Mục tiêu nổi, chính thức của cả hai đởi tổng thống Mỹ LB Johnson (Operation Rolling Thunder-từ 2-3, 1965 kéo dài đến 1 -11 1968) và của R. Nixon 1972 (Operation Linebacker II Từ ngày18 đến 29 tháng Chạp 1972) vẫn một mục tiêu là: Buộc chế độ Hà Nội phải ngồi vào thương thảo và chấp nhận những điều kiện do Mỹ đề ra để Mỹ đạt được cái gọi là “Hòa Bình Trong Danh dự” (Honorable Peace)
LBJ tuyên bố trong bài diễn văn đại đoàn kết tại Quốc Hội Mỹ: … “Chúng ta sẽ tiếp tục hướng tiến hiện tại của chúng ta tại Việt nam cho đến khi việc tìm kiếm ra giải pháp đàm phán thành công (We will continue our present course in Vietnam until the quest for negotiation succeeds) và đây là lời giải thích chính thức cho việc dội bom miền Bắc năm 1967 sau vụ Vịnh Bắc Bộ do Mỹ hư cấu tạo ra. Áp lực của phe diều hâu trong quốc hội ,dứoi sự thúc đẩy của kỹ nghệ chiến tranh đòi DỘI BOM NHIỀU HƠN NỮA.. Nhưng áp lực này lúc đó KHÔNG MẠNH BẰNG ÁP LỰC CHỐNG CHIẾN TRANH tử MỌI TẦNG LỚP QUẦN CHÚNG và DƯ LUẬN QUỐC TẾ.. Cho đến khi LB-Johnson không còn chịu nổi áp suất của chiến tranh, phải từ giã chính trường không tái ứng cử. Và R.Nixon thắng cử kế nhiệm đã GIA TĂNG ÁP LỰC để cùng đạt được mục đích “HÒA BÌNH DANH DỰ” cũng sử dụng KHÔNG TẬP MIỀN BẮC mạnh bạo hơn. R.Nixon chính thức tuyên bố lý do DỘI BOM MIỀN BẮC là để BUỘC HÀ NỘI CHẤP NHÂN ngồi vào hòa đàm ký kết hiệp định Paris 1973 (Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam on January 27, 1973.) bằng môt cuộc KHÔNG TẬP HÙNG HẬU VỚI TỔN PHÍ và TỔN THẤT NẶNG NỀ, nhưng ĐẠT HIỆU QUẢ là BUỘC chế độ Miền Bắc phải chấp nhận ngồi lại vào bàn hòa đàm và đúc kết hiệp định chấm dứt sự tham dự của Mỹ vào cuộc chiến Việt Nam, chỉ trong vòng gần 2 tháng . Mặc dù giới quan sát NGHI NGỜ LÝ CỚ NÀY , vì những gì HÀ NỘI ĐÃ ĐỒNG Ý trước khi DỘI BOM vào tháng 10 đều vẫn còn ở cuộc đàm phán sau tháng 12 -1972. ..Ở đây, Chúng ta cần nhớ là cuộc đàm phán để đi đến hiệp định Paris 1973 được Kissinger BÍ MẬT THƯƠNG THẢO với HÀ NỘI và đi đến thỏa thuận vào tháng MƯỜI năm 1972, mà không hề cho chế độ ngụy của THIỆU biết. Sự vụ "bể ra" là do phía Hà Nội đơn phương công bố nội dung của Hiệp Định, khiến Mỹ lúng túng và miền Nam bổ ngửa!!! Và sau đó chế độ Thiệu yêu cầu điều chỉnh chi tiết Hiệp Định, và Việt Cộng cũng kì kèo đòi thay đổi thêm (chẳng hạn như Mỹ phải đơn phương rút quân trước) mới ngồi vào bàn ký kết.
Nhưng người ta quên là THÁI ĐỘ ỠM Ờ muốn KÉO DÀI để KÌ KÈO của HÀ NỘI và LIÊN XÔ bấy giờ đi ngược lại CHỦ TRƯƠNG CHẤM DỨT NHANH CHÓNG của Mỹ do áp lực CHỐNG CHIẾN TRANH đã lên quá cao..đặc biệt sau vụ HỒ SƠ NGŨ GIÁC ĐÀI , khởi ssụ tù ngày 13 tháng 6 năm 1971. Và sau khi R.Nixon thành công trong chuyến công du Lịch Sử tại Bắc Kinh gặp gỡ Mao, và Chu An lai.. Việc gặp gỡ MAO tại Bắc Kinh được Henry Kissinger tiến hành bí mật từ tháng 7 năm 1971 và đến tháng 2 năm 1972, Nixon chính thức đến Bắc Kinh một tuần lễ (từ ngày 21- đến ngày 28 tháng 2 -1972) để đúc kết tất cả những thương thảo giữa Mỹ và TQ. Nhà nước Mỹ , hay đúng hơn là giới Tập Đoàn Đại Bản và Kỹ Nghệ Chiến Tranh Mỹ, đã đạt mục tiêu và Mỹ, trong trách nhiệm của Nixon phải chấm dứt cuộc chiến Việt nam thât sớm và nhanh chóng bằng mọi giá trong DANH DỰ nghĩa là KHÔNG ĐÍNH KÈM MỘT TRÁCH NHIỆM CHIẾN TRANH NÀO HẾT..”Chúng ta dội bom họ để buộc họ trở lại bàn Hội nghị” ("we bombed them in order to get them back to the table." ) mỉa mai thay là để chấp nhận thêm nhượng bộ của Mỹ, miển là ký kết HÒA BÌNH.. Điều này được phụ tá của Kissinger là John Negroponte mỉa mai nhận định “ Chúng ta dội bom đám Bắc Việt để họ chập nhận sự nhượng bộ của chúng ta. Khu phi quân sự đã được ấn định ký kết trong hiệp định Geneve 1954 chẳng có kiểu nào được (hiệp định Paris) công nhận là biên giới quốc tế. Yêu sách đòi Bắc Việt rút quân khỏi miền Nam cũng không được đề cập trong văn bản của hiệp định (Paris). Tuy rằng Kissinger đã có đạt được “thỏa thuận bằng mồm” với Lê Đức Thọ cho một cuộc rút quân lấy lệ khoảng 30 chục ngàn bộ đội Bắc Việt” ( "We bombed the North Vietnamese into accepting our concessions."The DMZ was defined as provided for in the Geneva Accords of 1954, and would in no way be recognized as an international boundary. The demanded withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam was not mentioned at all in the text of the agreement. Kissinger did, however, obtain a "verbal agreement" from Tho for a token withdrawal of 30,000 North Vietnamese troops.)
Thế mới rõ là Mỹ chỉ cần đi ra khỏi Viêt Nam và đi thật nhanh vừa do áp lực chống chiến tranh vừa là đã đạt được mục tiêu "chiến lược" với TQ,(Tiền lợi nhuận từ dịch vụ chiến tranh, thử vũ khí và mở bang giao với TQ phân tán TQ và Sô Viết) Trong lúc đó Việt Công và Liên Sô sau chuyến công du của Nixon đển Bắc kinh lại cứ ỡm ờ muốn kéo dài để kì kèo.. Khiến Mỹ phải dùng đòn chí tử để buộc Bắc Việt và Liên Sô lúc đó đồng thuận để Bắc Việt ngồi vào ký kết CHẤM DỨT CHIẾN TRANH để Mỹ phủi tay phủi đít đi gọn nhẹ.. tính chuyện khác ...Cho nên cái hiệp định đó mới có tên là Hiệp định chấm dứt chiến tranh và tái lập Hòa Bình tại Viêt nam (Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam) Chứ không phải “hàng ước” hay “ngưng chiến” (truce).. Và sau cuộc dội bom phí phạm bất chấp với phí tổn quá cao từ ngày 18-đến ngày 29 tháng 12 năm 1972 và chỉ chưa đầy 1 tháng, đến ngày 27 tháng Giêng năm 1973 là ký kết XONG "HÒA BÌNH" !!! Mỹ Không còn trách nhiệm gì đến Viêt Nam nữa...
Và gần chính xác một năm sau ngày "ký kết Hiệp Định Paris tái lập Hoà Bình", ngày 19 tháng Giêng năm 1974, Trung Cộng, một đàn anh của Việt Cộng, và là "ngừoi bạn mới" của Mỹ, - kéo tầu đánh chiếm Trường Sa của nước đàn em thân cận "Nguỵ VNCH" mà Mỹ đã bao bọc suốt 20 năm để làm "tiền đồn CHỐNG CỘNG" cho Mỹ, bảo vệ TỰ DO DÂN CHỦ cho Mỹ....nhưng.... Mỹ đứng ngoài hạm đội đú đởn ngắm nhìn tên đàn em Nguỵ đang dãy chết còn bị đấm thêm môt cái vào mặt. Mỹ đã phủi tay rồi- đã ký kết thoả thuận với VC với TQ rồi.. Nên chỉ "ôm gái ông bia" nhìn ông "đàn em tay sai thân cận VNCH" bị TQ đấm thêm một quả trước khi phải chết như đã định đoạt!
Chuyên quá dễ hiểu, chỉ còn NGỤY vì quá nộ lệ và quá thần thánh Mỹ, quá NGỤC là cứ ấm ức mãi đến bây giờ!!! Thật tội nghiệp.. Còn bọn Viêt Cộng cứ hoang tưởng cho rằng mình đã "thắng Mỹ", mà thật ra người Mỹ yêu hoà bình, phong tràp chống chiến tranh đã thắng chính phủ nhà nước Mỹ, buộc nó phải rút quân nhanh hơn dự định.
NKPTC
Nhân 30-4 nhìn lại
Operation Linebacker II (1972)
Operation Linebacker II operations were initiated on 18 December 1972 and were directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to continue until further notice. The primary objective of the bombing operation would be to force the North Vietnamese government to enter into purposeful negotiations concerning a cease-fire agreement. The operation employed air power to its maximum capabilities in an attempt to destroy all major target complexes such as radio stations, railroads, power plants, and airfields located in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. Unlike previous bombing campaigns, Linebacker II provided the Air Force and U.S. Naval forces with specific objectives and removed many of the restrictions that had previously caused frustration within the Pentagon.
During these operations, Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft and B-52s commenced an around-the-clock bombardment of the North Vietnamese heartland. The B-52s struck Hanoi and Haiphong during hours of darkness with F-111s and Navy tactical aircraft providing diversionary/suppression strikes on airfields and surface-to-air missile sites. Daylight operations were primarily carried out by A-7s and F-4s bombing visually or with long-range navigation (LORAN) techniques, depending upon the weather over the targets. In addition, escort aircraft such as the Air Force EB-66s and Navy EA-6s broadcast electronic jamming signals to confuse the radar-controlled defenses of the North. The Strategic Air Command also provided KC-135s to support the in-flight refueling requirements of the various aircraft participating in Linebacker II operations.
Andersen Air Force Base in Guam was the site of the most massive buildup of air power in history. More than 15,000 people and more than 150 B-52s lined all available space on the flightline. During Operation Linebacker II in December 1972, bombers stationed at Andersen flew 729 sorties in 11 days.
Navy tactical air attack sorties under Linebacker II were centered in the coastal areas around Hanoi and Haiphong. There were 505 Navy sorties in this area during Linebacker II. The following carriers participated in Linebacker II operations: Enterprise, Saratoga, Oriskany, America and Ranger. Aircraft of the Seventh Fleet performed the most extensive aerial mining operation in history, blockading the enemy's main avenues of supply. The reseeding of the mine fields was resumed and concentrated strikes were carried out against surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery sites, enemy army barracks, petroleum storage areas, Haiphong Naval and shipyard areas, and railroad and truck stations.
Between 18 and 22 December the Navy conducted 119 Linebacker II strikes in North Vietnam. The attack effort was concentrated in the Haiphong area. Strikes were conducted against surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery installations, railroads and highways Thanh Hoa Army barracks, the Haiphong Naval Base, petroleum centers and other military related targets.
Until the cease-fire ending US combat operations in Vietnam took effect on 28 January 1973, USS America and the other carriers ranged off the coast of Vietnam, conducting strike operations in support of troops and targeting strategic targets throughout North Vietnam.
On 25 December 1972 a Christmas Day bombing/tactical air attack recess went into effect during which none of the US air services flew sorties. Heavy raids around Hanoi, which resumed the day after the Christmas bombing halt, were eased as NVN showed indications of returning to the conference table.
The impact of the bombing was obvious in the severe damage to the North Vietnamese logistic and war-support capability. By 29 December 1972, the 700 nighttime sorties flown by B-52s and 650 daytime strikes by fighter and attack aircraft persuaded the North Vietnamese government to return to the conference table. Linebacker II formally ended on 27 January 1973.
Bad weather was the main limiting factor on the number of tactical air strikes flown during Linebacker II.
| Linebacker II Total Night USAF Sorties | |||||
| Day/Date | B-52 Attack | SEAD | CAP/ Escort | Chaff | Total |
| 1: Dec 18 | 129 | 17 | 63 | 22 | 231 |
| 2: Dec 19 | 93 | 19 | 61 | 24 | 197 |
| 3: Dec 20 | 99 | 18 | 55 | 26 | 198 |
| 4: Dec 21 | 30 | 13 | 23 | 9 | 75 |
| 5: Dec 22 | 30 | 15 | 27 | 15 | 87 |
| 6: Dec 23 | 30 | 13 | 12 | 3 | 58 |
| 7: Dec 24 | 30 | 16 | 22 | 16 | 84 |
| 8: Dec 26 | 120 | 18 | 33 | 25 | 129 |
| 9: Dec 27 | 60 | 23 | 32 | 23 | 118 |
| 10: Dec 28 | 60 | 7 | 28 | 23 | 118 |
| 11: Dec 29 | 60 | 11 | 33 | 25 | 129 |
| Totals | 741 | 170 | 390 | 209 | 1,510 |
| Of 741 planned B-52 sorties, 12 were aborted. The Air Force SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) mission was carried out by F-105, F-4C, and F-4E fighters. CAP (combat air patrol), escort, and chaff dispersal were carried out by numerous types. In addition, US Navy and US Marine aircraft flew a total of 277 night support sorties in A-6, A-7, and F-4 aircraft. SOURCE: LINEBACKER IIBy Walter J. Boyne Air Force Magazine November 1997, Vol. 80, No. 11 | |||||
On the first day of Linebacker II, the crew aboard a B-52G would tragically became the first casualty of the operation. The bomber and crew aboard Charcoal-01 launched from Andersen with the first wave of Linebacker II, headed toward their targets in Vietnam. Within seconds of their objective, the B-52 was hit by a surface-to-air missile. The pilot, Col. Donald L. Rissi, and gunner, Master Sgt. Walt Ferguson, were killed. Three other crew members -- Maj. Dick Johnson, radar navigator; Capt. Bob Certain, navigator; and, Capt. Dick Simpson, electronic warfare officer, -- survived the attack, but were taken prisoners of war. The officers were released from captivity in 1973 as part of Operation Homecoming, the return of U.S. service members held as POWs. The status of Lt. Robert J. Thomas, copilot, was unknown at the time of the incident. Officials listed the lieutenant as "missing in action, shot down over North Vietnam, 18 December 1972." Thomas' remains were identified and returned to his family in 1978.
Overall Air Force losses included fifteen B-52s, two F-4s, two F-111s, and one HH-53 search and rescue helicopter. Navy losses included two A-7s, two A-6s, one RA-5, and one F-4. Seventeen of these losses were attributed to SA-2 missiles, three to daytime MiG attacks, three to antiaircraft artillery, and three to unknown causes.
In 1997 crews from the US Army Central Identification Lab, Hawaii, and Joint Task Force-Full Accounting excavated the last B-52 crash site from Linebacker II operations in Vietnam. The recovery team began work at the site in November 1997 and expected to completed the process in March 1998.
Sources and Methods
- Adapted from
Operation Operation Linebacker II @ Air Force History Support Office and
Naval Aviation Chronology 1970-1980 @ NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER - LINEBACKER II Day to day details
- LINEBACKER II By Walter J. Boyne Air Force Magazine November 1997, Vol. 80, No. 11
Dec 25, 1966:
Harrison Salisbury reports on damage caused by U.S. bombing
Harrison Salisbury, assistant managing editor of the New York Times, files a report from Hanoi chronicling the damage to civilian areas in North Vietnam by the U.S. bombing campaign. Salisbury stated that Nam Dinh, a city about 50 miles southeast of Hanoi, was bombed repeatedly by U.S. planes starting on June 28, 1965. Salisbury's press report caused a stir in Washington where, it was reported, Pentagon officials expressed irritation and contended that he was exaggerating the damage to civilian areas. On December 26, the U.S. Defense Department conceded that American pilots bombed North Vietnamese civilians accidentally during missions against military targets. The spokesman restated administration policy that air raids were confined to military targets but added, "It is sometimes impossible to avoid all damage to civilian areas."
1965-1968
Friday, Sep. 01, 1967
World: McNAMARA ON BOMBING THE NORTH
In an evenhanded report on the air campaign against North Viet Nam, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara last week provided the Senate's Preparedness Subcommittee with a wealth of information that has never before been made public—and some sober conclusions unlikely to encourage either the hawks who would drastically escalate the bombing of the North, or the doves who would end the bombing entirely. Among the highlights:
WEIGHED against its stated objectives," said Mc-Namara, "the bombing campaign has been successful." There were three objectives when the bombing began in February 1965, and they remain unchanged: 1) to reduce the flow and increase the cost of Hanoi's supply of men and materiel to South Viet Nam; 2) to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese; and 3) to make clear to Hanoi that aggression in the South would have to be paid for by a high price in damage to the North.
Infiltration has indeed been made costly and difficult for the North Vietnamese. From January through July of this year, said the Defense Secretary, U.S. fighter-bombers averaged 13,000 sorties a month over the North —75% of them directed against lines of communication and goods moving over them. "In addition, we have struck approximately 1,900 fixed targets in North Viet Nam, including 57 bridges, 50 major railyards, troop barracks, petroleum storage tanks and power plants."
Attacking from China. For all this harassment, enough supplies keep coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail to fuel the Communist war in the South. In clear terms, Mc-Namara explained why. North Viet Nam has, he said, such a highly diversified transportation system, ranging from sampans to bicycles, that even at the present level of bombing, "the volume of traffic it is now required to carry, in relation to its capacity, is small." It is surprisingly small: "Intelligence estimates suggest that the quantity of externally supplied material, other than food, required to support the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Viet Nam at about their current level of combat activity is significantly under 100 tons per day—a quantity that could be transported by only a few trucks." Therefore, "complete interdiction of these supplies has never been considered possible by our military leaders."
But the price Hanoi must pay to get the goods through "is hurting North Viet Nam's warmaking capability." Some 500,000 people, said McNamara, have had to be di verted from other tasks to repair bomb damage. Since the President has authorized attacks on 85% of the 359 targets chosen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, few really damaging targets remain. True, four airfields are as yet unhit, but only an estimated 20 MIGs are now operating from North Vietnamese fields. The clear implication is that the rest of Hanoi's air force now nests in China and attacks from Chinese bases.
Seldom by Sea. McNamara turned next to the arguments of the hawks, who advocate either total obliteration of everything that moves in North Viet Nam, military or civilian, or closing Hanoi's ports by bombing and mining. Total bombing, he said, would violate America's limited aims in the war. In addition, "short of virtual annihilation of North Viet Nam and its people," such bombing might very well not work.
What about interdicting Russian and Chinese supplies to Hanoi by closing North Viet Nam's ports, notably Haiphong? That, too, argued McNamara, would not work. North Viet Nam imports some 5,800 tons a day, some 4,700 tons of it through Haiphong's port. Military equipment makes up only 550 tons daily in imports, and "little if any" of it comes in by sea. Haiphong is a "convenience rather than a necessity" for imports, and even if all 400 miles of North Vietnamese coast could be interdicted, "North Viet Nam would still be able to import over 8,400 tons a day by road, rail and waterway." McNamara noted that the U.S. had long ago destroyed Haiphong's petroleum off-loading facilities. As a result, Hanoi now unloads petroleum from tankers sitting offshore. Barges float the fuel in by night, and Hanoi has "no evidence of an oil shortage."
Proof in the South. Since U.S. air power cannot completely cut off supplies to North Viet Nam, or the arms and men Hanoi sends south, McNamara's inescapable conclusion was that the U.S. should continue bombing the North at roughly the present level, using the air campaign as "a supplement to," not "a substitute for" the ground war of counterinsurgency in the South. "I am convinced," said McNamara, "that the final decision in this conflict will not come until we and our allies prove to North Viet Nam that she cannot win in the South. The tragic and long-drawn-out character of that conflict in the South makes very tempting the prospect of replacing it with some new kind of air campaign against the North. But however tempting, such an alternative seems to me to be completely illusory." Find this article at:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,837232,00.html
Operation Thunder
Military intelligence officers working in Vietnam believed that without the support of the Ho Chi Minh government, the National Liberation Front would not survive. They therefore advocated the bombing of Hanoi in an attempt to persuade North Vietnam to cut off supplies to the NLF.
Curtis LeMay, the commander of the US air force, argued that by using the latest technology, North Vietnam could be blasted "back to the Stone Age." Others pointed out that "terror" raids on civilian populations during the Second World War had not proved successful and claimed that a better strategy would be to bomb selected targets such as military bases and fuel depots.
Three months after being elected president, Lyndon B. Johnson launched Operation Rolling Thunder. Unlike the single bombing raid in August 1964, this time the raids were to take place on a regular basis. The plan was to destroy the North Vietnam economy and to force her to stop helping the guerrilla fighters in the south. Bombing was also directed against territory controlled by the NLF in South Vietnam. The plan was for Operation Rolling Thunder to last for eight weeks but it lasted for the next three years. In that time, the US dropped 1 million tons of bombs on Vietnam.
The response of the NLF to 'Rolling Thunder' was to concentrate its attacks on the US air bases in South Vietnam. General Westmoreland, the person in charge of the military advisers in Vietnam, argued that his 23,000 men were unable to defend adequately the US air bases and claimed that without more soldiers, the NLF would take over control of South Vietnam.
On March 8, 3,500 US marines arrived in South Vietnam. They were the first 'official' US combat troops to be sent to the country. This dramatic escalation of the war was presented to the American public as being a short-term measure and did not cause much criticism at the time. A public opinion poll carried out that year indicated that nearly 80% of the American public supported the bombing raids and the sending of combat troops to Vietnam.
As the United States is the most advanced industrial nation in world it was able to make full use of the latest developments in technology in its war against North Vietnam. B-52 bombers, that could fly at heights that prevented them being seen or heard, dropped 8 million tons of bombs on Vietnam between 1965 and 1973. This was over three times the amount of bombs dropped throughout the whole of the Second World War and worked out at approximately 300 tons for every man, woman and child living in Vietnam.
As well as explosive bombs the US air force dropped a considerable number of incendiary devices. The most infamous of these was napalm, a mixture of petrol and a chemical thickner which produces a tough sticky gel that attaches itself to the skin. The igniting agent, white phosphorus, continues burning for a considerable amount of time. A reported three quarters of all napalm victims in Vietnam were burned through to the muscle and bone (fifth degree burns). The pain caused by the burning is so traumatic that it often causes death.
The US also made considerable use of anti-personnel bombs. The pineapple bomb was made up of 250 metal pellets inside a small canister. Gloria Emerson, a reporter in Vietnam, witnessed their use: "An American plane could drop a thousand pineapples over an area the size of four football fields. In a single air strike two hundred and fifty thousand pellets were spewed in a horizontal pattern over the land below, hitting everything on the ground."
The United States also experimented with the use of plastic rather than metal needles and pellets in their anti-personnel bombs. The advantage of plastic was they could not be identified by X-Ray machines. Dropped on highly populated areas, anti-personnel bombs could severely disrupt the functioning of North Vietnam. It has been claimed that the major objective of the US bombing raids on North Vietnam was not to kill its 17 million population but to maim them. As was pointed out at the time, serious injury is more disruptive than death as people have to be employed to look after the injured where they only have to bury the dead.
One of the major problems of the US forces was the detection of the NLF hiding in the forests of Vietnam. In 1962, President Kennedy approved Operation Ranch Hand. This involved the spraying of chemicals from the air in an attempt to destroy the NLF hiding places. In 1969 alone, Operation Ranch Hand destroyed 1,034,300 hectares of forest. 'Agent Orange', the chemical used in this defoliation programme not only destroyed trees but caused chromosomal damage in people.
Chemicals were also sprayed on crops. Between 1962 and 1969, 688,000 agricultural acres were sprayed with a chemical called 'Agent Blue'. The aim of this exercise was to deny food to the NLF. However, research suggests that it was the civilian population who suffered most from the poor rice harvests that followed the spraying.
In economic terms, the bombing hurt the economy of the United States more than North Vietnam. By the beginning of 1968, it was estimated that $300 million of damage had been done to North Vietnam. However, in the process, 700 US aircraft, valued at $900 million had been shot down. When all factors were taken into consideration it was argued that it cost the United States "ten dollars for every dollar's worth of damage inflicted."
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A TRIANGULAR END TO A LONG WAR
"The triangular relationship among the United States, the USSR, and China unlocked the door to a series of major breakthroughs: the end of the Vietnam War;…"
- Kissinger - Diplomacy
SECRET talks became a hallmark of diplomacy during the Nixon years when Henry Kissinger, in his capacity as President Richard Nixon’s national security adviser, usurped the functions of the State Department to establish direct channels between the White House and foreign governments.
In his memoirs, Kissinger later reasoned that this facilitated a quick resolution of problems which in their view were being slowed down by red tape and built-in institutional agenda resistant to seeing old issues in new ways.
In some respects he was right about this. The cornerstone of Nixon’s first term was his resolve to end the Vietnam conflagration, and in the process somehow restore America’s tattered stature as a world power. Together they managed to forge a diplomatic strategy that not only ended the US involvement in the Vietnam conflict but also established the three-way balance of powers between the US and the two communist powers - the Soviet Union and China. They also used these new ties to break the deadlocked negotiations to end the Vietnam War.
These milestones would not have been reached within the space of Nixon’s presidency had he not endorsed the expedient measures that Kissinger had taken. And it is doubtful that the US could have ended its involvement in the Vietnam War with a settlement signed by both the North and South Vietnamese had it not made the outcome of the war a matter of low priority for the two communist powers with the establishment of a triangular diplomacy.
IT BEGINS BADLY
The secret talks that Kissinger, then, had begun with North Vietnam’s Le Duc Tho in late 1969, were not going well. The conflict of objectives made it difficult to come to a settlement. The US wanted a mutual cease-fire but the North Vietnamese were adamant about a unilateral withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam. The "Vietnamization" program which had already begun, also gave the North Vietnamese no incentive to concede to any demands when American troops were being systemically withdrawn. Nor did the US offer anything they wanted. It offered them cosmetic concessions such as obviating the necessity of placing the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South on the same legal basis as that of the Americans or formally announcing the event.
The US persisted in the same course, and the reason for that was the failure to understand the North Vietnamese resolve in regaining what they felt was rightfully theirs. It’s conduct of the affair saw them as invaders of the non-communist South. But Hanoi did not see itself as an outsider in South Vietnam. During the negotiations it never admitted that its troops were there nor discussed if it had a right to be there. Far from recognizing the Vietnamese resolve, the US belittled it. A remark Kissinger made reflected this sentiment. "I refuse to believe a little fourth-rate power like North Vietnam doesn’t have a breaking point.", he said.
That was one of the main disadvantages to holding the talks secretly. Kissinger was handicapped without field experts’ readings on Vietnam history and character, as well as intelligence on current sentiments in Vietnam at the time. Early on in the talks this handicap showed up when he offered a time table on troop withdrawals without knowing the numbers. The secrecy of the talks meant he could not consult the military either. He also kept the State Department ignorant of the talks, and had also left South Vietnam’s President Thieu largely in the dark about the content of the talks. The principal negotiators were himself and Tho, despite the fact that a negotiated settlement would require the South’s acquiescence. Later this called a halt to the agreement days before signing when Thieu objected to terms he had not been privy to.
Hanoi displayed more savvy about the workings of its counterpart. Mindful that public opinion held great sway in American politics it conducted a public relations campaign by claiming publicly that they had made a reasonable offer to the US but that the Nixon administration was intransigent. This lent the already vocal and vehement anti-war groups more fuel to their protests. This only added to the internal pressures of Nixon’s administration.
Nixon had already made it worse for himself by declaring that he would see an end to this war "in six months" when he was campaigning for the presidency. This fondness for setting deadlines came up again when Kissinger threatened Hanoi with force if they did not come to an agreement by November 1969. That threat fizzled out when November came and went with no sign of US military coercion.
By May 1971,the US gave in, with Kissinger offering the unilateral withdrawal that Hanoi had wanted from the start. But the US had still hoped to score on securing a political concession from the North Vietnamese, by their not insisting on the overthrow of the South Vietnamese.
TAKING THEIR MINDS OFF VIETNAM
Securing that concession - which took place more than one year later - could not have been done through conventional diplomatic horse-trading. It would be a strategy of isolating North Vietnam from the two key communist powers as well as a little brute force that would do it.
At same time the secret talks commenced certain events took place which made it possible for the US to take the initiative in creating a three-way balance of powers.
In the spring of 1969, certain events came to the notice of the US which suggested that there were tensions between the communist powers. Skirmishes along the Sino-Soviet border that year had been taken for granted as being instigated by fanatical Chinese leaders. But Soviet diplomats gave the game away by being too interested in finding out the US reaction to these border skirmishes. A closer investigation revealed Soviet intentions to attack China
Until then there had not been much differentiation in thinking about China and the Soviets, as they were considered integrated parts of a greater communist threat. China had been diplomatically isolated for about 20 years and little was known about its motives or workings.
The US began building bridges to China, by sending signals in the form of unilateral initiatives to indicate a change in its attitude. The prohibition against the Americans traveling to China; Americans were allowed to bring $100 worth of Chinese-made goods into the US and limited grain shipments were permitted to China.
Secretary of State William Rogers made US intentions explicit on August 8, 1969, when he said that the US would welcome a significant role by Communist China in Asian and Pacific affairs. If Chinese leaders abandoned their introspective view of the world, the US would open up communication channels, he said.
On September 5, 1969, Nixon took a next step by warning the Soviet Union that the US would not remain indifferent to an attack on China. This was based on an assessment that the diplomatic maneuvers between the US and the Chinese would take too long to rely on them to pre-empt a Soviet attack.
The Chinese were receptive to these overtures from the US administration. In fact it had just two months after Nixon took office sent some signals indicating a willingness to reopen channels. These included dropping the prefix "principal enemy" in its reference to the US and referring to the Soviet Union as an equal threat. Unfortunately, the signals were too subtle and were missed.
By December 1969, diplomatic contacts were resumed between China and the US in Warsaw, but these were not successful as both sides were concerned with a standard agenda which did not allow a discussion on Sino-American relations. It was only when the US attack on Cambodia in May 1970 that gave Kissinger a chance to exercise his penchant for secret diplomacy again.
China had interrupted ambassadorial talks in protest against the Cambodian attack. But it continued to send signals to the US of its intentions to maintain communications. Some again were so subtle that it was lost on the US - such as Mao Zedong allowing Edgar Snow to be photographed with him in October 1970 or Mao’s invitation to Nixon to visit which he made in an interview he gave Edgar Snow on December 1970.
It was direct and explicit message sent by China via the Pakistani President Yahya Khan that finally made the connection. Kissinger received the message from Yahya on December 8, 1970 - this was an invitation of a special envoy of President Nixon to discuss Taiwan.
Then in April 1971, Zhou En-Lai invited the United States table tennis team to China after the team had befriended the Chinese team in Japan. This signal eventually led to Kissinger’s secret meeting with China in July 1971.
The meeting went well, and the establishment of ties between the US and China meant that Chinese interest in a North Vietnam victory was much diminished, as the latter’s ties were much stronger with Moscow, who supplied arms to them. China also began to put pressure on Hanoi to accept a compromise that would allow the survival of the Thieu government. North Vietnam’s President Pham Van Dong visited Beijing in early 1972 to ask Mao not to receive Nixon but he was rebuffed.
Similarly the Soviet Union became more interested in détente than the outcome of the Vietnam conflict. The success of Kissinger’s meeting in China led to Moscow’s willingness to have a summit meeting with the US. Within a month of Kissinger’s visit to Beijing, the Kremlin invited Nixon to Moscow, when previously it had been stalling over the arrangements for the summit between Brezhnev and Nixon.
This led to a summit in May 1972 with the Soviet Union giving a tacit agreement to America’s presence in Vietnam.
NORTH VIETNAM AGREES, BUT NO ONE TOLD SOUTH VIETNAM
In August 1972 the cumulative effect of the triangulation of powers began to take effect. Hanoi’s politburo agreed to the negotiated settlement. By then most of the troops had been withdrawn already. Both sides were also aware that it was an election year. Kissinger and the North Vietnamese wanted the agreement settled before November elections. The North Vietnamese were fearful of force Nixon would unleash if reelected. Kissinger wanted it, believing he could extract more from the North Vietnamese. Nixon & Thieu wanted it after the elections, which led to a clash.
By October, Kissinger has carved out the following terms of peace with the North Vietnamese:
5-Organization of elections
Unfortunately, while Kissinger was successful with China and the Soviet Union, he was not so with Vietnam. He failed to tell Le Duc Tho that South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu’s approval was contingent on the agreement being made, and that that could result in a delay on the October 24 signing date.. Thieu had not been briefed on the settlement, or that a deal had been struck. and had not received a copy of the peace accord. Kissinger had also sent a misleading cable to Thieu saying the North Vietnamese "appear to be ready to accept a cease-fire".
Instead Thieu finds out from his own intelligence that the draft treaty had already been distributed amongst communist cadres. He took his own action by putting up banners which make a cease-fire conditional on a North Vietnamese withdrawal.
Kissinger also prematurely makes the announcement that "peace is at hand". Later he conceded that he "surely made a mistake not analyzing what Thieu’s domestic needs were and how we could help him prepare for what was coming,". But this he called a "trifling error in human calculation".
To get Thieu to sign, Kissinger now tries to get North Vietnam to make some concessions in the treaty which they thought they had already shaken hands on. Thieu’s resentment makes him reluctant to sign. On top of that he wants 69 changes to be made to the accord. When the North Vietnamese refuse to budge, feeling duped by the US, the US launches what came to be known as the Christmas bombing, a 12 day bombing run targeted at Hanoi.
By January 1973, the two side agree to sign. Thieu does so, relying on the US stating its commitment to retaliate if the agreement is violated. That year the Nobel Peace Prize goes to Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. Tho rejects the prize..
ALTERNATIVES
In Kissinger’s assessment, a negotiated settlement was essential to preserving the US’s credibility as a world power. The settlement was reached, but not without prolonging and already long war and at a considerable cost in human life.
When Nixon’s administration inherited the Vietnam War problem, domestic sentiment had escalated to a point where his predecessor Lyndon Johnson could not make a public appearance without being hounded by demonstrators. And by then it had become clear that the US was not going to win this protracted war. At least domestically, it would follow that the act of withdrawal would not lost the US any credibility with its own people.
As for its credibility abroad, it was already no secret that the US was already doing pulling out its troops. The process may have been termed "Vietnamization" but the Vietnamese saw it for what it was - a unilateral withdrawal of US forces.
To its credit, the Nixon administration did use the Vietnam imbroglio as a spur to pursuing its triangulation policy with China and the Soviet Union. But had Vietnam been set aside, the triangle diplomacy would still have taken place. China had long been ready to open channels with the US. And given its tensions with the Soviet Union, it was likely that the Soviets would have responded to the bigger threat of a China-US alliance and dropped its interest in Indochina. This feat alone would have restored US credibility, without need to tortuous negotiations and widespread destructive acts like the bombing of Cambodia and Hanoi.
The US administration already knew of Chinese-Soviet tensions before the skirmishes in 1969, which confirmed them. At that period the Chinese were also giving overt signals to open up lines of communication. Kissinger himself had already made the assessment before going to China in his first visit in 1971, that its primary concern would be its own security.
Another factor that could have helped bring the negotiations to a close sooner was that although Kissinger was a master geo-strategist, he failed to take enough notice of domestic politics and how his allies would have to account for the deals they had struck to their own people. He left Thieu with no time and no room to maneuver when he forced the peace accords on him. Thieu could not prepare his people for the outcome nor did he have a say in the wording of the accords which could ameliorate its effects - till later after Saigon was bombed. Lives could have been spared, had Thieu too been given a chance to maintain some credibility before his people. The failure to get Thieu to the signing, also undermined the basis of trust between Le Duc Tho, who had agreed to the October treaty in good faith. This did little for US credibility, when it had to resort to brute force to get extra concessions when the original deal had already been struck.
Bibliography:
Henry Kissinger - The White House Years
Henry Kissinger - Years of Upheaval
Marvin Kalb & Bernard Kalb - Kissinger
Walter Isaacson - Kissinger, A Biography
Henry Kissinger - Diplomacy
Barbara Tuchman - The March of Folly
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