwait
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NOFORN
MISC: 09KUWAIT95
DESTINATION: VZCZCXRO3981RUEHDE RUEHDIRRUEHKU #0110/01 0361636SSSSS ZZH051636Z FEB 09AMEMBASSY KUWAITRUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2777RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000110
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2029
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KU IR
SUBJECT: THE INTERIOR MINISTER'S REMEDY FOR TERRORISTS:
"LET THEM DIE."
REF: KUWAIT 0095
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: During a February 3 meeting in their
ongoing dialog on US-Kuwait CT cooperation, Kuwaiti Minister
of Interior Shaykh Jaber al-Khalid Al Sabah discussed with
Ambassador US and Kuwaiti efforts to locate and apprehend
terror financiers (including Mohammed Sultan Ibrahim Sultan
Al-Ali, aka Jawad/Abu Umar), applauded improved liaison
information exchange, expressed skepticism Kuwait would ever
develop a rehabilitation center for former GTMO detainees and
other extremists supporting jihad, and suggested the US
should release current GTMO detainees back into Afghanistan,
where they could be killed in combat. He sardonically
questioned why US NAVCENT forces had gone to the trouble of
rescuing foundering Iranian hashish smugglers two weeks
earlier, saying "God meant to punish them with death and you
saved them. Why?" Characterizing the previous Saturday's
provincial elections as a "huge success," Shaykh Jaber
expressed his belief that President Obama and the US had the
tools necessary to successfully confront all challenges. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador called on Shaykh Jaber February 3 to
review progress on our CT liaison relationship and to seek
the Interior Minister's support for operational concepts
aimed at intercepting individuals involved in the
exploitation of traditional smuggling routes in the northern
Gulf to move would-be jihadists and their
financier/facilitators between Kuwait and Iran, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Shaykh Jaber began the meeting by applauding
the "huge success" of the provincial elections in Iraq and
expressing his confidence in the ability of President Obama
and the "super power" US to address current challenges.
¶3. (S/NF) Ambassador noted she'd met recently with VADM
McCraven, now JSOC commander for this region, and that they'd
discussed alternative approaches to staunching the flows of
terror financing, given the constraints of Kuwait's current
legal and political systems. Offering his support for these
approaches ) and underscoring that he was as concerned about
terrorist influences from Saudi Arabia as from Iran, given
the loose border controls -- the Minister expressed his
understanding of what he characterized (fairly) as improved
information exchange between our services, while
acknowledging the ongoing deficiencies in Kuwait's legal
system that stymie effective prosecution and restraint of
these individuals once captured.
¶4. (S/NF) Ambassador noted recent press reports that
self-confessed jihadi recruiter and financier Mohammed
al-Bathali had been released on a 500 dinar bond after being
sentenced to three of a possible five years imprisonment for
"inciting jihad against a friendly state." (Reftel) At the
same time, Kuwait's Ambassador to the US, Shaykh Salem Al
Sabah, had approached S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson to
inquire after the status of Kuwait's four remaining GTMO
detainees. Ambassador clarified that President Obama's
announcement of our determination to close the detention
center at Guantanamo did not mean we no longer had security
concerns which would be factored into any release scenarios;
the Kuwaiti detainees were nasty, unrepentant individuals and
Kuwait's record had been tarnished by the example of former
GTMO detainee al-Ajmi, who'd allegedly blown himself up in
Mosul following his release to the Kuwaiti authorities.
Ambassador asked the Interior Minister the status of the
rehabilitation center Prime Minister Shaykh Nasser Mohammed
Al Sabah had mentioned in his September 18th conversation
with then-Secretary Rice in Washington. Ambassador noted
that we were aware of the stories of Saudis who'd gone
through SAG rehabilitation centers only to re-emerge with Al
Qaeda in Yemen; nonetheless, the GOK had to take steps to
show its seriousness in changing and controlling the
behaviors of extremists within its society.
¶5. (S/NF) Shaykh Jaber replied with an anecdote: Following
the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm, General
Schwarzkopf had raised the issue of "rehabilitating" Kuwaitis
who'd been exposed to the brutality of war so that they could
re-integrate into society. Shaykh (Ret,d General) Jaber had
replied: "But you are thinking of the Vietnam model, where
young war veterans came home to empty apartments or anonymous
urban environments. That is not who we are. We are a small,
close-knit society and everyone knows each other. No one
will feel alienated: those who can heal will heal naturally
with family; those who cannot heal in that environment will
never heal." Relating this to the current topic, Shaykh
KUWAIT 00000110 002 OF 002
Jaber told the Ambassador: "You know better than I that we
cannot deal with these people (i.e. the GTMO detainees). I
can't detain them. If I take their passports, they will sue
to get them back (Note: as happened with Al-Ajmi. End
note.) I can talk to you into next week about building a
rehabilitation center, but it won't happen. We are not Saudi
Arabia; we cannot isolate these people in desert camps or
somewhere on an island. We cannot compel them to stay. If
they are rotten, they are rotten and the best thing to do is
get rid of them. You picked them up in Afghanistan; you
should drop them off in Afghanistan, in the middle of the war
zone."
¶6. (S/NF) Ambassador then raised with the Minister developing
an SOP for dealing with incidents such as the recent rescue
by US NAVCENT forces in the northern Gulf of seven Iranian
smugglers whose boat was foundering while engaged in
smuggling hashish. In the event, the Omanis had agreed to
repatriate the Iranians but we nonetheless needed to think
about dealing with similar episodes in future in expeditious
fashion. The initial response of the Kuwaiti Coast Guard had
been to refer the matter to the Minister of Interior, via the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador noted our
supposition that the Kuwaiti Coast Guard must have had
similar experiences with Iranian smugglers who needed
repatriation to Iran. Smiling broadly, the Interior Minister
deflected the question, saying "God wished to punish them for
smuggling drugs by drowning them, and then you saved them.
So they're your problem! You should have let them drown."
In any case, he added, the Kuwaitis generally sent the
Iranians back to Iran in their own boats so there had not
been a question of physically handing them over.
¶7. (S/NF) In closing, Ambassador noted that the Minister had
created the position of Special Advisor to Shaykh Jaber for
Kuwait Security Services (our GRPO liaison counterpart) and
assigned Shaykh Salman Sabah al-Salem al-Humoud Al Sabah to
that role. Ambassador asked whether the Minister believed
there was any appropriate liaison relationship between the
Embassy and Shaykh Salman, to which the Minister replied in
the negative. Finally, the Ambassador invited the Minister
to join her in attending the US Ambassador's reception
February 24 at the IDEX event in Abu Dhabi, as part of our
efforts to boost the relationship.
¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Minister was as frank and pessimistic as
ever when it came to the subject of apprehending and
detaining terror financiers and facilitators under Kuwait's
current legal and political framework. Ongoing tensions
between parliament and the PM and his cabinet make any
changes highly unlikely any time soon. The remaining GTMO
detainees remain a particularly thorny issue for the
leadership here, who privately recognize the downsides of
taking custody and readily acknowledge their inability to
manage them but who remain under strong domestic political
pressure to "bring their boys home." Telling was the fact
that press accounts of the Ambassador's February 3 meeting
with the Minister (which was one-on-one with a notetaker) and
her meeting two days earlier with the MFA U/S focused solely
on the GTMO issue, although it was discussed only marginally.
END COMMENT.
********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
JONES
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1108 2009-04-29 13:01 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO2039
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1108/01 1191330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291330Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3084
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4481
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2784
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4250
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0485
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
CSE C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000004
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL RU UNSC KNNP KN
SUBJECT: WAITING AND WATCHING: NORTH KOREA AFTER CURRENCY
REFORM
REF: 09 SHENYANG 167
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. For
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On December 15, EAP DAS David Shear and ConGen
staff met with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a major player
here in Chinese-North Korean economic exchanges. XXXXXXXXXXXX
attributed the DPRK,s recent currency reform to several
factors: controlling rampant inflation, preventing 'hot
money' flows, leveling the wealth gap between workers and
traders, controlling domestic currency, and most importantly,
uncovering potential political opposition. As a result of the
reform, commerce has come to a halt. The leadership, as part
of an ambitious 2012 development strategy, hopes for the
restoration of relations with the United States. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
believes that current plans assume Kim Jong-il will be around
for some time and that Kim Jong-un will be his successor. The
recent recall of DPRK scholars, students and scientists from
China following the defection of a North Korean exchange
student, for example, suggests increasing levels of paranoia.
END SUMMARY.
GIVE ME GOOD REASON
-------------------
¶2. (S/NF) On December 15, EAP DAS David Shear and Consulate
Shenyang staff met with XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX visits
Pyongyang frequently. Admitting he is unsure of the exact
value of Chinese investment into North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX believes
the number to be many billions of renminbi. Chinese
companies, like their ROK counterparts, use North Korea as a
processing zone, primarily in the mining and seafood
industries. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the DPRK leadership's 2012
target for achieving 'strong-country' status should form the
principal basis for analyzing recent political developments,
including the currency reform measure.
¶3. (S/NF) The most important reason for the recent DPRK currency
reform, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, is to uncover political opposition,
particularly against Kim Jong-il's younger son. Controlling
inflation, leveling the wealth gap, controlling domestic
currency and access to foreign currency, are all part of this
strategy. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the third son, Kim Jong-un,
favored the currency revaluation, and that going forward Kim
Jong-un leans toward a Vietnamese-style of economic reform.
Opposition to the currency exchange, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, might
reveal who opposes the ascension of Kim Jong-un to
leadership. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Kim Jong-il's support of the
currency reform points to his favoring the third son; those
opposing the revaluation, also oppose the third son. XXXXXXXXXXXX drew
parallels to the 2009 nuclear tests, which he said were
also influenced by succession plans. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the first
son, Kim Jong-nam, opposes his younger brother's reform
plans and favors a Chinese-style of economic opening.
¶4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the number of factions competing for Kim
Jong-il's attention have made it increasingly difficult for
Kim Jong-il to listen to anyone. As a sign of Kim Jong-il's
paranoia, he recently recalled all students, scholars, and
scientists in China following the defection of an exchange
student in Northeast China. He did this despite the need for
Chinese knowledge, production skills, and technology to
achieve the country's goals for 2012. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX believes
that current instability will settle and the government will
move ahead with reform, fully expecting Kim Jong-il to be
around for sometime to come. The reform, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, may
not be toward a more open economy. Rather, with currency
reform giving the regime the ability to control domestic
currency, reforms will lead to tighter control over the
economy.
¶5. (S) Prior to revaluation, one dollar equaled 3500 won. To
put that in perspective, the average worker in Pyongyang
earns 3000-4000 won per month. XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that according to
the DPRK Embassy, the official exchange rate following reform
is now one dollar equals 129 won. For the common person,
SHENYANG 00000004 002 OF 002
besides suffering from a significant cut in won-based
savings, supermarkets and department stores that deal in won
have suspended activity as they wait to see what impact
currency reform will have on commodity prices. Thus, it has
become difficult to purchase day-to-day needs. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed
out, if commodity prices rise, the economy will be ruined.
However, if prices settle as a result of reform, and assuming
constant wages, the economy will be okay as workers once
earning one dollar a month will now earn nearly 20 dollars.
¶6. (S) Traders, who earn many times more than the average
wage-earner, have been unaffected by the reform in monetary
terms, as savings are held mostly in euro and dollars. Since
the revaluation, only stores dealing with foreign exchange
have been open and prices in these stores have increased
400-500 percent. For example, a TV that cost RMB 4000 now
costs RMB 20,000. Many of these stores raised prices in
anticipation of the reform, with the expectation that prices
would then fall. However, prices have not fallen. Many of the
stores that raised prices prior to reform have since been
closed by the government, their goods confiscated. Thus, even
traders who have not lost money from revaluation now have
nothing to buy. Chinese traders along the North Korean border
have also been affected by currency reform even though most
trade is done in euros and dollars. As is the case within
North Korea, people are waiting and watching to see what will
happen to prices. In the meantime, nobody wants to sell
anything.
NOT A CRISIS YET BUT CLOSE
--------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX does not believe the DPRK is in crisis mode at this
time. As he said, the people are used to this sort of thing.
He saw the currency reform as being part of a broader
conflict within the government as it moves forward in the
next several years. Since 2002, the DPRK has allowed some
economic reform, without expressing strong support or
opposition. As he put it, the government has been waiting and
watching to see what would happen.
CHINA, the U.S., and EVERYTHING
-------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said many in the DPRK believe the Chinese do not
understand their country. While neither the Chinese nor the
DPRK are likely to criticize the other in public, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that in private the DPRK has disparaged the Chinese for not
including North Korea on its list of 147 tourist destinations
or 137 investment destinations. These omissions and the
disparate Chinese actions on regional development projects
clearly indicate that North Korea is not a priority for the
Chinese. For instance, while China recently elevated the
long-beleaguered Changchun-Jilin-Tumen River development plan
to a national level project, the DPRK left the Tumen River
Development Plan, as it sees no benefit (REFTEL). Relations
between the two countries were getting so bad, in fact,
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang two months ahead of
schedule.
¶9. (S/NF) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, North Korea has set an ambitious
target of developing a strong country by 2012. As part of
this project, it is planning to build 100,000 residential
apartments in Pyongyang by 2012. In order to encourage
Chinese investment, the DPRK is offering Chinese investors
mining and ocean rights for their injection of cash into the
project. A former Consul General of the North Korean
consulate in Shenyang, recently spent two weeks in Beijing
attracting about RMB 12 billion for this project and planned
to come to Shenyang following his time in Beijing.
¶10. (S) Restoration of relations with the United States is
another important part of the DPRK's reform plans. He said,
however, that North Korea looks forward to an ongoing cycle
of ups and downs in negotiations and that it counts on the
U.N. to be slow in implementing sanctions. As he said, he
believes that once things settle down, North Korea will show
China and the U.S. "its bottom card."
WICKMAN
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PRETORIA939 2009-05-08 15:03 2010-12-08 21:09 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Pretoria
VZCZCXRO9866
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHSA #0939/01 1281504
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081504Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8404
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1363
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 6820
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0931
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 9165
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
Friday, 08 May 2009, 15:04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 000939
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS KDEM, PGOV, PREL, SF
SUBJECT: PART 1 OF 3: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SOUTH AFRICA’S
NEXT PRESIDENT
PRETORIA 00000939 001.2 OF 003
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (SBU) Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, President of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, is a controversial but not well understood personage who emerged from obscurity to where he now occupies the apex of South Africa’s political pyramid. He is deeply loved and revered by his closest constituencies; he is mistrusted by opposition parties; and is hated by those here who believe he is “wrong for South Africa.” Zuma’s nearly five decades of involvement with the ANC, has brought him to this moment. Zuma is now poised to become the fourth post-apartheid President of South Africa, following Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Kgalema Motlanthe.
¶2. (SBU) The National and Provincial elections held on April 22, 2009 resulted in the ANC winning its fourth consecutive governing majority (65.9%). Under the South African constitution, the Parliament elects the state president; thus the ANC majority in Parliament elected Jacob Zuma to be inaugurated in Pretoria on May 9, 2009. This message weaves together various sources to provide a comprehensive look at the life and times of Jacob Zuma. Our goal is to dispel the caricatures that dominate the media and present a more realistic picture of the man who will soon lead the most dynamic emerging democracy in Africa. This is the first in a series of three related cables. End Summary.
-----------------
The Boyhood Years
-----------------
¶3. (SBU) Zuma was born on April 12, 1942 in the rural village of Inkandla in the heart of Zululand (now, Kwa-Zulu Natal). One hundred or so years before Zuma’s birth, the Zulu War leader Shaka led a bloody expansion of the Zulu kingdom against other African tribes, and fifty or so years before, the last Zulu War was won by the British Empire. Two centuries of colonial incursions into the heart of South Africa and the advent of the Afrikaner Boers into central and eastern territories reduced the Zulus to dependency status in a racist system that placed all blacks at the bottom of a segregated system of governance. Jacob Zuma was born the first-born son of the second wife of a provincial policeman and had two full brothers and two full sisters. The first wife of his father had three boys and four girls. His father, whom he says he never saw, died while Zuma was very young.
¶4. (SBU) The death of his father left his mother destitute and displaced her from her home in Inkandla. She returned to her own village of Maphumulo where she worked for low pay as a domestic. As the war ended, she relocated to a Durban township and worked as a domestic to feed her children. Zuma’s childhood was spent between Durban and the rural interior of Zululand. In 1947, the National Party won the election and instituted apartheid and racial categories as the policy of the state. The Group Areas Act, pass laws, Bantustans, separate facilities and amenities were in place. The racial segregation of the colonial period became the law, and the authoritarian police state was prepared to enforce wit with violence. In reaction, the violent, chaotic relations between the state and the oppressed Africans led to an atmosphere of periodic bloody riots, political suppression, torture, murder, strikes, townships in flames, Qsuppression, torture, murder, strikes, townships in flames, and widespread suffering.
¶5. (SBU) Zuma was forced to work odd jobs from a young age to supplement his mother’s meager income -- as a herd boy, a gardener, a domestic, in tea houses, and small shops. He faced the same problems of life of all Africans in the apartheid state. In the rural, pastoralist cattle culture of the Zulu, Zuma’s first job as a herd boy linked him to an ancient traditional occupation of African boys throughout the continent. He once wrote, “I used to look after them (the cows) very well. That was the first time I was praised for a job well done.”
¶6. (SBU) Not unusual for the times, as an unregistered African, Zuma only achieved schooling to Form III, or Fifth
PRETORIA 00000939 002.2 OF 003
Grade equivalent. However, friends and relatives recognized his hunger for learning and helped him with what they had learned. He claims to be self-taught and that he taught himself to read and write. In his teens, in 1955, a cousin encouraged him to attend night school in Durban. In this era, African churches, trade unions, and civic organizations offered educational opportunities to their members that were otherwise lacking from the state. Throughout South Africa and beyond, Zuma’s life exemplified the distinction between education and intelligence -- the former he lacked, the latter he had in abundance. In 1985, in a biography penned for the Communist Party, he said he was self-educated up to the Junior Certificate level. Later in his life he said, “Education is education whether it is formal or not.” He continued, “I have done everything that the educated have done.”
--------------------------
To Political Consciousness
--------------------------
¶7. (SBU) The ANC was established in 1912 as one of several civil agencies seeking to end racism and segregation and to protecting the human and civil rights of the African majority. By mid-century, it had attracted the support of African intellectuals and traditional leaders as well as the average neglected African who was denied the rights of citizenship in the land of their birth. Zuma’s elder half brother from his father’s first wife was a secret member of the ANC. A maternal uncle was a trade union activist. They talked to him about the struggle for equality and freedom, setting the spark for his developing political consciousness.
¶8. (SBU) Zuma actively took to politics, resistance, and activism as a young man of 17 years. He attended public and underground meetings where the goals of groups like the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were discussed. In 1958, he hovered around the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) -- an organ made famous a decade earlier by the young revolutionary Nelson Mandela -- and in 1958, Zuma joined the ANC and its Youth League. He said he was not an active participant, but he attended meetings and rallies. In 1959, he joined the South African Council of Trade Unions (SACTU) with his brother and soon was involved in an anti-pass campaign in the Noxamana district as well as in demonstrations opposing the Bantustan policy. In these activities, he found a fraternity among like-minded groups that defined his life’s work.
¶9. (SBU) In 1961, the year Nelson Mandela was arrested and jailed, Zuma was 19 years old and committed to fighting apartheid. That year, in Durban, he began courses with SACTU on Marxism-Leninism, the labor theory of value, and political discussions about colonialism, imperialism, the anti-colonial movement, and the nature of the struggle inside South Africa. While a member of a political study group in 1962, the year Mandela was sentenced to life in prison, Zuma was recruited into the militant armed wing of the ANC -- Umkonto wa Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation, aka “MK”). The following year, he was recruited into the SACP, though in his words, he did “little party work.” It was Zuma’s associations with these organizations at this critical tipping point in South Africa’s history that became the guiding commitment of his QAfrica’s history that became the guiding commitment of his life up until today.
--------------------
Life in the Struggle
--------------------
¶10. (SBU) As an underground member of the banned ANC and the SACP, young Jacob Zuma was urged to go into exile, gain military training, and join the fight against apartheid. In June 1963, the 21 year old Zuma was arrested with 45 other young comrades in Zeerust, in the Transvaal (now North West Province), as they were walking to Botswana into self-imposed exile. He was detained for ninety days, then tried and sentenced to ten years in prison for “conspiracy to overthrow the government.” Zuma spent the next ten years incarcerated with many other political prisoners, including the senior ANC leadership in prison such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, among other political prisoners at the infamous Robben Island. While in Robben Island, in what had become
PRETORIA 00000939 003.2 OF 003
the ANC’s graduate school, they discussed the U.S. civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, the African independence movement, and the global ideological contest of the Cold War.
¶11. (SBU) Zuma rarely discusses this period of his life in public, nor did his biography speak frankly about that experience, his relationships, and what he learned. He does say that many important people there engaged in serious political debates and disagreements, but he failed to say who they were or what they argued about. The only insight he provided says he held many responsible positions within ANC structures at Robben Island, he was a mentor for students, and at the end was Chairman of the Political Committee. In the culture of the revolutionary anti-apartheid movements, his presence at Robben Island during Mandela’s first decade there is the best possible “struggle credential” he could possibly have acquired to rise in the movement. Released from prison at the age of 32 in 1974, Zuma immediately re-engaged the struggle with the ANC Natal underground.
End of Part One LA LIME
---
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09RANGOON536 2009-08-17 11:11 2010-12-12 21:09 SECRET Embassy Rangoon
VZCZCXRO4173
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGO #0536/01 2291149
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 171149Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9360
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2233
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5697
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9299
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6880
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 2291
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2671
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000536
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: SENATOR WEBB'S MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER THEIN SEIN
RANGOON 00000536 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: P/E Chief Jennifer Harhigh for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
Summary
-------
¶1. (S) During a one-hour meeting with Prime Minister Thein
Sein on August 14, Senator Webb requested a meeting with Aung
San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and urged her release from house arrest,
noting the positive impact it would have on bilateral
relations and Burma's standing in the world. The Senator
also sought the release and deportation of detained American
John Yettaw. Using classic regime rhetoric, the PM
criticized sanctions as harming the economy and hindering
democracy, and explained the regime's roadmap, promising
free, fair and inclusive elections. That said, the Prime
Minister made clear that Burma wants better relations with
the U.S. as well as the ability to communicate directly with
Washington; the regime has tapped Science and Technology
Minister and former Ambassador to the U.S. U Thaung as a
direct line to the GOB. The tone of the meeting was positive
and cordial, with both Senator Webb and the Prime Minister
citing the benefits that improved bilateral relations could
offer if certain issues are resolved. End summary.
Participants
-------------
¶2. (U) Codel Webb's August 14 meeting with the Prime
Minister and other GOB Ministers took place at Government
House in Nay Pyi Taw, Burma. Participants included:
Codel Webb:
Senator Jim Webb
Senate Professional Staff Member Marta Mclellan Ross
Charge d'Affaires Larry Dinger
DATT Colonel Brey Sloan
Political/Economic Chief Jennifer Harhigh
Burma:
General Thein Sein, Prime Minister
U Thaung, Minister of Science and Technology
U Nyan Win, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Brig. Gen. Kyaw San, Minister of Information (also spelled
Kyaw Hsan)
Maj. Gen. Khin Aung Myint, Minister of Culture
Col. Thurein Zaw, Deputy Minister, Ministry of National
Planning and Economic Development
Col. Thant Shin, Chief of Staff, Office of the Prime Minister
U Kyaw Kyaw, Director General, Protocol Department, MOFA
U Ye Lwin (notetaker)
Visit, Meeting with Head of State Can Enhance Bilateral
Relationship
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶3. (C) PM Thein Sein greeted Senator Webb warmly, noting he
is very impressed with the Senator's achievements. He said
the GOB views the Senator's visit as a very important event,
and noted that the meeting with Senior General Than Shwe,
Burma's head of state, will help enhance the bilateral
relationship. Senator Webb replied that despite the
differences between the U.S. and Burmese governments, under
the right conditions there can be a new road forward. He
hopes for frank discussions. Senator Webb congratulated the
government for taking a step forward and preparing for
elections. Implementation of electoral laws would be an
important signal to the world. With progress on those areas
and the resolution of other issues, it will be possible to
have a new dialogue. The Senator said he understands that
Burma faces challenges and that stability in Burma's
multi-ethnic state is a complicated issue. Webb said he has
talked and written about the need for a new approach on
sanctions with Burma, but noted that events in the last few
months make any change in U.S. sanctions policy difficult.
RANGOON 00000536 002.2 OF 004
Senator Requests ASSK Meeting, Questions her Detention
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶4. (C) Senator Webb asked the PM to allow him to meet with
ASSK as an important signal to the U.S. He questioned the PM
why authorities believe it is necessary to continue ASSK's
house arrest, adding that most of the world judges the GOB by
how it treats ASSK.
¶5. (C) The PM replied that ASSK's trial is over and that
the verdict was in accordance with the law. ASSK's legal
status is purely a domestic issue. ASSK was given only the
minimum sentence of three years. The SPDC halved that
sentence, and she will be able to serve the remaining
eighteen months at home. If she follows the rules, the
sentence might be further reduced. The PM continued that
UNSYG Ban was not allowed to meet ASSK because her trial was
still underway during his July visit. The situation is
different now, allowing the GOB to accommodate the Senator's
request. Webb reiterated that he is interested in exploring
"a new road" with Burma, and added that from the world's
perspective, it will be very difficult to accept elections as
"open" if ASSK is kept away from the public.
Seeks Deportation of Detained Amcit
-----------------------------------
¶6. (C) Senator Webb also requested the release and
deportation of American John Yettaw as a goodwill gesture.
He said he does not defend Yettaw's actions, but stressed the
American's ill health. The PM replied that Yettaw has been
punished according to his crimes. The GOB has procedures
that it must follow in such cases, but he pledged that the
government will consider the request positively.
GOB Seeking Better Bilateral Relations
--------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Turning to bilateral relations, the PM noted that
the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1947,
before Burma's independence. Vice-President Nixon visited in
1958 and again in 1985. Ne Win had an official visit to
Washington in 1966. Senators McCain and Kerry have visited.
Burma received assistance from the U.S. before 1988 for
counternarcotics, security cooperation, poppy eradication,
education, health, and human resources. Post-Nargis, the
U.S. provided generous emergency assistance, for which Burma
is grateful. The GOB is trying to find remains of American
WWII soldiers and repatriate them.
¶8. (S) Thein Sein stated that Burma believes in peaceful
coexistence and strives for positive relations and good
communications with all countries. In that regard, he
continued, Burma has designated U Thaung, the Minister of
Science and Technology and a former Ambassador to U.S.
(present at the meeting), as the "communicator" for relations
with Washington. The U.S. and Burma had very good relations
before, the PM stated, and the GOB wants to engage in direct
communication and dialogue. Efforts via UN SYG Ban and UN
Special Envoy Gambari have not been direct, the PM said, and
he urged Senator Webb to "please tell the U.S. Government"
that Burma wants direct relations with the U.S. (Note:
Separately, Director General for Protocol Kyaw Kyaw told the
Charge that U Thaung can be available for direct conversation
with Washington. End note.) The PM also proposed the two
countries upgrade their representation to Ambassadors in both
capitals.
Stability, Security Shape Regime's Outlook
------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) The PM avoided polemics, but nevertheless repeated
traditional regime rhetoric regarding Burma's diverse ethnic
background and the resulting need for stability and security.
The regime is doing its best to solve problems and educate
RANGOON 00000536 003.2 OF 004
the people about democratic practices, he said. The
government must take an all-inclusive approach; the focus
should not be on one individual or organization. Security,
development, human rights, and democracy are all related.
Burma must have security and stability for peace and
tranquility, he stressed.
PM Calls for Investment, Criticizes Sanctions
---------------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Turning to economics, the PM noted that the
worldwide financial crisis and sanctions were taking a toll
on Burma's economy. Burma has an agricultural base and
produces enough rice to feed its people and export a surplus.
However, beyond food security, Burma needs industrialization
to develop. The country has natural resources, he stated,
but needs outside investment and technology. Western
sanctions create more poverty, hinder the development of
democracy, and create hatred of the West. Economic
development will lead to political stability and democracy.
Elections Will be Free, Fair, Inclusive
---------------------------------------
¶11. (C) The PM explained the regime's "Roadmap to
Democracy," saying Burma has learned the lesson of Iraq and
Afghanistan: don't move toward democracy in haste. The
constitution had been approved by 92.48 percent of the
people. Planned elections in 2010 will be free, fair, and
inclusive, he insisted. Political party and election laws
will be issued soon. All "eligible" parties will be able to
participate. The PM invited Senator Webb to return for
another visit and to tell President Obama "we wish him very
well."
Senator Webb: U.S. and Burma Can Work Together
--------------------------------------------- --
¶12. (C) Senator Webb responded by citing the Obama
Administration Burma policy review and noting that he had had
many discussions about Burma with then-Senators Clinton and
Obama. He came to Burma now to help shift bilateral
relations to a different path. The U.S. and Burma have all
the ingredients for a natural friendship once certain issues
are resolved. Both were colonized by the British, both have
many nationalities. Diversity is a challenge but also a
strength. The Senator said he is aware of the situation
inside Burma since 1947, which has been complicated for a
long time by China. U.S. and Burma can work together, and the
U.S. can provide balance in the region.
¶13. (C) Senator Webb acknowledged the PM's point that a
country needs development to foster democracy. He referred
to Vietnam, where he had helped by serving as a bridge
between the government and U.S.-based Vietnamese. He had
observed parallels between Burma and Vietnam during his 2001
personal visit to Burma. He noted that one of his friends
had closed his business in Burma because of sanctions,
putting people out of work. Burma's citizens could have a
better life if relations were better. The Senator concluded
by reiterating that the GOB must address a number of issues
to gain the trust and support of the United States. The PM
again thanked the Senator for visiting and added "we will
consider your points."
Biographic Note
---------------
¶14. (C) U Thaung is currently Minister for Science and
Technology. He served as Ambassador to the U.S. from
1991-1996, and has also served as Ambassador to Canada. He
is a former Minister of Labor and Minister of Industry-1 and
has held various GOB positions related to mining and
industry. He reportedly graduated from the same Defense
Service Academy class as Vice Senior General Maung Aye and is
believed to have served with Senior General Than Shwe in the
RANGOON 00000536 004.2 OF 004
Psychological Warfare Department. Many observers consider
him a regime insider with close ties to those two senior
leaders.
¶15. (SBU) Codel Webb declined the opportunity to clear on
this message.
VAJDA
---
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL672 2009-04-27 06:06 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #0672/01 1170635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270635Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4147
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5773
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1316
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9637
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5865
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1817
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 4294
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000672
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV KN KS
SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK's recent restaffing and expansion of
the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile
military rhetoric over the last several months are related to
the DPRK leadership's "top priority" need to stabilize the
DPRK internally in preparation for succession, according to
XXXXXXXXXXXX A second priority was to achieve improved
Relations with the United States, which the DPRK regards as its only
potential security guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------
Military Statements and the NDC
-------------------------------
¶2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that the
Korean People's Army's (KPA) spate of high-level
announcements over the past several months (such as the March
8 KPA Supreme Command report, the first in 15 years, and the
four KPA General Staff statements since January, not seen
since 1999) should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military
asserting control over the country, because the military
could act only in concert with the Worker's Party and the
Cabinet. Instead the "generals appearing on TV" was a
phenomenon directed at DPRK citizens with two goals: to show
that the DPRK's hostile external situation meant citizens had
to pull together, and as a "power display" to send a
law-and-order message to counter the increasing economic
disorder resulting from decades of economic "depression."
There was dissatisfaction among some elite groups in the
DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China and Vietnam and
wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated. To tamp down
this internal dissent, external tension was needed. The ROKG
was not particularly worried about the specific threats to
the South contained in the statements because they saw the
statements as targeted at the domestic audience, and in any
case knew the DPRK would try to achieve surprise if it were
to resort to military action, rather than giving warning.
¶3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim
Jong-il's (KJI) waning health. After KJI's August 2008
stroke, the DPRK was a "different environment that needed
stronger leadership." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that before the stroke, KJI
was confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he
suffered "physical and psychological trauma." KJI had become
obsessed with creating political stability to allow an
orderly succession, though XXXXXXXXXXXX did not claim to know who was
next in line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch
the Supreme People's Assembly had declared the beginning of
KJI's third ruling period. But rather than celebrating the
renewal of his mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that
would pave the way for succession.
¶4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from
8 to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired
National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first
established in 1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had
since taken on policy and coordination functions. Now it had
the lead on succession, XXXXXXXXXXXX believed. KJI brother-in-law
Chang Song-taek's addition to the NDC was important for
succession preparation, not only because he was married to
KJI's only sibling and close confidante 63-year-old Kim
Kyong-hui, but also because Chang was seen as having
effectively protected and acted for KJI during KJI's fall
2008 recovery period.
¶5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National
Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh
Kuk-ryul, a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative
terms, since all senior officials are loyalists) who XXXXXXXXXXXX
thought was consolidating various ROK-surveillance and
special operations institutions under his control at NDC.
One of these was the Worker's Party's Operations Department,
which Oh has headed since 1989. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also referred to an
April 21 JoongAng Ilbo newspaper article claiming that
"Office 35," charged with intel collection, and the "External
Liaison Office," charged with training agents, had both been
moved from the Operations Department to NDC/KPA control,
saying that ROK intel sources did not think there was
evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which
formulates actions against the South, was "passive" during
the 1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming
more active again. In other words, Oh's job was to keep the
South off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the
succession period. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believed that changes to the
DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would
also focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to
frequent DPRK propaganda aiming for the establishment of a
"strong and prosperous" nation by 2012, saying that DPRK
authorities believed they had already succeeded ideologically
and militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic
side, which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in.
¶6. (C) The DPRK's determination to maintain internal order
meant that it could go so far as to engage in "limited armed
conflict" with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well
aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and
would respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK
knew that combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would
prevent it from achieving surprise, so XXXXXXXXXXXX was reassured that
no direct military provocation was imminent.
-----------------------
Relations with the U.S.
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Asked what the ROKG's policy options were, given the
above situation, XXXXXXXXXXXX answered indirectly, saying that the
main question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to
maintaining internal stability to allow for succession was
the DPRK's determination to improve relations with the U.S.,
because only the U.S. could solve both the DPRK's security
and economic problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this push for improved
relations was ironic, given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S.
as a menace, but was nevertheless high on DPRK authorities'
agenda. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement
with the Clinton Administration as the first, failed, chance
for peace with the U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration
had turned to negotiations too late for substantial progress;
and that the Obama Administration amounted to a "second
chance." The DPRK craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming
for a "big deal," but first needed to raise tensions to
create the need for dialogue.
¶8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what
happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. XXXXXXXXXXXX was convinced that
the DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while
seeking an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his
recommendation to ROK policymakers was to stay on an even
keel to keep the South-North situation from deteriorating
further. The DPRK's April 21 proposal for dialogue about
land-use and wages at the Kaesong Industrial Complex was
potentially helpful in that regard, but had to be approached
carefully, because the DPRK would try to seize the initiative
and lock-in economic benefits without offering reciprocal
steps. Like other ROKG officials, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized the need
for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on all issues
related to North Korea.
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that China would seek to prevent
U.S.-DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a
smile that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S.,
China would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK
nuclear weapon test.
-----------
Mt. Kumgang
-----------
¶10. (C) As an aside, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented on the July 2008 shooting
death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that
KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact
with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed,
so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten
discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those
exercise periods.
STEPHENS
-- In the context of potential violations of international regimes and UNSCR resolutions, Russia needs to hear the concerns of key European partners, such as France and Germany. (In the wake of the Litvinenko murder and subsequent recriminations, UK influence is limited.) EU reinforcement is important for consistency (although Russia tends to downplay the “bad news” that European nations prefer to deliver in EU channels, rather than bilaterally).
-- Regional actors should reinforce our message. Russian weapon sales that destabilize the Middle East should be protested by the Sunni Arab governments that have the most to lose. Given Russia’s competing interest in expanding sales
MOSCOW 00005154 004 OF 004
to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the protests of our moderate Arab partners could also carry a price tag for Russian defiance. The same is true for Latin America, whose leaders to date have not made sales to Chavez an issue on their bilateral agenda with the Russians.
-- The appearance of Russian weapons in Iraq, presumably transferred by Syria, and the prospect of American and coalition casualties as a result could change the calculus of Russian sales to Damascus. The more evidence that we can provide, the more Russia may take steps to restrict the Asad regime. At the same time, we need to be prepared for the Russian countercharge that significant numbers of weapons delivered by the U.S. have fallen into insurgent hands.
-- Finally, providing the Russians with better releasable intelligence when arguing against weapons transfers to rogue states is essential. Our Russian interlocutors are not always impressed by the evidence we use to prove that their arms are ending up in the wrong hands. While we doubt Russia will terminate all its problematic sales for the reasons described above, more compelling evidence could lead the GOR to reduce the scope of its arms transfers or tighten export controls.
------------
Final Caveat
------------
¶13. (C) There are few voices in Russia who protest the sale of weapons to countries of concern and no domestic political constraints that tie the hands of Russian policymakers on this score. The pride that Russian officialdom takes in the arms industry as a symbol of Russia’s resurgence is largely shared by average Russians. American concerns are interpreted cynically, as the disgruntled complaints of a competitor, and viewed through the prism of a 1990’s story line in which the West seeks to keep Russia down, including by depriving it of arms markets. Burns
===
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL672 2009-04-27 06:06 2010-11-30 16:04 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #0672/01 1170635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270635Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4147
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5773
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1316
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9637
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 5865
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 1817
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 4294
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000672
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV KN KS
SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK's recent restaffing and expansion of
the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile
military rhetoric over the last several months are related to
the DPRK leadership's "top priority" need to stabilize the
DPRK internally in preparation for succession, according to
XXXXXXXXXXXX A second priority was to achieve improved
Relations with the United States, which the DPRK regards as its only
potential security guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------
Military Statements and the NDC
-------------------------------
¶2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that the
Korean People's Army's (KPA) spate of high-level
announcements over the past several months (such as the March
8 KPA Supreme Command report, the first in 15 years, and the
four KPA General Staff statements since January, not seen
since 1999) should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military
asserting control over the country, because the military
could act only in concert with the Worker's Party and the
Cabinet. Instead the "generals appearing on TV" was a
phenomenon directed at DPRK citizens with two goals: to show
that the DPRK's hostile external situation meant citizens had
to pull together, and as a "power display" to send a
law-and-order message to counter the increasing economic
disorder resulting from decades of economic "depression."
There was dissatisfaction among some elite groups in the
DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China and Vietnam and
wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated. To tamp down
this internal dissent, external tension was needed. The ROKG
was not particularly worried about the specific threats to
the South contained in the statements because they saw the
statements as targeted at the domestic audience, and in any
case knew the DPRK would try to achieve surprise if it were
to resort to military action, rather than giving warning.
¶3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim
Jong-il's (KJI) waning health. After KJI's August 2008
stroke, the DPRK was a "different environment that needed
stronger leadership." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that before the stroke, KJI
was confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he
suffered "physical and psychological trauma." KJI had become
obsessed with creating political stability to allow an
orderly succession, though XXXXXXXXXXXX did not claim to know who was
next in line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch
the Supreme People's Assembly had declared the beginning of
KJI's third ruling period. But rather than celebrating the
renewal of his mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that
would pave the way for succession.
¶4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from
8 to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired
National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first
established in 1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had
since taken on policy and coordination functions. Now it had
the lead on succession, XXXXXXXXXXXX believed. KJI brother-in-law
Chang Song-taek's addition to the NDC was important for
succession preparation, not only because he was married to
KJI's only sibling and close confidante 63-year-old Kim
Kyong-hui, but also because Chang was seen as having
effectively protected and acted for KJI during KJI's fall
2008 recovery period.
¶5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National
Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh
Kuk-ryul, a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative
terms, since all senior officials are loyalists) who XXXXXXXXXXXX
thought was consolidating various ROK-surveillance and
special operations institutions under his control at NDC.
One of these was the Worker's Party's Operations Department,
which Oh has headed since 1989. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also referred to an
April 21 JoongAng Ilbo newspaper article claiming that
"Office 35," charged with intel collection, and the "External
Liaison Office," charged with training agents, had both been
moved from the Operations Department to NDC/KPA control,
saying that ROK intel sources did not think there was
evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which
formulates actions against the South, was "passive" during
the 1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming
more active again. In other words, Oh's job was to keep the
South off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the
succession period. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believed that changes to the
DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would
also focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to
frequent DPRK propaganda aiming for the establishment of a
"strong and prosperous" nation by 2012, saying that DPRK
authorities believed they had already succeeded ideologically
and militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic
side, which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in.
¶6. (C) The DPRK's determination to maintain internal order
meant that it could go so far as to engage in "limited armed
conflict" with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well
aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and
would respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK
knew that combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would
prevent it from achieving surprise, so XXXXXXXXXXXX was reassured that
no direct military provocation was imminent.
-----------------------
Relations with the U.S.
-----------------------
¶7. (C) Asked what the ROKG's policy options were, given the
above situation, XXXXXXXXXXXX answered indirectly, saying that the
main question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to
maintaining internal stability to allow for succession was
the DPRK's determination to improve relations with the U.S.,
because only the U.S. could solve both the DPRK's security
and economic problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this push for improved
relations was ironic, given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S.
as a menace, but was nevertheless high on DPRK authorities'
agenda. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement
with the Clinton Administration as the first, failed, chance
for peace with the U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration
had turned to negotiations too late for substantial progress;
and that the Obama Administration amounted to a "second
chance." The DPRK craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming
for a "big deal," but first needed to raise tensions to
create the need for dialogue.
¶8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what
happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. XXXXXXXXXXXX was convinced that
the DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while
seeking an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his
recommendation to ROK policymakers was to stay on an even
keel to keep the South-North situation from deteriorating
further. The DPRK's April 21 proposal for dialogue about
land-use and wages at the Kaesong Industrial Complex was
potentially helpful in that regard, but had to be approached
carefully, because the DPRK would try to seize the initiative
and lock-in economic benefits without offering reciprocal
steps. Like other ROKG officials, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized the need
for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on all issues
related to North Korea.
¶9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that China would seek to prevent
U.S.-DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a
smile that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S.,
China would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK
nuclear weapon test.
-----------
Mt. Kumgang
-----------
¶10. (C) As an aside, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented on the July 2008 shooting
death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that
KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact
with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed,
so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten
discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those
exercise periods.
STEPHENS
----
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SINGAPORE529 2009-06-04 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Singapore
R 040908Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6790
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
Thursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08
S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000529
EO 12958 DECL: 06/04/2029
TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, ECON, SN, CH,
KN
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S MAY 30, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Daniel L. Shields. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (SBU) May 30, 2009; 6:30 p.m.; The Presidential Palace; Singapore.
¶2. (SBU) Participants:
United States
-------------
The Deputy Secretary Glyn T. Davies, EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Shields, CDA (Notetaker)
SINGAPORE
---------
Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew Chee Hong Tat, Principal Private Secretary to MM Cheryl Lee, Country Officer, Americas Directorate, MFA
¶3. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Steinberg used his meeting with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons and do not want North Korea to collapse. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad than a North Korea that has collapsed. MM Lee asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s answer was that “they can survive on their own.” The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” MM Lee also offered views on the Chinese economy, Taiwan, Chinese leaders, and U.S.-China relations. End Summary.
China and North Korea
---------------------
¶4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew on May 30 on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual international security forum held in Singapore. The Deputy Secretary used the meeting with MM Lee to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee’s views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Chinese do not want North Korea, which China sees as a buffer state, to collapse. The ROK would take over in the North and China would face a U.S. presence at its border. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad for China than a North Korea that has collapsed, he stated.
¶5. (S) MM Lee said he asked Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma’s Delphic answer was that “they can survive on their own.” MM Lee said he interpreted this as meaning that even if China cut off aid, the DPRK leadership would survive. This is a leadership that has already taken actions like killing ROK Cabinet Members in Burma and shooting down a KAL flight. If they lose power, they will end up facing justice at The Hague, like Milosevic. They have been so isolated for so long that they have no friends, not even Russia. They have not trusted China since the Chinese began cultivating ties with the ROK, given China’s interest in attracting foreign investment, he said. The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee expressed worry about the effect on Iran if the DPRK persists. MM Lee said he believes the DPRK can be contained and will not proliferate, but Iran has very high ambitions, ties to Shiite communities outside Iran, and oil wealth.
¶6. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea’s decisions will have an impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well “go nuclear.” The Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few years the DPRK’s current leadership will be gone and there will be new leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said.
¶7. (S) MM Lee said he wishes the USG well in its efforts on North Korea, but he would be surprised if the North Koreans agree to give up nuclear weapons. They might give up a first-strike capacity, but they want nuclear weapons in case the USG decides to seek regime change. They are psychopathic types, with a “flabby old chap” for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation. MM Lee noted that he had learned from living through three and a half years of Japanese occupation in Singapore that people will obey authorities who can deny them food, clothing and medicine.
¶8. (S) MM Lee said the ROK, after seeing what had happened with German unification, does not want immediate unification with the DPRK. There is “nothing there” in the DPRK, other than a military organization. Kim Jong-Il has already had a stroke. It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke. The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies. China is calculating all this. They have their best men on the job. They want to help the United States to advance common objectives. But they do not want the South to take over the North, MM Lee said.
Chinese Economy
---------------
¶9. (C) Regarding the Chinese economy, MM Lee said the global economic crisis has hit many countries, but the feel on the ground differs considerably from place to place. The Chinese economy is reportedly in the doldrums, but when MM Lee visited Jiangsu Province on May 24, his impression was one of continued prosperity. Shanghai has been harder hit, with container port traffic down 30-35 percent, similar to the situation in Singapore. There is no sign of deep unrest in China. The Chinese are very confident they will be able to sustain eight percent growth. The government is pumping resources into the economy, with a focus on developing Western China. Whether such policies can be sustained for three to four years is unclear, but China can certainly sustain these policies for at least a year, he said.
¶10. (C) MM Lee stated that in the absence of a social safety net in China, the Chinese savings rate is 55 percent, exceeding even Singapore’s 50 percent level. Consumption accounts for only 35 percent of Chinese GDP, as opposed to 70 percent of U.S. GDP. The Chinese leadership may be loath to shift permanently to a more consumption-oriented economy, but the leadership will do so temporarily, if only to avoid unrest. 20 million people have moved back to the countryside because of economic dislocations. The government is providing microfinance to facilitate the transition. The pragmatists are in charge. There is nothing Communist about it. They just want to preserve one party rule. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that current Chinese policies designed to counter the economic crisis could undermine reform. MM Lee said this cannot be helped. China wants to prevent riots like the ones that happened in Guangzhou in March when Hong Kong-connected enterprises suddenly shut down, he said.
Taiwan
------
¶11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said.
¶12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma’s positions on the ‘92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan’s leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said.
¶13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan’s economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan’s South need China’s market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan’s continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing’s calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan “back to China,” even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan.
Xi Jinping
----------
¶14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.
Wang Qishan
-----------
¶15. (C) MM Lee said Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s meeting with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man.
China’s Rise
------------
¶16. (C) MM Lee said China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated.
¶17. (C) MM Lee said China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma.
Build Ties with Young Chinese
-----------------------------
¶18. (C) MM Lee said the best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the United States, with the UK as the next option, then Japan. While they are there, it is important that they be treated as equals, with the cultural support they may need as foreigners. Why not have International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for China? Why not have Chinese cadets at West Point alongside Vietnamese cadets and Indian cadets? America’s advantage is that it can make use of the talent of the entire world, as in Silicon Valley. China still tends to try to keep the foreigners in Beijing and Shanghai. MM Lee noted that his own experience as a student in the UK had left him with an enduring fondness for the UK. When he spent two months at Harvard in 1968, an American professor had invited him home for Thanksgiving. This was not the sort of thing that happened in the UK, and Lee had realized he was dealing with a different civilization. In the future, China’s leaders will have PhDs and MBAs from American universities, he predicted.
¶19. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.
Visit Embassy Singapore’s Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
SHIELDS
----------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE80163 2009-07-31 20:08 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO1645
RR RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #0163/01 2122048
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 312024Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME 0673
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 5248
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7044
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2637
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 9388
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9465
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1034
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 2653
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 3680
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 4458
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2406
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 7503
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 9888
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2537
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4533
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2427
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 6121
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5675
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3128
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2351
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5996
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5977
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8735
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5501
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 5526
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 2691
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 1046
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1500
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 8889
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9893
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 8737
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 8905
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 2969
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 7784
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5364
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8154
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2034
TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPKO KUNR
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: THE UNITED
NATIONS
REF: STATE 048489
Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
¶1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new
National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United
Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued
DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the
United Nations (paragraph 2).
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and
reflects the results of a recent Washington review of
reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations.
The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic
priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs
(paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as
they allocate resources and update plans to collect
information on the United Nations. The priorities should
also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage
reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission
Strategic Plans (MSPs).
¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was
established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If
needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and
the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following
each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
¶C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to
non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies
participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection
Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can
assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to
encourage relevant reporting through their own or State
Department channels.
¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
¶A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State
reporting officers for much of the biographical information
collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email
and other means is vital to the community's collection
efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for
dissemination to the IC.
¶B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the
following information as possible when they have information
relating to persons linked to : office and
STATE 00080163 002 OF 024
organizational titles; names, position titles and other
information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell
phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information,
such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic
format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and
intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site
identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent
flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant
biographical information.
¶3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
¶A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1)
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1)
3) Somalia (FPOL-1)
4) Iran (FPOL-1)
5) North Korea (FPOL-1)
¶B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1)
2) Iraq (FPOL-1)
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1)
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3)
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response
(HREL-3)
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDN-5H)
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H)
8) Burma (FPOL-1)
¶C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations
1) Africa (FPOL-1)
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1)
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1)
¶D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1)
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)
¶E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1)
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1)
¶F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)
¶G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3)
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4)
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H)
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4)
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4)
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H)
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H)
STATE 00080163 003 OF 024
¶H. Intelligence and Security Topics
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue.
2) GRPO can provide text of this issue.
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1)
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information
Systems (INFR-5H)
¶15. Collection requirements and tasking
(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is
the Department of Commerce; DHS is the Department of Homeland
Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense
HUMINT; Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the
Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence;
FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the
Department of Health and Human Services; Navy is the Navy
HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA's Clandestine Service;
OSC/MSC is the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the
Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation) collects
information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA's
requirements; Treasury is the Department of Treasury; USAID
is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the
U.S. Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative;
WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and
Arms Control Center.)
¶A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1).
-- Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing
troops and air transportation equipment, such as helicopters,
to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union
(AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
-- Details of deployments of troop contributor countries to
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed in
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of
UNMIS/UNAMID.
-- Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and
UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan.
-- Details of diplomatic engagement between UNMIS/UNAMID
Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the
Sudanese government or Darfur rebel groups.
-- Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan
(including Darfur).
-- Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments
of the situation on the ground as it affects UN action.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,
STATE 00080163 004 OF 024
Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states
regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including force protection in
Afghanistan.
-- Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or
member states affecting elections in Afghanistan.
-- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed
at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian
assistance.
-- Plans and intentions of key member states and Secretariat
leadership concerning Afghan political and economic
reconstruction, including efforts to combat warlords and drug
trafficking.
-- Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or reluctance to
secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization
(NGO) personnel (international as well as locally-hired
staff).
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan,
Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: Taliban
International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Somalia (FPOL-1).
-- UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace
the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union
(AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
-- Plans and intentions of UN leadership, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led
maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia.
-- Willingness of member states to pledge troops or air
transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia.
-- Views of Somali population on the deployment of a UN or
multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia.
-- Details of diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and
Somali government or Somali opposition officials.
-- Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia.
-- Details of UN Development Program (UNDP)-Somalia training
Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance
for the Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint
Security Force.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN
4) Iran (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),
STATE 00080163 005 OF 024
Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by
Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons.
-- Positions and responses of member states to future
International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director
General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and
relevant provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.
-- Specific plans and activities of the UK, France, Germany
(EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran.
-- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states,
especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran,
sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and
Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership positions.
-- Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states,
coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning
sanctions against Iran.
-- Member support/opposition/subversion of US positions
regarding Iranian sanctions.
-- Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member
states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective
implementation of existing sanctions, as well as its efforts
to end UNSC involvement in Iran's nuclear program by
returning Iran's nuclear file to the IAEA.
-- Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and
within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
-- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in
Iran; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with Iranian officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip
5) North Korea (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5,
to consider additional resolutions against North Korea and/or
sanctions under existing resolutions.
-- Information on the plans and actions of UNSC members to
address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or
proliferate nuclear weapons.
-- UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a
nation in famine, and misuse of aid.
-- North Korean delegation views and activities;
instructions/plans of delegation officials on North Korean
WMD-related issues.
-- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in
North Korea.
-- Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with North Korean officials.
-- Biographic and biometric information on ranking North
Korean diplomats.
STATE 00080163 006 OF 024
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
¶B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1).
-- Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states on
UN Security Council (UNSC) reform.
-- Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member
states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC
procedures or limitation of Perm 5 privileges.
-- International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among
key groups of countries: self-appointed frontrunners for
permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan
(the Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group
(especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that opposes
additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the
EU, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency.
-- Willingness of member states to implement proposed reforms.
-- Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member
recommendations for UNSC reform.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico,
Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
2) Iraq (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member
states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials
concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the
UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi
boundaries.
-- Plans and intentions of the International Organization for
Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally
displaced persons and refugees.
-- Extent to which member states will support or subvert US
positions regarding Iraqi objectives, including
reconstruction efforts.
-- Information on plans and intentions of the SYG,
Secretariat staff, or member states affecting elections in
Iraq.
-- Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission.
-- Iraqi attitudes toward the UN.
-- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed
at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian
assistance.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
STATE 00080163 007 OF 024
Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants
International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1).
-- Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat
decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and
coalitions on UN engagement and role in the Middle East Peace
Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap.
-- Indications that a UNGA special session on the Middle East
might be reconvened.
-- Developments within the UN system that would further the
Arab-Israeli peace process.
-- Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia) MEPP plans
and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals
and envoy negotiating strategies.
-- Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US
positions, Quartet plans, and other (EU, Russia, UK) special
envoys.
-- Indications member states or donor countries might scale
back UN peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the
Middle East.
-- Plans of the SYG or member states to pressure the US on
the MEPP.
-- Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority,
including its representative to the UN, to gain support in
the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for its
strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues,
including from Russia and EU countries, especially France,
Germany, and UK.
-- Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and UNSC on
possible settlement of the Shab'a Farms dispute to include
Syria/Lebanon border demarcation.
-- Secretariat views regarding water management as part of
the Middle East Peace Process, including domestic and
regional competition for allocation.
-- Quartet views on Syria's policies and approach toward
Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and
efforts to subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations.
-- UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on
territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and
right of return.
-- Views, plans and tactics of HAMAS to gain support in the
UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on
HAMAS-Israeli issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority
issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU countries,
especially France, Germany, and the UK.
-- Information on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West
Bank, and its relations with HAMAS/Hizballah.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US
priority to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
STATE 00080163 008 OF 024
Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain, Syria, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese)
International Organizations: EU, UN
Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and
Gaza Strip
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3).
-- Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and
foreign NGOs to promote human rights.
-- Plans and intentions of member states toward the
International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and other
UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights
issues.
-- Plans and intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose
US policies in the UNHRC.
-- Views of UNSC and other member states on Zimbabwe,s
government policies on human rights, humanitarian assistance,
democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
-- Views and intentions of UNSC, UN human rights entities,
and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human
rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about
appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka.
-- Plans and perceptions of member states toward
establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human
rights abuses.
-- Plans and intentions of member states toward proposals and
resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states,
including those advancing democracy; women's rights,
particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and
1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or
those condemning human rights abuses in individual countries.
-- Information on reactions of member states to resolutions
designed to promote democracy, human rights and reforms in
the Muslim world.
-- Perceived success or failure of abilities and priorities
of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
(OHCHR), and efforts by member states to undermine OHCHR
independence.
-- Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC members regarding
reform and the role of the US.
-- Member state support for/opposition to objectives of human
rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies.
-- Plans and intentions of member states or UN Special
Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into
US counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in
Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo.
-- Degree of coordination by and among human rights agencies,
especially between the UN Human Rights Council, the OHCHR,
STATE 00080163 009 OF 024
the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council,
and the International Labor Organization.
-- Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and
UNHRC sessions and world human rights conferences,
particularly plans by developing countries to stymie
criticism of their human rights records through procedural
motions or influencing votes.
-- Plans of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to
sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting
freedom of speech under the rubric of criminalizing
"defamation of religion."
-- Details of UNHRC and OHCHR budget shortfalls.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon,
Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities
and War Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response
(HREL-3).
-- Information on the planning and execution of responses to
humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat;
indications US assistance may be requested.
-- Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
World Food Program (WFP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN
Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO),
and other UN entities to respond to and to coordinate
activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including
environmental disasters.
-- Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member
states on UNRWA.
-- Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership.
-- Information on ability of UN to gain/not gain humanitarian
access to troubled areas, especially in light of security
concerns.
-- Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS
coordinates, and number of personnel.
-- Details of friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security
Coordinator Headquarters and field offices.
-- Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof
between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid programs.
-- Interoperability and willingness to work with US
coalitions in humanitarian assistance operations; willingness
to provide support despite security threats.
-- Indications of donor fatigue.
-- Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by
UNHCR to refocus organization's work and to redistribute
programs to other agencies.
-- Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls.
-- Perceived ability of the UNDP to coordinate an effective
UN presence in each country and to promote democratic
STATE 00080163 010 OF 024
governance.
-- Plans and ability to care for and protect internally
displaced persons.
-- Communications and logistics problems.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities,
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health
Organization
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMDN-5H).
-- Plans and intentions of member states to address threats
to international security from the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
-- Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects
of resolutions pertaining to missile proliferation, missile
defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel's nuclear
program.
-- Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA
Secretariat staff, member states, or influential blocs or
groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or
the Group of 77 (G-77), on the role of the UN on nuclear
proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to
produce or use weapons of mass destruction.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms
Control Organizations, OIC, UN
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H).
-- Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member states to
respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or
state sponsors of terrorism threatening the safety or
security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities,
protectees, or installations.
-- Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel
and/or missions and terrorist organizations.
-- Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies
(subcommittees), UN agencies and among member states about
measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas
facilities, operations, and personnel.
-- Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO
personnel.
-- Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at
the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or domestic and overseas
UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York.
-- Details of UN efforts to acquire, collect, assess and
disseminate threat information within the US and overseas.
-- Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN
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domestic and overseas UN facilities.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
8) Burma (FPOL-1).
-- Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and
actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy,
and attempts to play a larger UN role.
-- Plans and intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN
Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction with
Burma and engagement with UN member states.
-- Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma; level of trust
in his Special Adviser.
-- Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special
Adviser on Burma, and on key countries in the UN.
-- Role of the UN in Burmese elections.
-- Development and democratization activities of UNDP in
Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s
relationship with Burmese officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, UN
¶C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.
1) Africa (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states
regarding peace operations, especially in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African
Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia.
-- UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding military
operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
-- Early warning information available to the Secretariat on
potential threats to peace and security.
-- UN views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict
resolution and post-conflict capacity building.
-- UN expectations of US military involvement in African
peacekeeping missions and how this may influence UN
willingness to establish, curb, or end missions.
-- Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa are
straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact
of current operations on future operations and readiness.
-- UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to
expand the UN role in African conflict zones, either in the
form of more comprehensive "peacemaking" mission mandates or
in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and
timely UN-led multilateral intervention.
-- Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the
UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa,
including by working with the AU or other regional
organizations and NGOs.
-- Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain
influence in Africa via UN peace operations.
-- Information on extent of support and capabilities for
peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of
Western African States (ECOWAS).
-- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and
actual practice.
-- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches
unofficial communications of events; views on those
discrepancies.
-- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding
UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries.
-- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN
peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative
ability to contribute to such efforts.
-- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda
participation and leadership.
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d,Ivoire,
Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia,
France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa,
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1).
-- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states
regarding ongoing peace operations outside Africa.
-- Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support UN
peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in
areas of potential conflict.
-- Views of member states on and plans to respond to the
US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations
capabilities.
-- Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat
toward proposed resolutions, mandates, peacekeeping issues,
and US-sponsored initiatives.
-- Information on whether member states will utilize
references to the ICC to condition support for peace
operations.
-- Information on deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment
screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace
operations.
-- Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military
forces, including surge capabilities.
-- Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member
states on Haiti,s government policies and actions on human
rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.
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-- Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and
key member states regarding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda,
Uruguay, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1).
-- UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the
capability of the UN to organize, lead, and carry out new,
complex military operations and civilian police operations.
-- Information on Secretariat or member views on or
initiatives for peace operations reform.
-- Information on the appointment of SYG special
representatives for new peace or political operations.
-- Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of
engagement, and threat environment for proposed peacekeeping
activities, including transportation and communications
infrastructures and any available maps.
-- Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and
materiel that countries are willing to contribute.
-- Information on interoperability of equipment and material
available for logistic support.
-- Information on turf battles between the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and
Department of Political Affairs over control of peace
operations.
-- Information on turf battles between logistic and military
sides of peace operations.
-- UN member views on reform of the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations.
-- Information on troop contributing countries' tendency to
follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders
vice UN field commanders.
-- Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee
concerns within peace operations mandates.
-- Host government views and concerns about UN policies
toward that country.
-- Influence of UN security coordinator on operational
planning; field personnel reaction to UN security directives.
-- Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG) deployments.
-- Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children;
national and UN responses.
-- Changes in ability of member states, especially member
states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute troops to peace
operations, including for economic, social, and operational
reasons.
-- Details on contributions of member states (in kind,
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personnel, or financial).
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda,
Uruguay, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
¶D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1).
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and
Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially
voting intentions of UNSC members and priorities or frictions
among the Perm 5.
-- Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or oppose
US policies in the UNSC.
-- Specific views and positions of key member states on
US-sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for
the US, and other proposed resolutions and mandates.
-- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics
of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the
UNSC, especially those that do not include the US
(particularly the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,
Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin America and
Caribbean Countries (GRULAC).
-- Differences in the positions of member states, differences
between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures
for determining voting instructions, and voting instructions
to delegations.
-- Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member states
joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups,
blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially
those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM,
G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, and the OIC).
-- Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups
regarding UNSC candidacy.
-- Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent
Representatives, information on their relationships with
their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1).
-- UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions
issues, especially during negotiations of sanctions
resolutions.
-- Willingness of and efforts by UN member states to violate
sanctions.
-- Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target
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governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil
population.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee
members.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee
expert groups and their ability to support sanctions
monitoring.
-- Pressure to limit scope and length of new sanctions,
especially from coalitions and regional groups.
-- Views and actions of the Secretariat or member states with
regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to
support sanctions implementation and to address violations.
-- Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Sierra Leone,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, UN
¶E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1).
-- SYG's management and decision-making style, and his
influence on the Secretariat.
-- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for
UN management.
-- Role and influence of Secretariat and other key officials
with SYG and other UN system agencies.
-- Views of and brokering by key officials on major issues.
-- Changes in and appointment and selection process for key
officials of Secretariat, specialized agency, committee,
commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva,
Vienna, and other UN system cities, to include special
assistants and chiefs of staff.
-- Personalities, biographic and biometric information,
roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key
UN officials, to include under secretaries, heads of
specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides,
heads of peace operations and political field missions,
including force commanders.
-- Relations between key UN officials and member states.
-- Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include
preferred candidates and candidates lacking UN member support.
-- Views of UNSC members and other member states on Cuban,
Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Syria,
Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1).
-- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
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subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for
UN management.
-- Perceptions of member states of the effectiveness of the
Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint
Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement,
and corruption.
-- Effectiveness of the OIOS, in light of the review of the
OIOS mandate.
-- Plans and moves to implement OIOS recommendations.
-- SYG's view of the role of the OIOS.
-- Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence of corruption in
UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement
measures to reduce corruption.
-- Plans and intentions of UN member states or the
Secretariat to address corruption issues at the UN and UN
agencies.
-- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to
push for or block management reform proposals.
-- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or
senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of
corruption or mismanagement by field missions, including
efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse.
-- Internal complaints by UNDP staff about waste, fraud, or
abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them.
-- Plans and intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to
push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their own
countries or those of their friends.
-- Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP
Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field
staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under the "One UN"
Program.
-- Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group
platforms, especially on budget and management reform issues.
-- Developments in the implementation of the performance
based personnel system and contractor reform.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN specialized agency
executive committees.
-- Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on
the UN reform process.
-- Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending
a common whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds
and programs.
-- Indications of pressure by member states or groups to
increase or control growth in the budget.
-- Secretariat and member attitudes towards changes in the
scale of assessments.
-- Options under consideration to resolve financial problems.
-- SYG views on and plans for responding to Government
Accountability Office reports calling on the UN to more
effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make
further progress on management reform.
-- Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the
UN budget process.
-- Status and use of advanced information systems to
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streamline UN processes.
Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
¶F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1).
-- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics
of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the
General Assembly, especially those that do not include the
US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group,
Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC.
-- Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts
to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions
or policy initiatives.
-- Information on the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it
relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth
Committees.
-- Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to
secure additional voting rights in the UN and its specialized
agencies.
-- Lobbying by member states for committee membership
assignments or vice presidencies.
-- Information on current and likely future leadership of
regional groups, blocs, and coalitions.
-- Differences over positions between UN missions and their
respective capitals.
-- Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions.
-- Plans, intentions, and agendas of key committee chairs;
member views of issues that come before these committees.
-- Efforts of Third World countries to moderate, via NAM and
G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation of
religion, or human rights issues.
-- Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working
groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy.
-- Perceptions of member states of the viability and
potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus.
-- Biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC
Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan,
Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their
relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa,
Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
¶G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3).
-- Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive
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Framework for Action to address the global food crisis.
-- WFP activities and proposals related to reforming donor
food aid policies and establishing a new standing global fund
to address regularly occurring food crises.
-- WFP and FAO plans and proposals regarding the impact on
food prices and food security of the growing use of ethanol
and biofuels.
-- Internal UN responses to international calls for reform of
FAO and WFP.
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, Libya,
Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan,
Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe
International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health
Organization
Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and
Gaza Strip
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4).
-- Country preparations for the December 2009 Copenhagen UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Meeting.
-- Developments related to other UNFCCC meetings and
discussions on a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.
-- Perceptions of key negotiators on US positions in
environmental negotiations.
-- Developments on the Montreal Protocol, including reactions
to US efforts to limit hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs).
-- Indications that member states working through the UN and
its specialized agencies are/are not fostering environmental
cooperation, partnerships and capacity building between and
among member states and regional and sub-regional
organizations.
-- Monitoring of and compliance with UN-sponsored
environmental treaties; evidence of treaty circumvention.
-- Information on adherence to member states' own national
environmental programs, including protection, monitoring, and
cleanup efforts.
-- Efforts by treaty secretariats to influence treaty
negotiations or compliance.
-- Information on the Convention on Biological Diversity,
particularly on access, benefit sharing and bio-safety.
-- Information on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
including potential efforts to modify or amend its provisions.
-- Information on excessive maritime claims, including those
relating to ridges.
-- Information on efforts to develop a mechanism to add
chemicals to the list of persistent organic pollutants.
-- Information and perceptions on the strategic approach to
international chemicals management, especially efforts of the
EU's management program.
-- Information on participation in and compliance with the UN
Basel Convention.
-- Status of efforts to set standards to promote
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environmental protection, including protection of forests,
desertification, and invasive or endangered species.
-- Efforts within the UN to protect water resources, and to
promote development of alternative sources of energy.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, UN
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H).
-- Information on efforts by UN member states or
organizations to promote or obstruct regulatory reform,
including banking and financial reforms, transparency,
international law, trade, development, and foreign direct
investment to reflect the Monterrey anti-poverty consensus
and the Millennium Development Goals.
-- Plans, intentions, and tactics of the UNGA President
regarding international financial problems; views of member
states regarding these plans.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to support US
priorities related to economic freedom and promotion of
democracy.
-- Secretariat or member plans to develop multilateral
economic, trade, or development agreements impinging on US
interests.
-- Efforts by member states and the Secretariat to reconcile
international differences over globalization, especially the
perceived impact of globalization on human rights, labor, and
environmental issues.
-- Member positions on UN decisions, plans, and activities
concerning environmentally sustainable economic growth
through market economies, free trade, private investment, and
efficient multilateral development assistance.
-- Efforts to expand the global compact involving
corporations committed to observing human rights,
environmental, and labor standards.
-- SYG's views and statements on trade issues and efforts to
influence future World Trade Organization rounds.
-- Plans and intentions of UN member states that may impact
freedom of navigation.
-- Information on international taxation initiatives.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, FAO, International
Financial Institutions and Infrastructures, UN, World Bank,
World Trade Organization
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4).
-- Plans, tactics, timetables, and draft proposals for the
Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and especially
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information related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiative, from
interested individual member states (especially China, Cuba,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and South Africa) and
like-minded groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda
Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South
Africa, and Sweden).
-- Member state views of the major problems facing the NPT;
whether or under what conditions states would consider
withdrawing from the NPT.
-- Member views on and responses to US plans and policies on
missile defense and positions on a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, particularly those of Russia, China, and Pakistan.
-- Information on IAEA plans for safeguards, international
fuel banks, or other nuclear fuel supply arrangements, and
meetings of the Board of Governors at the IAEA.
-- Member views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into
force.
-- Member plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group; views of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Initiative.
-- Readiness of member states to reform the agenda of the UN
General Assembly's First Committee; proposals prepared by
member states for the First Committee.
-- Views of key delegations on US proposals on land mines.
-- Tactical and substantive information regarding periodic
arms control meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna and
elsewhere, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) review process, UN experts group on missiles,
and meetings on conventional arms.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to introduce new
arms control or proliferation prevention measures or make
significant changes to existing agreements.
- Member or Secretariat plans to address WMD proliferation,
safeguards, arms control and disarmament, or other threat
reduction efforts.
-- Foreign attitudes on UN-sanctioned arms control
negotiations.
-- Biographic and biometric data on, and positions of key UN
arms control interlocutors, especially candidates for the
position of Director General of the IAEA, and the heads of
other international institutions.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland,
Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South
Africa, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms
Control Organizations, NATO, OSCE, UN
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4).
-- UN, WHO, and other international organizations,
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forecasts, expected impacts, plans, proposals, key studies,
and reactions to major health crises and other health-related
issues, including efforts on disease eradication, improving
health standards and access to care and medicine, and
programs to monitor and respond to emerging infectious
disease outbreaks and other disasters or emergencies.
-- Information on deliberations in the UN and other
international health organizations on health issues and the
policy positions and objectives of member states and key
figures, including compromises, insertions, and items omitted
in published declarations and studies.
-- Information on international health organizations,
relationships and interactions with countries and other
organizations, including relationships with regional offices
or subsidiaries.
-- Details on limits and restrictions placed on international
organizations to investigate reports of diseases that pose an
international threat, including restrictions placed on the
nationality of members of investigation teams.
-- Details on disease transparency, particularly indications
about inconsistent reporting of outbreaks to appropriate
international organizations and delivery of specimens to WHO-
and FAO-affiliated laboratories, and including discussions or
agreements impacting the publicly disclosed occurrence of
diseases.
-- Details of discussions related to the accessibility of
HIV/AIDS drugs (antiretroviral drugs or ARVs).
-- Details related to the availability, accessibility, and
regulation of health care, particularly medications,
vaccines, and counterfeits.
-- Member state attitudes toward maintenance of smallpox
stocks.
-- Information on global counterfeit medications to include
surveillance, countermeasures, and research and development
issues.
-- Details on efforts to implement health-related Millennium
Development Goals.
-- Details on corruption in international health
organizations or the corrupt use of goods and services
provided for health issues by bilateral and multilateral
donors and international health organizations, including WHO,
UNAIDS, FAO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria.
-- Details on irregularities in Global Fund fundraising,
spending, and treatment of whistle blowers.
-- Personalities, biographic and biometric information,
roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key
health officials, to include the Director General of the WHO,
head of UNAIDS, the Pan American Health Organization, under
Secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief
advisers, and top aides.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
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Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health
Organization, WHO
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H).
-- Information on plans and intentions of UN bodies and
member states to respond to or address within UN fora the
worldwide terrorist threat.
-- Structure, plans and key figures of UN counterterrorism
strategy.
-- Information on plans and activities of UNSC,s four
counterterrorism sub-bodies.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to address terrorism
by implementing anti-terrorism legislation as called for
under resolutions, particularly as they relate to tracking
financial transactions.
-- Views of member states on US policy toward terrorism.
-- Efforts of member states to support or oppose activities
undertaken by UN specialized agencies such as the
International Maritime Organization and the International
Civil Aviation Organization to improve maritime and airline
security.
-- Information on UN support for technical assistance to
member states to combat terrorism, particularly in Africa.
-- Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of
terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and
definition of terrorism.
-- (For further requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism
Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H).
-- Plans and intentions of member states to support or oppose
US priority to combat trafficking and exploitation of men,
women, and children.
-- Member state perceptions of ability of UN Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) to follow through on strategies to
support women and children through UN specialized bodies.
-- Information on member efforts to combat organized crime,
narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons.
-- Plans and intentions of member states to address
reproductive issues, including the aims of the EU vis-a-vis
the US, GRULAC, Arab, and OIC nations.
-- Member state perceptions or plans regarding efforts to
reconcile religious differences worldwide.
-- Information on reforms undertaken within the UN
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
and future plans of the organization.
-- Member views on education initiatives.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
¶H. Intelligence and Security Topics
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related
requirements.
2) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related
requirements.
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1).
-- Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs on UN
decision-making.
-- Efforts of foreign NGOs to undermine US policy initiatives.
-- Foreign NGO role in, views toward, and influence on UN
policies and activities on globalization, justice, human
rights, the environment, and
family/women/children/reproductive issues.
-- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to assist refugees,
displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR
and WFP.
-- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to support the UN
Environmental Program or national efforts with environmental
protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts.
-- Contacts between foreign NGOs and Secretariat staff that
could involve sharing of confidential data.
-- Foreign efforts to strip US or foreign NGOs of UN
affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN
affiliation.
-- Efforts by member states-*particularly China, Cuba,
Israel, Russia, and Islamic countries*-to obtain NGO
affiliation for organizations supporting their policies.
-- Efforts by organizations affiliated with terrorist
organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain
NGO affiliation with the UN.
-- Efforts by the EU through the Arhus convention to place
NGOs on UN bureaus; reactions of member states to those
efforts.
-- Role of NGOs at the Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees (OHCR), OHCHR, and UNHRC in the Third Committee of
the UNGA.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information
Systems (INFR-5H).
-- Current technical specifications, physical layout, and
planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and
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information systems, networks, and technologies used by top
officials and their support staffs.
-- Details on commercial and private VIP networks used for
official communications, to include upgrades, security
measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V
P N versions used.
-- Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials,
as well as limited distribution telephone numbers/directories
and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories;
dialing numbers for voice, datalink, video teleconferencing,
wireless communications systems, cellular systems, personal
communications systems, and wireless facsimiles.
-- Information on hacking or other security incidents
involving UN networks.
-- Key personnel and functions of UN entity that maintains UN
communications and computer networks.
-- Indications of IO/IW operations directed against the UN.
-- Information about current and future use of communications
systems and technologies by officials or organizations,
including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones,
very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile
radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption,
international connectivity, use of electronic data
interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), Worldwide
interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and
fiber networks.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
Uganda, Vietnam
International Organizations: UN
CLINTON
-------------------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10BANGKOK192 2010-01-25 07:07 2010-12-15 21:09 SECRET Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO6557
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #0192/01 0250759
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 250759Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9667
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2258
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7904
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6126
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0330
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7534
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
Monday, 25 January 2010, 07:59
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000192
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON
EO 12958 DECL: 01/25/2030
TAGS PREL, PGOV, TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PRIVY COUNCIL CHAIR
PREM, OTHER “ESTABLISHMENT” FIGURES ON YEAR AHEAD
REF: BANGKOK 184 (SEH DAENG)
BANGKOK 00000192 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador paid a series of New Year’s-related calls on influential Thai figures, including Privy Council Chair GEN Prem, Privy Council member ACM Siddhi, and former PM Anand, to discuss the year ahead. Abhisit’s performance, issues related to the royal family, and challenges posed by Thaksin/Hun Sen emerged as the primary themes. Prem offered a more positive assessment of Abhisit’s performance than Siddhi, who criticized Abhisit for a lack of resolve and the absence of an effective team to carry out his policies. All three focused on the challenge posed by Thaksin to the government and, indirectly, to the monarchy; Anand attributed part of the King’s poor health to Thaksin, and both Prem and Siddhi were upset about Thaksin’s alliance of convenience with Cambodian leader Hun Sen. All three had quite negative comments about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. While asserting that the Crown Prince will become King, both Siddhi and Anand implied the country would be better off if other arrangements could be made. Siddhi expressed preference for Princess Sirindhorn; Anand suggested only the King would be in a position to change succession, and acknowledged a low likelihood of that happening.
¶2. (S) Comment: On the two most difficult and sensitive issues of the day in Thailand -- Thaksin and the monarchy -- the Thai elite appear as unsure about the future as any other sector of society. The stakes are significant for all sides, and resolution of the political divide and royal succession could still be far over the horizon. Elite concerns about Abhisit in office appear to reflect less on his performance than on general worries about the ultimate resolution of issues. End Summary and Comment.
Mixed Views on Abhisit’s performance
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Privy Councilor Chair GEN Prem shared his assessments of PM Abhisit, the Crown Prince’s relationship with Thaksin, and difficulties dealing with Cambodia/Hun Sen with Ambassador over lunch January 13. Regarding Abhisit, Prem referenced widespread criticism that the PM was too young and not strong enough to be an effective leader in trying times. However, Prem felt that Abhisit had proved in 2009 that he was up to the challenge of doing what was necessary to run a fractious coalition government, no easy task. In addition, there were no other politicians available who were more principled and had more integrity than Abhisit, and Thailand needed such a leader at this point. Prem expressed hope that Thais and foreigners alike would be more patient with Abhisit, who he believed was the right man to serve as premier.
¶4. (C) Fellow Privy Councilor ACM Siddhi, hosting Ambassador at his home January 11, was more critical of Abhisit than Prem. Siddhi said that he had told Abhisit’s father, his own long-time personal physician, that his son needed to be more decisive and “make more friends” in 2010. Abhisit spent too much time at the podium and not enough time assembling an effective team to which he could delegate action and rely on for well-thought out policy initiatives, in Siddhi’s view. Abhisit also needed to get out to engage the grassroots, one of Thaksin’s strengths. On Siddhi’s wish list: Abhisit pushing through a permanent appointment for Acting Police Chief Pratheep; using his power over wayward coalition parties by threatening parliamentary dissolution if they did not get in line; and telling the Army to take action to dismiss renegade MGEN Khattiya, even if Defense Minister Prawit refused to sign a dismissal order.
Political Year Ahead
--------------------
¶5. (C) While GEN Prem expressed moderate concern about the potential for violence and political discord in early 2010, he felt the situation was no worse than six months ago. Prem asked about U.S. laws regarding demonstrations and avoiding
BANGKOK 00000192 002.2 OF 003
excessive disruptions of government functions and daily lives of citizens; Ambassador explained the U.S. system of permits for protests which allowed for free speech but not free access everywhere. Ambassador shared U.S. frustration about decisions negatively affecting economic/investment climate, such as Ma Tha Phut and the digital lottery cancellation; the uneven application of the rule of law, breaches of contract, and regulatory shifts affected the investment climate more negatively at this point than political turmoil.
¶6. (C) ACM Siddhi expressed more concerns than Prem about the security situation in 2010, suggesting that Army Commander Anupong’s inability to control wayward red-affiliated MGEN Khattiya’s M-79 attacks on yellow-shirt rallies and trips to see Thaksin overseas was not a good harbinger (note: three days later, someone attacked Anupong’s office at night with an M-79, with Khattiya widely seen as the likely suspect, see reftel. End note). Siddhi said he had higher hopes for deputy Commander Prayuth, widely expected to replace Anupong in October and seen as particularly close to the Queen. Siddhi claimed Prem had sent a signal of his displeasure with Anupong by snubbing him during a group call at Prem’s residence to pass birthday greetings, not stopping to talk to Anupong personally as he did with other key military commanders.
Royal Family: King, Crown Prince, Entourages
--------------------------------------------
¶7. (S) Regarding King Bhumibol’s health, Prem indicated that the King was exercising 30 minutes a day on a stationary bicycle at Siriraj Hospital and passing a medicine ball with a physical therapist to build up strength and regain weight. Prem acknowledged that he had not seen the King since the hospitalization, but that the Queen and Princess Sirindhorn saw the King daily. When Ambassador asked about the Crown Prince’s involvement, Prem repeated: the Queen and Sirindhorn visit him daily.
¶8. (S) Prem acknowledged Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn probably maintained some sort of relationship with fugitive former PM Thaksin, “seeing him from time to time.” Prem, clearly no fan of either man, cautioned that Thaksin ran the risk of self-delusion if he thought that the Crown Prince would act as his friend/supporter in the future merely because of Thaksin’s monetary support; “he does not enjoy that sort of relationship.” When Ambassador asked where the Crown Prince was currently, in Thailand or Europe, Prem replied dismissively: “You know his social life, how he is.” (Note: a presumed reference to Vajiralongkorn’s preference to spend time based out of Munich with his main mistress, rather than in Thailand with his wife and son).
¶9. (S) ACM Siddhi, in a similar vein, noted that the Crown Prince frequently slipped away from Thailand, and that information about his air hostess mistresses was widely available on websites; he lamented how his former aide, now Thai Ambassador to Germany, was forced to leave Berlin for Munich often to receive Vajiralongkorn. Siddhi raised Thaksin’s controversial November Times On-line interview, which Siddhi claimed cast the King in a bad light and attempted to praise the Crown Prince as broad-minded and educated abroad, hinting that Vajiralongkorn would be ready to welcome Thaksin back to Thailand once he became King.
¶10. (S) Ambassador mentioned to Siddhi the Crown Prince’s more engaging approach in the early December King’s Birthday reception with Ambassadors, shaking each envoy’s hand and appearing more at ease than in the 2008 reception. Siddhi stated that succession would be a difficult transition time for Thailand. According to Palace Law, the Crown Prince would succeed his father, but added after a pause, almost hopefully: “if the Crown Prince were to die, anything could happen, and maybe Prathep (Sirindhorn) could succeed.”
¶11. (S) Ambassador similarly raised the Crown Prince’s more confident demeanor with former PM Anand in late December, seeking Anand’s assessment of the dynamics in play as succession inevitably drew nearer. Anand’s response was
BANGKOK 00000192 003.2 OF 003
similar to Siddhi’s, but more detailed and blunt. Anand said that he had always believed that the Crown Prince would succeed his father, according to law. However, there could be complicating factors -- if Vajiralongkohn proved unable to stay out of politics, or avoid embarrassing financial transactions. After a pause, Anand added that the consensus view among many Thai was that the Crown Prince could not stop either, nor would he be able, at age 57, to rectify his behavior. After another pause, Anand added that someone really should raise the matter with the King, before adding with regret that there really was no one who could raise such a delicate topic (note: implied was the need for an alternative to Vajiralongkorn).
¶12. (S) ACM Siddhi expressed his personal concern about the declining image of the royal family in Thailand, noting that something as simple as excessive motorcade-related traffic jams caused by minor royals was an unnecessary but enduring irritant. Personal Private Secretary Arsa Sarasin had raised this with the King about eight years ago, according to Siddhi, and the King had agreed, authorizing Arsa to talk to royal family members and to set up new rules limiting entourages and occasions when traffic would be stopped. Nothing had changed; Siddhi noted that he had been caught up in traffic for 45 minutes the previous week returning for a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador, due to a royal motorcade. Stories that the Crown Prince now ordered second story windows closed as his motorcade passed achieved nothing but additional popular resentment, Siddhi added sorrowfully.
Thaksin and Hun Sen
-------------------
¶13. (C) Thaksin clearly remained on the mind of all three “establishment” figures. Former PM Anand asserted that the King’s health and mood remained poor “primarily because of Thaksin” and the challenge Thaksin posed to the stability of the country. GEN Prem asked Ambassador what the U.S. would do in the situation Thailand found itself, with a neighboring country appointing as an adviser a former leader bent on bringing down the government. Ambassador replied that while former U.S. Presidents did occasionally give paid speeches overseas, they would never work for another government; he advised Prem and Thai officials to take the high road in their public comments about Cambodia, and not to be drawn into a tit for tat with Thaksin and Hun Sen. (Note: Prem seemed to be musing out loud, but he clearly was focused on what he perceived as a threat from Thaksin and Hun Sen’s facilitation of Thaksin’s efforts).
¶14. (C) ACM Siddhi said that PM Abhisit had called him on his 90th birthday recently and had indicated that now that Thailand was no longer ASEAN Chair, Abhisit would feel less constrained in responding to Hun Sen’s bullying rhetoric more freely. Siddhi expressed concern that in addition to Cambodia and Brunei, clearly in Thaksin’s camp due to his close personal ties with Hun Sen and the Brunei Sultan, Laos and Vietnam might back Hun Sen in the ongoing Thai-Cambodia diplomatic spat.
¶15. (C) ACM Siddhi attacked Thaksin as trying to use money, red-shirt protests, and Hun Sen to “destroy our country,” but he predicted Thaksin would not succeed. Thaksin never had tried to negotiate, Siddhi alleged, but only issued demands; had he been willing to come back and spend a nominal time in jail for his conviction, Thaksin likely would have been quickly pardoned/released as a former PM. Now Thaksin would try to create chaos, possibly sparking the use of force. While Siddhi expected Thaksin to lose the February 26 decision on his 76 billion baht ($2.3 billion) in frozen assets, he claimed his sources indicated Thaksin still had 240 billion baht ($7.3 billion) overseas. Rather than live overseas quietly, Thaksin had decided to fight, funding websites attacking the King and Queen to stir up anti-monarchy views. JOHN..
--
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10HAVANA84 2010-02-09 18:06 2010-12-16 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL US Interests Section Havana
VZCZCXRO9953
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHUB #0084/01 0401849
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091849Z FEB 10
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5178
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0114
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0039
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
Tuesday, 09 February 2010, 18:49
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HAVANA 000084
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CCA
EO 12958 DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS ECON, EFIN, PREL, PGOV, CU
SUBJECT: KEY TRADING PARTNERS SEE NO BIG ECONOMIC REFORMS
IN 2010, AGREE CUBA’S FATE HINGES ON VENEZUELA
REF: A. 09 HAVANA 631 (GOC TELLS CUBANS TO FEND FOR THEMSELVES) B. 09 HAVANA 322 (...ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD?) C. 09 HAVANA 763 (NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION)
HAVANA 00000084 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Principal Officer Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: There is little prospect of economic reform in 2010 despite an economic crisis that is expected to get even worse for Cuba in the next few years, according to key commercial specialists, economic officers and Cuba-watchers in Havana. Promised structural reforms remain on hold while the Cuban government wrings its hands in indecision, fearful of the political consequences of these long-overdue changes. The one potentially significant reform implemented in 2009, the leasing of idle land, has not been effective. The Cuban government (GOC) could be forced to speed up reforms in the event of a significant reduction of assistance from an increasingly unstable Venezuela. Otherwise, the GOC will continue to prioritize military-led control and aim for a slow, measured pace of reform focused on agriculture and import substitution. The Cuban people have grown accustomed to tough times and will respond to future government belt tightening with similar endurance. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) Pol/Econ Counselor hosted a breakfast with commercial and economic counselors from six of Cuba’s seven largest trading partners, including China, Spain, Canada, (the U.S.), Brazil and Italy, plus key creditors France and Japan. These countries also represent most of the foreign companies investing in Cuba, with the notable exception of Venezuelan state-owned enterprises.
DIPLOMATS ARE MOSTLY PESSIMISTIC
--------------------------------
¶3. (C) The global financial crisis and the inability to service foreign debt will make the dire situation in Cuba even worse in 2010, according to EU diplomats. Brazil was a bit more optimistic noting that Cuba can still withstand more economic hardship. All diplomats agreed that Cuba could survive this year without substantial policy changes, but the financial situation could become fatal within 2-3 years. Italy said GOC contacts had suggested Cuba would become insolvent as early as 2011.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT: NO ROOM FOR IMPORT REDUCTIONS
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶4. (C) The GOC has responded to the crisis with calls to further reduce imports and increase domestic production. However, Spain argued there is little more room for Cuba to reduce its imports after a 37% reduction in 2009 as the increasing majority are now basic necessities like food and animal feed. (Note: press reports February 9 that Cuba has cut rice imports from Vietnam, its largest supplier, by 11 percent for 2010. End Note.) Exports and other sources of foreign currency (tourism and remittances) are unlikely to increase substantially without a dramatic global turnaround, access to U.S. markets or an opening to U.S. tourists. Two-way trade with China alone in 2009 fell by close to $1 billion. Regarding increasing production, the only significant reform in the last five years, the leasing of idle land to improve agricultural production, has little chance of succeeding as implemented. The diplomats noted that many of the Cubans that were granted land have no farming experience, and the few farmers with experience have limited access to capital, tools and markets.
STILL DEFAULTING ON TRADE PARTNERS
----------------------------------
¶5. (C) Payment problems continue for all countries. Despite once again restructuring all of its official debt in 2009, Japan has yet to see any payments. Even China admitted to having problems getting paid on time and complained about
HAVANA 00000084 002.2 OF 004
Cuban requests to extend credit terms from one to four years. When France and Canada responded with “welcome to the club”, China suggested Canada help secure payment from a Cuban joint venture that includes Canadian firm Sherritt International which is now reportedly receiving its share of profits.
AN UNWELCOMING ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶6. (C) Foreign investors have been treated poorly in Cuba and new investors will demand additional protections and guarantees, according to the French. The Chinese complained that the GOC’s insistence on keeping majority control of all joint ventures makes no sense. “No matter whether a foreign business invests $10 million or $100 million, the GOC’s investment will always add up to 51%,” China’s commercial counselor said in visible exasperation. He noted a joint venture to produce high-yield rice that produced a good first harvest but was not sustainable at the GOC-mandated prices. Brazilian investors are taking a longer term view on returns, however, noting some success in raising capital for the refurbishment of the port at Mariel.
MAJOR REFORMS ON HOLD
---------------------
¶7. (C) Despite the grave analysis, none of our contacts foresee meaningful economic reform in 2010. Immediate reform is neither necessary nor politically advisable since it has the potential of being too politically “destabilizing,” said the Brazilian. Even reforms openly supported in the official press late last year (Ref A), such as the ending of the food ration system, are now on hold due to the initial negative public reaction. Any discussions around Chinese-style reforms, particularly regarding foreign investment, have been difficult and “a real headache” according to the Chinese. The French said the GOC will not act until its face is up against the wall and it runs out of options, which is not yet the case in spite of all the challenges. One cited example of the GOC’s hesitancy is that all proposals for micro-credit programs coveted by the Ministry of Foreign Investment require the Council of State’s approval. To date, only one small project by the Spanish has been approved with little success.
AS VENEZUELA GOES
-----------------
¶8. (C) The Spanish see future reforms determined by two factors: 1) foreign pressure that is outside of the regime’s control; and 2) domestic pressure developed after a consensus is reached through internal discussions. All our colleagues agreed that Venezuela is the most important and “increasingly complicated” foreign variable. Without Venezuelan support, the GOC would have to enact significant reforms similar to those that enabled the regime to survive through the Special Period of the early 1990s (Ref B), according to the Spanish. The view from the French is that Venezuela “es en flames” and a source of serious concern for Cuba.
THE DOMESTIC DEBATE CONTINUES
-----------------------------
¶9. (C) If reform is driven by domestic factors it will be slow and hesitant. Unlike former president Fidel Castro, Raul Castro needs the “support of the machine” to make chnges, according to the Canadians.naul Castro’s National Assembly speech in December (Ref C) made it clear that the GOC is in no hurry to reform, argued the Italians. The Spanish noted that the consensus-building process likely explains the numerous official press stories and letters to the editor in support of some sort of economic reforms, without the accompanying government measures. Even though this limited but noteworthy public debate is almost always framed in socialist and revolutionary rhetoric, many of the articles are highly critical of current policies and propose market-oriented reforms. The simple fact that space still
HAVANA 00000084 003.2 OF 004
exists (and appears to be growing) within Cuba for this form of public dissent indicates that the GOC has not completely given up on bigger reforms.
SLOW, MEASURED AND MILITARY-STYLE REFORMS
-----------------------------------------
¶10. (C) In lieu of structural reforms, the GOC will continue to take small steps to increase domestic production and reduce imports, focusing on lifting agricultural production from its current lamentable state. The GOC has started on a slow and steady path, according to the Canadians. “Unless (or until) the situation becomes unstable, the government is not going to walk any faster.” An example of step-by-step reform is the pilot suburban agriculture project taking place in the third largest city in Cuba. A Reuters reporter told us that he witnessed the GOC clearing land and providing resources to private, collective and state farmers working around the city of Camaguey. As an incentive, the GOC will permit farmers to sell a bit more of the production directly to consumers. The goal is to encourage idle workers to return to farms close to the city and produce enough food to feed the surrounding areas. The focus on local production will also cut down on costs associated with state-run (and thoroughly corrupt and inefficient) transportation and storage. If successful, the GOC will replicate this project in other cities.
¶11. (C) Even limited reforms could open up private sector opportunities (e.g. permitting cooperatives to operate barber shops, restaurants or retail stores), but in general the military will continue to expand its influence in core economic activities. According to the French, the Cuban leadership believes it can transfer the successes of military state companies that control a good part of the tourism industry to the rest of the economy. Many of our contacts agreed that the military is generally better regarded in Cuba than the political institutions, and reportedly intervened directly in the operation of flour mills earlier this year after bread had disappeared from markets. The Italians noted that the Agriculture Ministry is in the hands of the general most faithful to Raul Castro in Ulises Rosales del Toro. The French argued that the military is seizing all core economic activities of the state. The Cuban economy is increasingly run by military engineers that are capable of running the day-to-day business activities, but do not have the vision to enact reforms or lead the country out of the economic mess of centralized state planning.
¶12. (C) As a result, several of our colleagues commented that leadership of the Cuban economy is more centralized this year. A side effect of such control is that the economic ministries are restricting access. The French complained that the running of the GOC’s finances has shifted from the Central Bank to the Ministry of Economy and Planning and, with that shift, the French no longer have any access to officials or information. A Reuters reporter said that unlike in past years he was not granted any officials meetings on a recent trip to eastern Cuba despite several requests. All agreed that decision-making circles are small and increasingly isolated.
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
--------------------------------
¶13. (C) Many officials in the GOC have reconciled themselves to the inevitability of better relations with the United States, said the Brazilians. The Cubans involved in the Mariel Port project have said that the project is in preparation for the day when U.S. - Cuba economic relations normalize. While the French see the window for improving relations as closed after the GOC could not bring itself to take the necessary steps, the Brazilians argued that mixed signals from the Cuban regime are a reflection of dissent in the power circles about whether to move ahead. Some in the GOC objected to the U.S. role in Honduras and Haiti and decided that better relations were not worth the risk.
HAVANA 00000084 004.2 OF 004
(Comment: the “U.S. role” according to the official Cuban press was to support the coup in Honduras and a military occupation in Haiti. End Comment.)
THE CUBAN PEOPLE WILL SURVIVE
-----------------------------
¶14. (C) In the short term, the GOC will require even more belt tightening from the Cuban people. The Italians and French explained that Cuba cut imports before increasing production, which simply means there are fewer products available for Cubans. The GOC has been clear in its public statements that 2010 will be just as difficult as 2009 and further savings (i.e. cuts) will be necessary. Everyone agreed that the Cuban people could withstand more hardship, although the Italians questioned whether further economic tightening would end up weakening and delegitimizing the GOC further.
COMMENT
-------
¶15. (C) Despite how badly Cuba needs them, significant economic reforms are unlikely in 2010, especially with the continued delay of a policy-revising Communist Party Congress (Ref C). The GOC’s direction and leadership remains muddled and unclear, in great measure because its leaders are paralyzed by fear that reforms will loosen the tight grip on power that they have held for over 50 years. Faced with political uncertainty regarding future Cuban leadership and relations with the United States, the Cuban people are more likely to endure a slow erosion of state-subsidies than a much-needed radical restructuring. .FARRAR..
---------------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10SEOUL290 2010-02-22 08:08 2010-11-29 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHUL #0290/01 0530854
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220854Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7152
INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
Monday, 22 February 2010, 08:54
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000290
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/23/2030
TAGS PREL, PGOV, SOCI, MARR, ECON, ETRD, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL’S FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH NSA KIM
Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) During a February 3 meeting, National Security Adviser Kim Sung-hwan told EAP Assistant Secretary Campbell the ROKG wished to have discussions with Washington about delaying the planned transfer of wartime operation control to Korea. Kim agreed that turbulence in Sino-American relations meant Beijing would be hesitant to call a new round of the Six Party Talks. It was encouraging, however, that veteran DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan was slated to visit Beijing next week. NSA Kim asserted that Kim Jong-il needed to visit China soon in order to get more economic assistance, as the DPRK’s internal situation appeared to be significantly more unstable. NSA Kim acknowledged it was important to reach out directly to key DPJ officials like Foreign Minister Okada and Finance Minister Kan. The North Koreans, Kim said, were clearly using several different channels to “knock on the DPJ’s door.” President Lee may visit a Korean factory in the United States to help sell KORUS to the American public. Kim suggested that President Obama and President Lee pay a joint visit to the Korean War Memorial in Washington to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. Campbell asked for ROK understanding for U.S. plans to resume MIA remains recovery operations in North Korea. Kim emphasized that President Lee would never “buy” a summit with Pyongyang. End summary.
OPCON Transfer
--------------
¶2. (C) During a February 3 meeting with Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, ROK National Security Adviser Kim Sung-hwan said he wished to have discussions with the USG on the planned April 2012 transfer of wartime operation control (OPCON) to Korea. Kim agreed with Campbell’s observation that it was important for the Korean public to understand that any change that may be considered concerning OPCON transfer timing, and the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, would not diminish America’s commitment to the ROK’s security, and should not be so interpreted. China Unlikely to Call New 6PT Round
------------------------------------
¶3. (C) NSA Kim agreed with Campbell’s observation that the current turbulence in Sino-American relations meant Beijing would be hesitant to call a new round of the Six Party Talks (6PT) anytime soon. Referring to POTUS’ upcoming meeting with the Dalai Lama, Kim said the Chinese were “far too sensitive” about the Tibetan spiritual leader’s meetings with foreign officials. A few years ago, Kim related, the PRC had crudely pressured the ROK government into canceling a planned speech by the Dalai Lama at a Buddhist conference on Cheju Island.
¶4. (C) NSA Kim said he was encouraged by reports that veteran DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan was slated to visit Beijing next week at the invitation of Chinese 6PT chief Wu Dawei. NSA Kim said he understood Kim Gye-gwan might also visit New York. Campbell noted it was important for the DPRK authorities to hear from the Five Parties that Pyongyang’s attempt to shift the focus from denuclearization to a peace treaty was not working.
KJI China Trip and Deteriorating Conditions Inside DPRK
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶5. (C) NSA Kim asserted that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il needed to visit China soon in order to get more economic assistance. The PRC was in the process of delivering a portion of the food aid promised during Premier Wen’s visit to the DPRK last fall; approximately 6,000 metric tons (MT) of rice and 20,000 MT of soybeans has been delivered, but the DPRK needed a lot more. The situation inside North Korea, he added, appeared increasingly unstable. The North’s currency replacement had created strong resentment throughout DPRK society, Kim said, adding that DPRK Finance Chief Pak Nam-gi had apparently been sacked. Kim asserted there were credible reports of unrest in the North; according to ROK intelligence sources, DPRK police recently found a bomb on a passenger train en route from Pyongyang to Beijing.
U.S.-Japan Relations
--------------------
¶6. (C) Kim concurred with Campbell’s assessment that the DPJ
was “completely different” from the LDP and agreed it was important for the DJP to coordinate with Seoul and Washington as it made preliminary overtures to Pyongyang. The North Koreans, Kim said, were clearly using several different channels to “knock on the DPJ’s door.” Kim acknowledged Campbell’s point that it was important to reach out directly to key DPJ officials like Foreign Minister Okada and Finance Minister Naoto Kan.
FTA Prospects
-------------
¶7. (C) It was the ROK government’s view, Kim said, that there might be a window of opportunity to pass KORUS immediately after the U.S. Congressional elections this fall. Kim added that the ROK Embassy in Washington was working on a possible FTA event for President Lee during his upcoming trip to the United States for the nuclear summit. One idea, Kim explained, was to have President Lee visit a Korean factory to help underscore to the American public that the FTA was about creating jobs in America as well in Korea. Campbell praised ROK Ambassador Han Duck-soo for his public outreach on KORUS and noted that the U.S. business community needed to “stop being lazy” and help get KORUS through Congress.
Korean War Memorial Visit
-------------------------
¶8. (C) NSA Kim asked if, during the April nuclear summit in Washington, it would be possible to have POTUS and President Lee pay a joint visit to the Korean War Memorial. Campbell acknowledged the powerful symbolism for both the Korean and American audience of such a visit during the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, but cautioned that it would be extremely difficult to arrange during the nuclear summit.
MIA Remains Recovery in North Korea
-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) Campbell asked for ROK understanding about the U.S. position on resuming MIA remains recovery operations in North Korea. The USG felt strongly, Campbell explained, that this was an important humanitarian issue. Campbell stressed that the U.S. would coordinate closely with the ROK on the issue to “avoid sending the wrong signal” to the DPRK. Pressed by Kim about paying the North Koreans cash to help recover U.S. remains, Campbell agreed it was distasteful; he noted, however, that the United States had made similar payments to the Burmese and Vietnamese governments to facilitate cooperation on MIA issues.
Prospects for a North-South Summit
----------------------------------
¶10. (C) On prospects for a North-South summit, NSA Kim clarified remarks that President Lee made in an interview with the BBC in Davos. Kim said that, beginning last fall, the ROK has had contact with the DPRK about a summit. The North, however, has demanded that Seoul provide a certain amount of economic aid prior to any summit. That precondition was unacceptable, Kim stressed, noting that the Blue House had emphasized to the ROK press this week that President Lee would never “buy” a summit with the North. STEPHENS
---------------
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10SHENYANG4 2010-01-07 00:12 2010-11-30 16:04 SECRET//NOFORN Consulate Shenyang
VZCZCXRO2163
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHSH #0004/01 0070012
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 070012Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8952
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0247
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0194
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0137
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0195
SE C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 XXXXXXXXXXXX 000004
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, EAP/CM, INR
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS: CH ECON EFIN EIND EMIN KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: WAITING AND WATCHING: NORTH KOREA AFTER CURRENCY
REFORM
REF: 09 XXXXXXXXXXXX 167
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman. For
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On December 15, EAP DAS XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX staff met with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a major player
here in Chinese-North Korean economic exchanges. XXXXXXXXXXXX
attributed the DPRK,s recent currency reform to several
factors: controlling rampant inflation, preventing 'hot
money' flows, leveling the wealth gap between workers and
traders, controlling domestic currency, and most importantly,
uncovering potential political opposition. As a result of the
reform, commerce has come to a halt. The leadership, as part
of an ambitious 2012 development strategy, hopes for the
restoration of relations with the United States. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
believes that current plans assume Kim Jong-il will be around
for some time and that Kim Jong-un will be his successor. The
recent recall of DPRK scholars, students and scientists from
China following the defection of a North Korean exchange
student, for example, suggests increasing levels of paranoia.
END SUMMARY.
GIVE ME GOOD REASON
-------------------
¶2. (S/NF) On December 15, EAP DAS David Shear and Consulate
Shenyang staff met with XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX visits
Pyongyang frequently. Admitting he is unsure of the exact
value of Chinese investment into North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX believes
the number to be many billions of renminbi. Chinese
companies, like their ROK counterparts, use North Korea as a
processing zone, primarily in the mining and seafood
industries. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the DPRK leadership's 2012
target for achieving 'strong-country' status should form the
principal basis for analyzing recent political developments,
including the currency reform measure.
¶3. (S/NF) The most important reason for the recent DPRK currency
reform, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, is to uncover political opposition,
particularly against Kim Jong-il's younger son. Controlling
inflation, leveling the wealth gap, controlling domestic
currency and access to foreign currency, are all part of this
strategy. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the third son, Kim Jong-un,
favored the currency revaluation, and that going forward Kim
Jong-un leans toward a Vietnamese-style of economic reform.
Opposition to the currency exchange, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, might
reveal who opposes the ascension of Kim Jong-un to
leadership. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Kim Jong-il's support of the
currency reform points to his favoring the third son; those
opposing the revaluation, also oppose the third son. XXXXXXXXXXXX drew
parallels to the 2009 nuclear tests, which he said were
also influenced by succession plans. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the first
son, Kim Jong-nam, opposes his younger brother's reform
plans and favors a Chinese-style of economic opening.
¶4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the number of factions competing for Kim
Jong-il's attention have made it increasingly difficult for
Kim Jong-il to listen to anyone. As a sign of Kim Jong-il's
paranoia, he recently recalled all students, scholars, and
scientists in China following the defection of an exchange
student in Northeast China. He did this despite the need for
Chinese knowledge, production skills, and technology to
achieve the country's goals for 2012. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX believes
that current instability will settle and the government will
move ahead with reform, fully expecting Kim Jong-il to be
around for sometime to come. The reform, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, may
not be toward a more open economy. Rather, with currency
reform giving the regime the ability to control domestic
currency, reforms will lead to tighter control over the
economy.
¶5. (S) Prior to revaluation, one dollar equaled 3500 won. To
put that in perspective, the average worker in Pyongyang
earns 3000-4000 won per month. XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that according to
the DPRK Embassy, the official exchange rate following reform
is now one dollar equals 129 won. For the common person,
SHENYANG 00000004 002 OF 002
besides suffering from a significant cut in won-based
savings, supermarkets and department stores that deal in won
have suspended activity as they wait to see what impact
currency reform will have on commodity prices. Thus, it has
become difficult to purchase day-to-day needs. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed
out, if commodity prices rise, the economy will be ruined.
However, if prices settle as a result of reform, and assuming
constant wages, the economy will be okay as workers once
earning one dollar a month will now earn nearly 20 dollars.
¶6. (S) Traders, who earn many times more than the average
wage-earner, have been unaffected by the reform in monetary
terms, as savings are held mostly in euro and dollars. Since
the revaluation, only stores dealing with foreign exchange
have been open and prices in these stores have increased
400-500 percent. For example, a TV that cost RMB 4000 now
costs RMB 20,000. Many of these stores raised prices in
anticipation of the reform, with the expectation that prices
would then fall. However, prices have not fallen. Many of the
stores that raised prices prior to reform have since been
closed by the government, their goods confiscated. Thus, even
traders who have not lost money from revaluation now have
nothing to buy. Chinese traders along the North Korean border
have also been affected by currency reform even though most
trade is done in euros and dollars. As is the case within
North Korea, people are waiting and watching to see what will
happen to prices. In the meantime, nobody wants to sell
anything.
NOT A CRISIS YET BUT CLOSE
--------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX does not believe the DPRK is in crisis mode at this
time. As he said, the people are used to this sort of thing.
He saw the currency reform as being part of a broader
conflict within the government as it moves forward in the
next several years. Since 2002, the DPRK has allowed some
economic reform, without expressing strong support or
opposition. As he put it, the government has been waiting and
watching to see what would happen.
CHINA, the U.S., and EVERYTHING
-------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said many in the DPRK believe the Chinese do not
understand their country. While neither the Chinese nor the
DPRK are likely to criticize the other in public, XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that in private the DPRK has disparaged the Chinese for not
including North Korea on its list of 147 tourist destinations
or 137 investment destinations. These omissions and the
disparate Chinese actions on regional development projects
clearly indicate that North Korea is not a priority for the
Chinese. For instance, while China recently elevated the
long-beleaguered Changchun-Jilin-Tumen River development plan
to a national level project, the DPRK left the Tumen River
Development Plan, as it sees no benefit (REFTEL). Relations
between the two countries were getting so bad, in fact,
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang two months ahead of
schedule.
¶9. (S/NF) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, North Korea has set an ambitious
target of developing a strong country by 2012. As part of
this project, it is planning to build 100,000 residential
apartments in Pyongyang by 2012. In order to encourage
Chinese investment, the DPRK is offering Chinese investors
mining and ocean rights for their injection of cash into the
project. A former Consul General of the North Korean
consulate in Shenyang, recently spent two weeks in Beijing
attracting about RMB 12 billion for this project and planned
to come to Shenyang following his time in Beijing.
¶10. (S) Restoration of relations with the United States is
another important part of the DPRK's reform plans. He said,
however, that North Korea looks forward to an ongoing cycle
of ups and downs in negotiations and that it counts on the
U.N. to be slow in implementing sanctions. As he said, he
believes that once things settle down, North Korea will show
China and the U.S. "its bottom card."
WICKMAN
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